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9Part I
Introduction
10Summary
This dissertation contains three essays on monetary policy, dynamics of the interest rates
and international spillover patterns across economies. Each of the essays is self-contained
and independent of the others. Nevertheless, they all look from di⁄erent angles at the
transmission channels between monetary policy, asset prices and the real economy.
The objective of the ￿rst essay is to examine the e⁄ects of monetary policy and its
interaction with ￿nancial regulation within a micro-founded macroeconometric framework
for a closed economy with a heterogeneous banking system facing a period of very low
interest rates. This paper enriches the existing research on the e⁄ects of unconventional
monetary policy instruments. The original contribution comes from the analysis of the
interplay between monetary policy and banking regulation and from the examination of the
role of agents￿expectations for the e⁄ectiveness of unconventional monetary policy tools.
My main results point at a rather limited impact of the expectations. Overall, the ￿ndings
indicate that the optimal monetary policy should embrace qualitative monetary easing for
price stability, liquidity injections when addressing GDP growth and capital support to
enhance the stability of the ￿nancial system. In the presence of the lower bound, which
considerably disrupts positive e⁄ects of liquidity injections, the role of expectations for
the e⁄ects of the monetary policy becomes more important.
In the next essay of my thesis, I turn my attention to one of the transmission channels of
the monetary policy ￿interest rates ￿and argue that openness is crucial for understanding
the dynamics of the term structure. In my essay, I combine the macroeconomic viewpoint
of the term structure with a modelling strategy of empirical literature on international
business cycles and economic linkages between countries. I evaluate the yield curve by
means of a structural cointegrated vector autoregressive model nested within a no-arbitrage
a¢ ne term structure setup. The proposed model extends the term structure literature,
since it evaluates the relationship between macroeconomic aggregates and interest rates
for an open economy in a multilateral setup. In an empirical application using Swiss
data, I show that the model ￿ts well the yield curve in-sample and has a sound ability to
forecast interest rates out-of-sample. I document empirically that external macroeconomic
variables contain a lot of information that helps to explain the dynamics of the domestic
term structure. In addition, I ￿nd that the model is able to account for the expectations
hypothesis; it also replicates the empirical ￿ndings of the forward premium anomaly and
reconciles the uncovered interest rate parity implications once the model implied exchange
rate risk premia are considered.
The last essay is concerned with the dynamics of the co-movement among macro-
economic aggregates across countries. In this essay, I pursue the research question of
the degree of convergence or decoupling amongst economies. The original contribution
of my essay is to put this question into the Global VAR (GVAR) framework. Contrary
to previous studies, the model contains both macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables, and
it includes measures of ￿nancial and trade-based interdependencies between economies.
11Furthermore, it incorporates feedback between macroeconomic variables and time-varying
weights and thus accounts for the dynamic character of relations between economies. In
this essay, I report two major results. First, the development in international ￿nancial
markets and cross-border trade activity expands the transmission of shocks abroad and
ampli￿es business cycle ￿ uctuations to regions where the integration is greater, especially
as a result of asset price movements. Impulse responses of real sectors tend to support
the idea of decoupling of economies, showing evidence of slightly di⁄erent paths of eco-
nomic performance across regions. Second, ￿nancial linkages tend to substantially alter
the dynamics of the macroeconomic aggregates across economies by adding moderation
and disattachement in propagation of shocks among regions.
Zusammenfassung
In meiner Dissertation besch￿ftige ich mich mit aktuellen Fragestellungen der interna-
tionalen und monet￿ren Makro￿konomie.
Das erste Kapitel meiner Doktorarbeit, verfasst in einer Zusammenarbeit, zielt auf die
Analyse der E⁄ekte der Geldpolitik und ihrer Wechselwirkung mit der Bankregulierung
im Rahmen eines mikro￿konomisch fundierten Modells f￿r die geschlossene Wirtschaft
mit heterogenem Banksektor ab, die sich in einer Periode von niedrigen Zinsen be￿ndet.
Dieses Kapitel tr￿gt zu der wachsenden Literatur ￿ber DSGE-Modelle bei, die sich mit der
Struktur des Bankensektors befasst und dessen Auswirkung auf die Produktionswirtschaft
misst und analysiert. Die Arbeit steuert auch der zurzeit schnell wachsende Literatur
￿ber nicht konventionelle monet￿re Ma￿ nahmen der Zentralbanken neue Ideen bei. Der
Originalbeitrag bezieht sich auf die Analyse des Zusammenspiels zwischen Geldpolitik und
Bankregulierung, und insbesondere auf die Untersuchung der Rolle von Erwartungsbildung
bez￿glich der k￿nftigen Politik der Zentralbanken im Hinblick auf E⁄ektivit￿t der nicht
konventionellen geldpolitischen Instrumente.
In diesem Kapitel steht ein heterogener Bankensektor, repr￿sentiert durch Einlagen-
und Kreditbanken, im Zentrum des Models. Durch die Annahme, dass die Kreditbanken
insolvent werden k￿nnen, entsteht in der modellierten Wirtschaft ein E⁄ekt des Finanz-
hebels, der die Folgen der Schocks zu verst￿rken versucht. Die M￿glichkeit der Insolvenz
der Kreditbanken erlaubt die Wichtigkeit der Sicherheit auf dem Interbankmarkt in den
Vordergrund zu stellen und die destabilisierenden Auswirkungen der m￿glichen Liquid-
it￿tsengp￿sse zu erkunden. Des Weiteren verscha⁄t ein solcher Aufbau des Bankensektors
die M￿glichkeit, die Bedeutung der Bilanzen der Banken zu unterstreichen und die Wirk-
samkeit der ˜nderungen im Regelwerk der Bankenregulierung zu erforschen. Diese ˜n-
derungen enthalten zus￿tzliche Kapitalanforderungen f￿r Banken, einen antizyklisch fest-
gelegten Kapitalquotienten und eine Gesamtkapitalversicherung der Finanzinstitute. Ins-
gesamt fasst mein DSGE-Modell zehn strukturelle Schocks um; die Finanzschocks bestehen
aus direkten Geldspritzen (sog. "Quantitative Easing"), Wertpapierumtauschgesch￿ften
(sog. "Qualitative Easing"), direkten Krediten der Zentralbank an die Produktions￿rmen,
12Kapitalerh￿hungen f￿r die Banken und aus Besteuerung der Einlagen.
Das DSGE-Modell in diesem Kapitel ist von Preisniveaustarrheit gekennzeichnet. Es
fasst Haushalte, Banken, Produktionsunternehmen und eine Zentralbank um. Der Banken-
sektor besteht aus Einlagen- und Kreditbanken, die zusammen den Interbankmarkt dar-
stellen. Die Zentralbank f￿hrt sowohl die ￿bliche sich auf Preisstabilit￿t beziehende als
auch die nicht konventionelle Geldpolitik aus. Es wird aus Vereinfachungsgr￿nden zus￿t-
zlich angenommen, dass die Zentralbank die Rolle eine Regulierungsbeh￿rde innehat, in-
dem sie die Banken bez￿glich der Kapitalanforderungen unterrichtet und die Besteuerung
der Haushalte anordnen kann.
Die Haushalte nutzen ihre Ressourcen, um zu konsumieren oder zu investieren (anle-
gen). Sie erhalten Entgelt f￿r die geleistete Arbeit, platzieren Einlagen bei den Einlage-
banken, k￿nnen jedoch keine Kredite aufnehmen. Ihre Einlagen k￿nnen unter Umst￿nden
von der Zentralbank besteuert werden. Im stabilen Zustand des Modells (sog. "Steady
State") betr￿gt dieser Steuersatz null und er hat insofern keine weitere Auswirkung auf
die Haushalte. Ein positiver Steuersatz soll dagegen die H￿he der Bankeinlagen vermin-
dern und den Konsum anregen. In Folge der Einlagensteuer kommt eine St￿rkung der
Binnennachfrage zustande, die reell gesehen die untere Grenze f￿r den Nominalzinssatz
der Zentralbank zu umgehen vermag.
Produktionsunternehmen sind risikoneutral, legen Preise f￿r ihre Produkte fest, sind
Arbeitgeber f￿r die Haushalte und nehmen Kredite bei den Kreditbanken auf, um eigenes
Produktionskapital aufzubauen. Zum Aufbau des Kapitals k￿nnen auch Mittel von der
Zentralbank verwendet werden, sofern es den Unternehmen nicht m￿glich ist, aufgrund von
Liquidit￿tsengp￿ssen Kredite bei Banken zu bekommen. Die Preisstarrheit erfolgt durch
den Rotemberg-Kostenfaktor. Die Unternehmen sind monopolistische Konkurrenten mit
nach unten abfallenden Nachfragefunktionen. Sie produzieren gem￿￿ der Cobb-Douglas
Produktionsfunktion.
Sowohl Einlagen- als auch Kreditbanken sind risikoscheu. Einlagenbanken sammeln
Einlagen von den Haushalten und bieten den Kreditbanken Kredite auf dem Interbank-
markt. Zus￿tzlich investieren sie ihre Mittel in ein exogen bestimmtes Kapitalmarktportfo-
lio. Einlagenbanken ziehen zus￿tzlichen Nutzen aus der Unterhaltung ihres Eigenkapitals
￿ber der von der Zentralbank bestimmten Kapitalgrenze, die durch den Kapital- und den
Hebelquotienten bestimmt wird. Gleichzeitig m￿ssen Sie jedoch mit Opportunit￿tskosten
des Eigenkapitals rechnen. Das Kapital der Banken wird durch einbehaltene Gewinne
akkumuliert; ein kleiner Bestandteil des Kapitals wird als Pr￿mie in die Versicherung
eingezahlt, die auf Absicherung der ausgefallenen Kredite an die Kreditbanken abzielt.
Zum anderen wird aufgrund der Versicherung eine M￿glichkeit f￿r die Banken ge￿⁄net,
Kapitalunterst￿tzung seitens der Zentralbank zu erhalten. Diese Kapitalma￿ nahmen er-
folgen im Falle einer stark Erh￿hten Ausfallrate der Kreditbanken und Unternehmen. Die
Einlagenbanken k￿nnen von der Zentralbank zus￿tzliche Liquidit￿t bekommen; ebenso
ist es ihnen m￿glich, eine Unterst￿tzung in Form von Wertpapierumtauschgesch￿ften in
Anspruch zu nehmen. Die Kreditbanken werden analog zu den Einlagenbanken de￿niert,
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lagenbanken gew￿hrten Kredite nicht zur￿ckbezahlen.
Die Zentralbank ￿bt Geldpolitik gem￿￿ einer endogenen Zinsregel aus. In Krisenzeiten
kann sie zu "unkonventionellen" Mitteln greifen: Liquidit￿tsspritzen und Wertpapierum-
tauschgesch￿ften, die an Banken und Unternehmen weitergegeben werden k￿nnen. Zus￿t-
zlich kann die Bank eine Einlagensteuer festlegen. Es wird angenommen, dass all diese
Ma￿ nahmen in erster Linie durch Eink￿nfte aus den Versicherungspr￿mien und Steuer-
ertr￿gen erwirtschaftet werden. Insofern gelten diese Ma￿ nahmen als in￿ ationstreibend,
falls sie in ihrem Umfang ￿ber den ￿nanzierten Betrag hinausgehen.
Das Modell wird mit Hilfe von US-Daten kalibriert. Die dynamischen Eigenschaften
des Modells werden mittels einer Analyse der Impulsantworten erforscht. Dar￿ber hinaus
werden Experimente zur Untersuchung der Wirksamkeit der Geldpolitik durchgef￿hrt,
in denen Ergebnisse einer Rezession und darauf folgenden Ma￿ nahmen der Zentralbank
untersucht werden. Schlie￿ lich wird das Modell mittels einer Bayes￿ schen Methode mit
dem Metropolis Algorithmus auf Grundlage der US-Daten f￿r Produktion, Zinssatz der
Zentralbank und In￿ ation gesch￿tzt.
Der innovative Beitrag dieser Arbeit bezieht sich auf mehrere Bereiche. Zum einen, es
ist bei Weitem die umfassendste Analyse der unkonventionellen Instrumente, die einer Zen-
tralbank zur Verf￿gung stehen. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass Liquidit￿tsma￿ -
nahmen am e⁄ektivsten sind, ihre Wirkung scheint jedoch von begrenzter Dauer zu sein.
Andererseits sind Wertpapierwechselgesch￿fte best￿ndiger, f￿hren aber zu niedrigeren
Steigerung des Bruttosozialprodukts und Konsums. Kapitalzuf￿hrungen verbessern die
Stabilit￿t des Bankensystems indem sie die Solvabilit￿t der Banken und Unternehmen
st￿rken. Eine Einlagensteuer funktioniert ￿hnlich wie eine expansive Geldpolitik. Zum
zweiten, erforschen wir die E⁄ekte der Erwertungsbildung auf die Wirksamkeit der Geld-
politik, was uns erlabt, die Fragen der Glaubw￿rdigkeit und Selbstverp￿ ichtung der Zen-
tralbank zu ber￿cksichtigen. Unsere Hauptergebnisse weisen auf eine begrenzte Rolle der
Erwertungsformation f￿r die E⁄ektivit￿t der nicht konventionellen Geldpolitik hin. Wir
stellen fest, dass optimale Geldpolitik Wertpapiergesch￿fte zur Preisstabilit￿t, Liquid-
it￿tszuf￿hrungen f￿r das Wirtschaftswachstum und Kapitalzuf￿hrungen zur Steigerung
der Stabilit￿t des Finanzsystems umfassen soll. Zum dritten, ber￿cksichtigen wir die
Beschr￿nkung der Geldpolitik durch die Null-Grenze der Zinss￿tze. Diese Grenze scheint
die nicht konventionelle Geldpolitik wesentlich zu behindern; gleichzeitig tr￿gt sie dazu bei,
die Rolle der Erwartungsbildung auf die Wirksamkeit der nicht konventionellen monet￿ren
Ma￿ nahmen zu verdeutlichen.
Im n￿chsten Kapitel meiner Dissertation besch￿ftige ich mich mit einem der Trans-
missionsmechanismen f￿r die Geldpolitik, der Zinsstrukturkurve, und belege, dass Of-
fenheit der Wirtschaft von entscheidender Bedeutung f￿r das Verstehen der Dynamik
der Zinss￿tze ist. Insbesondere untersuche ich, wie die von innen und von au￿ en kom-
menden makro￿konomischen Faktoren in einer o⁄enen Wirtschaft die Bewegungen der
Zinsstrukturkurve und der Risikopr￿mien beein￿ ussen. Aufgrund der Wichtigkeit f￿r die
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hat sich die Finanzanalyse und die makro￿konomische Analyse seit langem dem Studium
der Zinsstrukturkurve zugewandt. Die meisten Finanzstudien fokussierten sich prim￿r
auf Vorhersagen der Bewegungen der Zinss￿tze und Wertpapierpreise, und verwendeten
dabei sog. latente Faktoren. Solche Modelle sind zwar von einer sehr guten Prognoseg￿te
gekennzeichnet, ihr Nachteil besteht jedoch darin, dass latenten Faktoren keine eindeutige
￿konomische Interpretation zugeordnet werden kann. Die Finanzmodelle scha⁄en es nicht,
eine Verbindung zwischen makro￿konomischen Gr￿￿ en und Zinss￿tzen, die selbst ja ein
Teil der wirtschaftlichen Umgebung sind, herzustellen. Das gilt vor allem f￿r eine o⁄ene
Wirtschaft, die sowohl von den Binnen- als auch von den Au￿ enkonjunkturzyklen abh￿ngt,
und wo die Entwicklung der Zinss￿tze von Erwartungen bez￿glich makro￿konomischer
Variablen beein￿ usst wird. In diesem Kapitel zeige ich ein Modell der Zinsstrukturkurve,
der diese Probleme anspricht und dabei eine hervorragende Prognoseg￿te aufweist.
Bereits in der makro￿konomische Analyse der Zinsstrukturkurve wurde versucht, die
Verbindung zwischen der Zinsstrukturkurve und den makro￿konomischen Gr￿￿ en zu schaf-
fen. Solche Modelle besch￿ftigen sich jedoch mit dem Fall einer geschlossenen Wirtschaft,
wo Zinss￿tze als eine inl￿ndische Angelegenheit betrachtet und ohne Anbindung an die
Au￿ enwelt modelliert werden. In meiner Arbeit schlie￿ e ich diese L￿cke, indem ich die
makro-￿konomische Betrachtung der Zinsstrukturkurve (also die Ankn￿pfung and die
makrowirtschaftlichen Variablen) mit den Modellierans￿tzen der empirischen Literatur
￿ber internationale Konjunkturzyklen vereine. Ich sch￿tze die inl￿ndische Zinsstruk-
turkurve unter Annahme wirtschaftlicher Ein￿ ￿ssen von au￿ en, indem ich die makro￿konomis-
chen Faktoren als eine kointegrierte Vektorautoregression darstelle, eingebettet in einen
a¢ nen No-Arbitrage Ansatz zur Bewertung der Zinss￿tze und verzinslichen Anleihen.
Kointegrierte Fehlerkorrekturvektorautoregressionen erlauben es von ihrem Aufbau her,
kurz- und langfristige Zusammenh￿nge zwischen makro￿konomischen und Finanz-Variablen
zu erkennen und zu modellieren. Des Weiteren erm￿glichen sie, wirtschaftliche ￿ber-
l￿ufe (sog. "Spillovers") zwischen M￿rkten, Sektoren und L￿ndern zu messen. A¢ ne
No-Arbitrage Modelle bilden eine Grundlage zur Bewertung der Zinsstrukturkurve unter
Annahme konsistenter Bewertung der Wertpapiere und Wechselwirkung wirtschaftlicher
und ￿nanzwirtschaftlicher Faktoren.
Die o⁄ene Wirtschaft wird in der kointegrierten Fehlerkorrekturvektorautoregression
modelliert, die in- (endogene) und ausl￿ndische (exogene) Variables beinhaltet. In meinem
Modell werden die wichtigsten wirtschaftlichen Gr￿￿ en zusammengefasst, und ihre En-
twicklung in ihrer Abh￿ngigkeit von aktuellen und verz￿gerten Werten der ausl￿ndischen
makro￿konomischen Aggregate bestimmt. Die ￿berl￿ufe von der Au￿ enwirtschaft wer-
den auf eine Art und Weise modelliert, die es erlaubt, eine Trennung zwischen kurz- und
langfristigen E⁄ekten durchzuf￿hren. Auf diesem Prozess der makro￿konomischen Fak-
toren baut ein a¢ nes No-Arbitrage Modell der Zinss￿tze auf. Insgesamt gew￿hrt diese
Vorgehensweise eine gewisse Flexibilit￿t, da sie das simultane Modellieren der Makro-
faktoren und Zinsen nicht vorschreibt, gleichzeitig aber erlaubt sich die R￿ckkopplung
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Der Ein￿ uss der Makrofaktoren wird dem Prinzip von No-Arbitrage untergeordnet.
Zwecks eines sparsamen Umgangs mit den Freiheitsgraden gehe ich in meiner Arbeit von
der Annahme aus, dass die Marktrisikopreisfaktoren nur von zeitgleichen Beobachtun-
gen der Variablen abh￿ngen. Sowohl in- als auch ausl￿ndische Faktoren werden bei der
Bestimmung der Marktrisikopreise einbezogen.
Die Sch￿tzung des Modells erfolgt in zwei Schritten. Erstens, die Sch￿tzer des Modell
f￿r die makro￿konomischen Faktoren werden aus dem VECX* ermittelt. Das bedeutet im
Besonderen eine Kalkulation der l￿nderspezi￿schen ausl￿ndischen Variablen, eine Auswahl
der geeigneten zeitlichen Struktur des Modells, eine Identi￿kation der langfristigen Kointe-
grationsrelationen vorausgesetzt Existenz instabiler Variablen, sowie eine Maximamwahr-
scheinlichkeitssch￿tzung unter ￿beridenti￿kationsbedingungen. Im zweiten Schritt werden
die Marktrisikoparameter durch einer Minimierung der Fehler-Quadratsumme gesch￿tzt.
Desweiteren werden die Eigenschaften des Modells im Hinblick auf seine F￿higkeit
getestet, um empirische Resultate aus der Literatur bez￿glich der Hypothese rationaler
Erwartungen und der Risikoaufschl￿ge auf dem Terminmarkt nachvollziehen zu k￿nnen.
Zum einen sch￿tze ich sog. Campbell-Shiller-Regressionen: eine Regression der Ren-
diten￿nderung auf Renditenspread und eine weitere Regression der risikoadjustierten Ren-
diten￿nderung auf den Renditenspread. Der Test bez￿glich der Risikoaufschl￿ge auf dem
Terminmarkt wird wiederum durch die Tatsache begr￿ndet, dass dieselben Faktoren die
Risikopr￿mien der Zinsstrukturkurve bestimmen, beein￿ ussen auch die Risikopr￿mien des
Devisenmarktes. Um es zu untersuchen, sch￿tze ich folgende Regressionen: eine Regres-
sion der Wechselkursentwicklung auf die Zinsdi⁄erenz zwischen In- und Ausland, sowie eine
Regression der ˜nderung im risikoadjustierten Wechselkurs auf die Zinsdi⁄erenz. Au￿ er-
dem pr￿fe ich die Dynamik des Modells, indem ich Analysen der Impulsantworten und der
Varianz der Vorhersagefehler vornehme. Durch eine "out-of-sample" Untersuchung wird
die Prognoseg￿te des Modells gesch￿tzt.
Das in diesem Kapitel vorgeschlagene Modell erweitert den Wissensstand der heuti-
gen Literatur ￿ber Zinsstrukturkurve, indem es die Dynamik der Zinsen hinsichtlich der
Auswirkungen erforscht, die durch O⁄enheit der M￿rkte bedingt sind. Meine Analyse zieht
￿konomisch relevante und statistisch signi￿kante Relationen zwischen makro￿konomischen
Variablen in Betracht und erkundet die Implikationen der externen E⁄ekte auf die Makro-
faktoren und die Zinss￿tze. In einer empirischen Anwendung auf der Basis Schweizer
Daten weise ich auf, dass das Modell imstande ist, die Zinsstrukturkurve sehr gut nachzu-
bilden, und bez￿glich der Prognoseg￿te das Nelson-Siegel-Modell schl￿gt, das selbst durch
seine exzellente Vorhersagekraft bekannt ist. Des Weiteren dokumentiere ich in meiner
Arbeit empirisch, dass die externen makro￿konomischen Faktoren sehr viele Informatione
beinhalten, die die Dynamik der Zinsstrukturkurve erl￿utern lassen.
Au￿ erdem komme ich zum Ergebnis, dass das Modell die Resultate reproduzieren
kann, die durch die Hypothese rationaler Erwartungen bedingt sind. Die Untersuchung
des Zusammenhangs zwischen Zins- und W￿hrungsrisiken ergibt, dass das Modell imstande
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Terminmarkt und der Zinsparit￿t nachzubilden.
Das letzte Kapitel meiner Dissertation besch￿ftigt sich mit Modellierung der Dy-
namik der makro￿konomischen Gr￿￿ en zwischen verschiedenen L￿ndern, d.h. mit dem
eigentlichen Prozess, der die Dynamik der Makrofaktoren aus dem zweiten Kapitel bes-
timmt. In diesem Teil meiner Dissertation bearbeite ich die Fragestellung, ob die L￿nder
oder L￿ndergruppen in wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht dazu tendieren zu entkoppeln oder ob sie
aufgrund zunehmender Globalisierung konvergieren. In den letzten Dekaden wurde die
￿konomische Entwicklung weltweit durch zwei Kr￿fte beein￿ usst. Zum einen, wurde die
Weltwirtschaft zunehmend komplexer und die Wirtschaftsprozesse begannen immer mehr
ineinander zu greifen. Im Laufe zunehmender Globalisierung erwiesen sich Nationalgren-
zen und regionale Di⁄erenzen f￿r international agierende Konzerne als immer weniger
relevant. Zum anderen rief der Prozess der steigenden ￿konomischen Selbst￿ndigkeit neue
Wirtschaftsm￿chte hervor; die aufstrebenden Wirtschaften gewannen an Bedeutung, sie
erh￿hten merklich ihren Anteil an weltweiter Produktion und Wachstum. Diese beiden
Ph￿nomene haben die Weltwirtschaft in einer entscheidenden Art und Weise gepr￿gt.
Die j￿ngsten makro￿konomischen Studien liefern keine eindeutige Erkl￿rung der Wir-
kungse⁄ekte von engeren Handels- und Finanzbeziehungen zwischen den L￿ndern. Sie
pr￿sentieren au￿ erdem widerspr￿chliche Aussagen hinsichtlich der Entwicklung und zeit-
gleichen Bewegung der makro￿konomischen Hauptvariablen. So wird beispielweise einer
engeren ￿nanziellen Ver￿ echtung oft ein h￿herer Grad am Gleichlauf der Konjunkturzyklen
aufgrund Wohlstandse⁄ekte zugeschrieben. Gleichzeitig jedoch wurde herausgefunden,
dass Finanzbeziehungen zu fallenden Korrelationen der Produktion f￿hren k￿nnen, da
sie Spezialisierung und Verteilung des Kapitals gem￿￿ Wettbewerbsvorteile zwischen den
L￿ndern unterst￿tzen. Die Studie von Kose (2008), die ein Bayes￿ sches dynamisches Mod-
ell mit latenten Faktoren verwendet, fand heraus, dass Konjunkturzyklen innerhalb der
Industrienationen und der aufstrebenden L￿nder sich ineinander ann￿hern, wohingegen
die Entwicklung zwischen den beiden Gruppen immer mehr auseinanderfallen.
Der innovative Beitrag meiner Arbeit besteht darin, nach Antwort f￿r die Frage der
wirtschaftlichen Konvergenz bzw. Divergenz in einem Globalen VektorAutoRegressiven
Modell (GVAR) zu suchen, das eine hohe Anzahl der L￿nder in der Analyse zul￿sst ohne
auf latente Faktoren zur￿ckgreifen zu m￿ssen. Im Gegensatz zu fr￿heren Studien erschlie￿ t
meine Arbeit sowohl makro￿konomische als auch ￿nanzielle Variablen und sie st￿tz sich
auf Sch￿tzungen wirtschaftlichen Abh￿ngigkeit im Hinblick auf Handelswegen und Fi-
nanzbeziehungen. Zus￿tzlich dazu, setze ich mich mit der h￿u￿gen Kritik der GVAR
Modelle auseinander, die sich auf Nutzung konstanter oder durchschnittlicher Gewich-
tungen bezieht. Ich baue zeitvariable Gewichte in das gesamte Modell ein, die mittels
eines Sub-Modells gesch￿tzt werden. Dieses Sub-Modell erm￿glicht es, Projektionen der
Gewichte herzustellen und eine R￿ckkopplung zwischen den makro￿konomischen Vari-
ablen und den Gewichten zu errichten, sodass der dynamische Charakter dieser Zwischen-
beziehung ber￿cksichtigt wird. Alles in allem ist die Einf￿hrung zeitvariabler Gewichte
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In meiner Arbeit fasst das GVAR Modell 40 L￿nder, die individuell als Vektorautore-
gressionen (VAR) dargestellt werden. Der VAR Prozess jedes Landes umfasst inl￿ndische
Variablen (endogene), l￿nderspezi￿sche ausl￿ndische (exogene) Variablen und eine globale
gemeinsame Variable (￿lpreis), wobei die letzteren zwei Posten als "weakly exogenous"
f￿r die Binnenwirtschaft im statistischen Sinne angenommen werden. Diese Spezi￿kation
erm￿glicht es, die Relationen zwischen den L￿nder auf zweifache Art und Weise zu mod-
ellieren. Zum einen, es entstehen Beziehungen zwischen endogenen, exogenen und der
globalen Variablen f￿r ein Teilmodell des einzelnen Landes; zum anderen werden Interak-
tionen zwischen den Variablen aus verschiedenen L￿ndern zugelassen, deren Ausma￿ in
der Kovarianzmatrix erfasst wird.
Die Sch￿tzung des Modells erfolgt durch Berechnung der Gewichtungen aus empirischen
Daten, die das Ausma￿ des Zusammenhangs zwischen den L￿ndern erfassen, und durch
eine separate Sch￿tzung der VAR der einzelnen L￿nder. Diese Prozedur kann angewandt
werden, wenn das globale Modell stabil ist, die Gewichte relativ klein sind und land￿ber-
greifende Kovarianz der Schocks gering bleibt. Generell erfordert die Sch￿tzung des Models
eine Konstruktion der l￿nderspezi￿schen exogenen Variablen mithilfe der zuvor berech-
neten Gewichte und eine Identi￿kation der Kointegrationsrelationen, die die gemeinsame
Bewegung der makro￿konomischen Gr￿￿ en im Modell de￿nieren.
Die Spezi￿kation der Kointegrationsverh￿ltnisse in einem GVAR-System hat einen
besonderen Ein￿ uss auf die Stabilit￿t des Systems und das Verhalten der Impulsantworten.
Aus diesem Grunde leiste ich folgender Sch￿tzungsstrategie Folge: ich ziehe verschiedene
kleinere GVAR Systeme mit unterschiedlichen Datens￿tzen in Betracht und ￿berpr￿fen
systematisch die Anzahl der Kointegrationsrelationen. Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass etwa
8% der l￿nderspezi￿schen exogenen Variablen sich in Tests als statistisch endogen erweisen,
sch￿tze ich auch Sub-Systeme ganz ohne l￿nderspezi￿sche exogene Variablen. Zus￿tzlich
vergleiche ich die Ergebnisse der Johansen-Tests fur Kointegrationsrelationen mit ARDL-
Regressionen f￿r einzelne Variablen in jedem Land. Diese Regressionen sind so aufgebaut,
dass sie ￿ber das Vorhandensein der zu vermutenden makro￿konomischen Zusammenh￿n-
gen zwischen den Variablen Aufschluss geben k￿nnen, wie zum Beispiel Produktionsl￿cke
zwischen der Binnen- und Au￿ enwirtschaft, ungedeckte Zinsparit￿t, langfristige Zinsregel
in der Geldpolitik, in- und ausl￿ndische Aktienrisikopr￿mien, langfristige Korrelationen in
der Entwicklung der Aktienm￿rkte sowie ein Zusammenhang zwischen Kreditmenge und
Produktion. Schlie￿ lich f￿hre ich mehrere Monte Carlo Analysen aus, um die Besonder-
heiten in der Performance der Kointegrationstests zu ￿berpr￿fen.
Um dynamische Eigenschaften des Modells zu untersuchen, nehme ich eine Analyse
der Impulsantworten und der Varianz der Vorhersagefehler vor. Zus￿tzlich dazu simuliere
ich im Modell kontrafaktische Situationen, bei denen ich den Ein￿ uss von verschiedenen
Gewichtungsschemata auf die Dynamik des GVAR Systems sch￿tze. Zum einen, vergleiche
ich Impulsantworten auf der Basis der gemischten Gewichtung (gemischt aus Handels-
und Finanzgewichte) aus dem Anfang, Mitte und Ende der Stichprobe. Zum anderen,
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einzusch￿tzen. Deweiteren, erstelle ich angesichts der Bedeutung der Gewichte f￿r GVAR
ein Sub-Modell f￿r Gewichte, das ich in das gesamte Modell integriere. Dieser Schritt
erm￿glicht eine genauere Erfassung der Dynamik der Gewichte und er￿⁄net die M￿glichkeit
einer R￿ckkopplung zwischen den makro￿konomischen Variablen und den Gewichten.
In meiner Arbeit berichte ￿ber zwei Hauptergebnisse. Zum einen weisen die Resul-
tate darauf hin, dass die Entwicklung in den Handels- und Finanzbeziehungen zwischen
den L￿ndern die grenz￿berschreitende Verbreitung der wirtschaftlichen Schocks erweitert
und die Konjunkturzyklen in den Regionen, die am st￿rksten Integriert sind, vor allem
infolge Preisschwankungen der Finanzm￿rkte, verst￿rkt. Impulsantworten in der reellen
Wirtschaft scheinen dagegen die Hypothese der auseinander driftenden ￿konomien zu un-
terst￿tzen, indem sie unterschiedliche Pfade der Reaktionen auf Schocks aufweisen. Zum
anderen, besagt meine Untersuchung, dass ￿nanzielle Ver￿ echtungen die Dynamik mul-
tilateraler Beziehungen ver￿ndern, indem sie mehr Moderation aber auch Entkopplung
zwischen den L￿nderregionen herbeirufen. Im Gegensatz zu der Konvergenzhypothese
scheinen die wachsenden Handels- und Finanzbeziehungen teilweise auch l￿nderspezi￿sche
Konjunkturzyklen zu verursachen.
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Unconventional Monetary Policy
and Bank Supervision
1.1 Introduction
The recent ￿nancial crisis has exempli￿ed that ￿nancial intermediaries do matter for the
propagation of shocks to the real economy. Motivated by this fact, we construct a dynamic
general equilibrium model (DSGE) that incorporates a two-sided interbank market. We
use this framework to investigate the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in an
economy with nominal rigidities that faces a period of low interest rates. Assuming that
at times of very low interest rates the usual tool kit of central bankers looses its bite,
we study the e⁄ects of unconventional monetary policy tools such as: liquidity injections
(quantitative monetary easing), asset swaps (qualitative monetary easing)1, direct lending
to ￿rms and imposing tax on money.
In this paper, we also turn our attention to the possibility of adjusting the supervisory
environment of banks. In particular, we examine e⁄ects on the economy for the case when
banks are not only constrained by a minimum capital adequacy ratio but also by a leverage
ratio which caps their ability to expand lending. Furthermore, we introduce an insurance
scheme for bank equity according to which central bank may support the banking sector
with additional funds (equity) in times of ￿nancial distress.
Our paper, however, goes beyond being a comprehensive review of the new monetary
policy tools. Having taken the banking regulation and the unconventional monetary pol-
icy under scrutiny, we formulate implications for exit strategies from the unconventional
monetary policy measures. In particular, we study how the formation of agents￿expec-
tation about the monetary policy a⁄ects the e⁄ectiveness of the central bank￿ s actions.
Our main results point at a rather limited impact of the expectations assumption on the
monetary policy. However, in the presence of a lower bound on the policy rate, which con-
1Quantitative easing is associated with creation of new money and expansion of banks￿balance sheet
whereas asset swaps of loans in exchange for government bonds alter the composition of banks￿assets in
the balance sheet but leave the balance sheet totals unchanged.
21siderably disrupts positive e⁄ects of liquidity injections for the real economy, the role of
expectations is becoming more important. Overall, our ￿ndings indicate that the optimal
monetary policy should embrace qualitative monetary easing for price stability, liquidity
injections when addressing GDP growth and capital support to enhance the stability of
the ￿nancial system.
Most workhorse general equilibrium models used in academia and central banks do
not explicitly combine relations between ￿nancial actors, credit markets and the rest of
the economy. Furthermore, models which incorporate ￿nancial frictions, starting with
Bernanke et al. (1999) and later followed by Iacoviello (2005), fail to properly account for
the cause of the recent crisis because they concentrate on the agency problem between
banks and ￿rms and emphasize the role of ￿rms￿collateral value. However, since current
economic turmoil has been magni￿ed by a near collapse of many ￿nancial institutions, we
decided to put a heterogeneous banking sector with ￿nancial frictions generated by en-
dogenous default rates, in the spirit of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), at the centre of
our model. This step allows us to accentuate the role of uncertainty in the banking system
and capture the destabilizing e⁄ects of evaporating liquidity in the interbank markets.
Recently, other papers have investigated monetary policy in models with banking sec-
tor. Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) propose a micro-founded
banking setup with an asymmetric information problem between banks and investors,
with a possibility of liquidity shocks in the interbank (wholesale) market. They analyze
only qualitative monetary policy actions in terms of direct credit market interventions by
modeling a central bank that issues government bonds to households and then lends this
capital to non-￿nancial ￿rms. Gertler and Karadi (2009) conclude that welfare accumula-
tion can be signi￿cant if central banks￿e¢ ciency costs are low. Our approach di⁄ers from
Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) in that we allow for endoge-
nously de￿ned default rates and multiple monetary tools aimed at di⁄erent agents in the
economy. Moreover, we take the formation of expectations into account when analyzing
the e⁄ects of monetary policy measures. This enables us to consider the issues of central
bank￿ s credibility and commitment to its actions.
Angeloni and Faia (2010) introduce banks that are subject to runs into their model and
explore the interplay between conventional monetary policy and bank regulation. They
￿nd that anticyclical capital requirements for banks can mitigate the e⁄ects of adverse
shocks on output and in￿ ation and postulate that the optimal monetary policy should
consist of mildly anticyclical capital requirements and the conventional monetary policy
that "leans-against-the-wind". Their analysis, however, does not explore the implica-
tions of heterogeneity of the banking sector for the monetary policy and disregards the
signi￿cance of balance sheet e⁄ects in the banking system (as pointed for instance by
Adrian et al. (2010)) for the propagation of shocks across the economy.
Recent but quickly growing part of the DSGE literature focuses on the industrial struc-
ture of the banking sector, following the Klein and Monti tradition. de Walque et al. (2009)
develop a model along the lines of Goodhart et al. (2005) and Goodhart et al. (2006)
22with a heterogenous banking sector and endogenous default probabilities acting as ￿-
nancial accelerator that generates countercyclical risk premia. Though the authors al-
low for liquidity injections, neither changes in the supervisory framework nor other un-
conventional monetary policy instruments are the subject of their analysis. Moreover,
de Walque et al. (2009) fail to account for possible interactions between the conventional
and unconventional monetary policy as their model lacks a presence of nominal rigidities.
Dib (2010) investigates how liquidity injections and/or asset swaps provided to lending
banks a⁄ect the economy. His study identi￿es disturbances in the banking sector as a sub-
stantial source of macroeconomic ￿ uctuations and economic turmoil. Gerali et al. (2010)
￿nd that an unexpected reduction in bank capital can have a signi￿cant impact on the real
economy and in particular on investment. They show that shocks that originate in the
banking sector explain a large fraction of the fall in output while macroeconomic shocks
play a smaller role. Acharya and Naqvi (2010) argue that the central bank should adopt
an anticyclical monetary policy that responds to changes in bank liquidity. Overall, from
our perspective none of those papers integrates all the necessary ingredients for a joint
analysis of the monetary policy and banking regulation of an economy constrained by very
low interest rates: heterogenous banking system, ￿nancial frictions, nominal rigidities and
a comprehensive set of the unconventional monetary policy instruments.
In this paper, we analyze various unconventional monetary policy actions and consider
di⁄erent regimes of the supervisory framework for banks. To that end, we follow calls
for a new supervisory standard have been demanded and discussed by public, researchers
and regulators in the aftermath of the crisis2 by addressing two possible changes in the
bank regulation. First, we complement the standard capital requirement for banks with
an additional one based on a leverage ratio, which so far has not been subject of the Basel
II Accord. Moreover, we consider a further modi￿cation of setting the minimum capital
ratio for banks in relation to some indicators of the macroeconomic activity in order to
mitigate procyclicality of the capital adequacy rules. Consequently, the central bank in our
model makes use of both the leverage ratio as well as the capital ratio that is a function
of the output gap. Second, we introduce an insurance scheme for banks, as proposed
for instance by Kashyap et al. (2008), in which insurance payments provide banks with
additional funds. This insurance kicks in after an occurrence of a systemic "event". We
de￿ne this "event" as a substantial increase in the credit default rates of ￿rms and banks.
In our model, the central bank may also set tax on deposits in order to overcome the
lower bound on the policy rate. Taxation of money was advocated by Buiter et al. (1999)
and Goodfriend (2000), amongst others. We consider this tax as an option of escaping
liquidity trap, in which additional increases in money stock fail to reduce interest rates
further.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The setup of the basic model is introduced
in Section 2. In Section 3, our impulse response analysis indicates that the quantitative
2See among many others ￿Annual Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium￿in the year 2008 ￿Main-
taining Stability in a Changing Financial System￿or BCBS (2009) and BCBS (2009), for instance.
23monetary policy is most e⁄ective (GDP, consumption, output, bank pro￿ts, solvency of
banks and ￿rms increase) but its impact seems to be of short duration. On the other
hand, e⁄ects of qualitative monetary easing tend to be more persistent but lead to lesser
increases in consumption and output. Equity injections to lending banks improve the
stability of the ￿nancial system by raising the solvency level of lending banks and ￿rms.
Money taxation seems to work similarly to an expansionary monetary policy.
In Section 4, we investigate the role of expectations formation for the unconventional
monetary policy and di⁄erent supervisory rules We ￿nd that regardless of the assumption
about the expectations (perfect foresight or perfect surprise) all monetary policy actions
are e⁄ective in that they reduce losses in GDP and consumption. However, quantitative
monetary actions increase the volatility of GDP and in￿ ation whereas qualitative easing
slightly reduces the variability of in￿ ation. In addition, though the existence of bank-
ing sector magni￿es business cycles, the heterogeneity of the banking sector reduces the
volatility in the economy and makes unconventional monetary policy actions more e⁄ec-
tive. Our main result suggests that the role of expectations is very limited. The impact
of qualitative easing, capital injections, and output driven capital ratio stays roughly the
same under both the assumption of perfect foresight and of an unexpected change of the
monetary policy. On the other hand, quantitative easing to banks is more e⁄ective when
it is unexpected whereas liquidity injections aimed at non-￿nancial ￿rms seem to work
better under full commitment, however, the di⁄erences tend to be relatively small. The
presence of the lower bound on the policy rate substantially diminished the positive e⁄ects
of quantitative monetary actions.
In addition to this short welfare analysis, Section 4 discusses estimation of the model
using US data and - in particular - the estimates of parameters in the Taylor-type monetary
policy rule. The last section concludes.
1.2 The baseline model
Our framework is a DSGE model with nominal rigidities. The economy is inhabited by
households, banks, non-￿nancial ￿rms and a central bank. Banking sector consists of
deposit and lending banks which interact in an interbank market. Central bank conducts
both conventional and unconventional monetary policy; as our model lacks any distinct
￿scal and supervisory authorities, we assume that the central bank takes over those roles.
In particular, it supervises banking sector through capital and leverage ratios and is able
to impose taxes on agents in the economy.
Overall, the economy is subject to various perturbations: productivity, monetary pol-
icy, quantitative and qualitative monetary easing shocks to banks and ￿rms as well as
imposing tax on money.
241.2.1 Households
Households allocate their resources to consumption Ct and investments and choose their
leisure time (1 ￿ Nt). They provide labor Nt against wage wt, place deposits Dh
t against an
interest rate rl
t with deposit banks and do not borrow. Following de Walque et al. (2009)
we impose a target in deposits
_
Dh via a quadratic disutility term3. This means that house-
holds dislike deviations of their deposits from the long-run optimal level. The households
maximization program is given by:
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t
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under the budget constraint:
Ct +
(1 ￿ Tt)Dh
t
1 + rl
t
= wtNt +
Dh
t￿1
￿t
+ ￿
f
t + (1 ￿ vb)￿b
t + (1 ￿ vl)￿l
t (1.2)
where ￿t = Pt=Pt￿1 is in￿ ation and ￿
f
t , ￿b
t, ￿l
t are pro￿ts of ￿rms, lending banks and
deposit banks, respectively. Households fully own ￿rms and they receive a share of banks
pro￿ts in line with retained earnings ratios vb and vl.
Furthermore, households may be subject to tax Tt imposed on their deposits by the
central bank. In steady state T = 0 so that it has no further implications for the optimal
choice of households. However, when set above zero, tax on deposits is supposed to
encourage additional consumption, especially when reduction of the policy rate is not
feasible any more. This mechanism works in our model due to the fact that households
have no other option of storing money but to place deposits with banks4. In e⁄ect, taxing
deposits temporally lowers the zero nominal interest rate ￿ oor which can easily be reached
in an environment of low interest rates5.
First order conditions of the households optimization problem are presented in Appen-
dix.
1.2.2 Non-￿nancial ￿rms
Entrepreneurs choose price P (i)t, labor N (i)t, capital K (i)t, loans L(i)
f
t to rebuild capital
stock and repayment rate on past borrowings ￿(i)t from the pro￿t maximization. They
3This term is necessary for technical reasons. For ￿ = 0, ￿rst order conditions in (A.2) and (A.9) give
the steady state for r
l
t leaving D
h
t undetermined. ￿ is kept very low so that the dynamics of the model are
not altered signi￿cantly by its use.
4In the real world central bank would have to take into account considerable administrative costs of
such an action. Holding large amounts of money in cash instead of in deposits would increase expenses.
In addition, making interest rates negative would create stress for lenders and people heavily depend on
interest income.
5Since T = 0 at steady state, the Friedman rule (of nominal interest rate being equal zero) is satis￿ed
when following condition between in￿ ation and representative household￿ s rate of time preference is ful￿lled:
1 = ￿=￿.
25face price adjustment costs Æ la Rotemberg which introduce a nominal rigidity into the
model.
max
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where the pro￿t is given by:
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￿￿ is the economy-wide in￿ ation rate and the parameter   measures the degree of price
stickiness. The higher  , the more sluggish is the adjustment of nominal prices;   = 0
implies ￿ exible prices. In addition, non-￿nancial ￿rms bear quadratic costs of default on
their loans6. At times of ￿nancial distress, when bank lending is scarce or di¢ cult to
obtain, central bank may step in and provide ￿rms with additional liquidity M (i)
f
t in
order to help them to build up capital needed for production.
The production sector comprises of a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms
each facing a downward-sloping demand curve for its di⁄erentiated product
Y (i)t =
￿
P (i)t
Pt
￿￿￿
Yt (1.5)
where P (i)t is the pro￿t-maximizing price consistent with production level Y (i)t.
Parameter ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between two di⁄erentiated goods. Both the
aggregate price level Pt and aggregate output Yt are beyond control of the individual ￿rm.
The aggregates for the economy are written as
Yt = K
￿
t (exp(At)Nt)
1￿￿ (1.6)
Kt = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt￿1 +
L
f
t
1 + rb
t
+
M
f
t
1 + rt
(1.7)
At = ￿aAt￿1 + "A
t (1.8)
6The expenses related to default consist of a variable part that relates to the notional of outstanding
loans in the economy,
￿
1 ￿ ￿(i)t￿1
￿ L(i)
f
t￿2
￿t￿1 , and an additional ￿xed cost,
￿
1 ￿ ￿(i)t￿1
￿
df. Linearity of cost
would imply indetermincy for (A.5); partition of cost is done in analogy to the setup of the maximization
problem for lending banks, where this partitioning allows to reconcile (A.9), (A.12) and (A.14) when
determining steady state values for r
b
t, r
l
t and it.
de Walque et al. (2009) solve this technicality by splitting the expenses related to default into non-
pecuniary costs that a⁄ect utility and pecuniary costs that impact pro￿ts. However, as they acknowledge,
this ￿ double cost￿lacks pure microfoundations. In our opinion, segmentation of the pecuniary default costs
into a ￿xed and variable portion is more appealing micro-economically.
26where ￿rms produce output according to a Cobb-Douglas function with At functioning
as an aggregate productivity shock. Equation (1.7) describes the law of motion for capital
which depreciates at rate ￿. Firms can obtain loans from lending banks L
f
t at interest rate
rb
t or receive liquidity from the central bank M
f
t at times of ￿nancial distress. Since ￿rms
are fully owned by households, their discount factor is given by:
_
￿t+s = ￿s Ct
Ct+s
(1.9)
First order conditions are solved assuming a symmetric equilibrium and are presented
in Appendix.
1.2.3 Banks
When modeling the banking sector we lean on de Walque et al. (2009) and Dib (2010)
and introduce deposit banks and lending banks. Both types of banks are risk-averse.
Deposit banks
Deposit banks collect deposits from households Dl
t and provide lending banks with loans
Dbs
t on the interbank market. They also allocate their resources to a market book
_
B
l
,
which is assumed to be exogenous and to yield a return
_
￿. In addition, deposit banks
derive utility from holding own funds Fl
t above the capital requirement k and the leverage
limit h - both imposed by the central bank - but they face opportunity costs rtFl
t of
maintaining these funds. We de￿ne leverage ratio as an inverse of the leverage multiple
which is a ratio of total assets to equity. Contrary to the capital ratio, leverage ratio does
not involve any riskiness weights of the assets and it serves as a primal measure of the
sheer size of the balance sheet. In our basic setup we ￿rst assume that the central bank
does not care about leverage ratio (bFl = 0); then, in Section 4, we present simulation
results for the case when leverage ratio does become an instrument of ￿nancial regulation.
The maximization program of the deposit banks is:
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under the constraints:
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t￿1
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+ vl￿l
t (1.12)
Loans on the interbank market are prone to lending banks￿default rate (1 ￿ ￿t). De-
posit banks￿own funds increase by a share of pro￿ts that are not redistributed to house-
holds vl￿l
t; a small proportion of funds ￿l is put into an insurance scheme run by the
central bank. A fraction ￿l of the lending banks￿defaulted amount is paid back from this
insurance, decreasing the losses su⁄ered from impaired loans on the interbank market. An-
other portion of the insurance payout, provided by the central bank, is aimed to increase
equity of the deposit banks by $l. This insurance payout kicks in only if the solvency of
the lending banks deteriorates notably.
Furthermore, deposit banks can exchange a portion of their lending for a risk-free asset
xl
t as a measure of so called qualitative easing policy conducted by the central bank. The
quantitative policy actions, i.e. liquidity injections, operate through Ml
t. We assume that
the portion of assets xl
t under the swap agreement is impaired and would not pay any
return otherwise.
First order conditions are presented in Appendix.
Lending banks
Equivalently to deposit banks, lending banks derive additional utility from holding extra
funds Fb
t (above the levels implied by the capital and leverage ratios) at the opportunity
cost of rtFb
t . The maximization program of lending banks is given by:
max
Dbd
t ;Lb
t;￿t
1 X
s=0
Et
_
￿t+s
8
> > <
> > :
log
￿
￿b
t+s
￿
+ dFb
￿
Fb
t+s ￿ k
￿
wb ￿
Lb
t+s ￿ xb
t+s
￿
+
_
w
_
B
b
￿￿
+bFb
￿
Fb
t+s ￿ h
￿
Lb
t+s +
_
B
b
￿￿
9
> > =
> > ;
(1.13)
under the constraints:
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Lending banks provide loans to the ￿rms Lb
t, borrow from deposit banks Dbd
t , invest in
an exogenous market book
_
B
b
at yield of
_
￿ and choose their optimal repayment rate ￿t. In
addition, lending banks can receive liquidity injections from the central bank Mb
t (quan-
28titative easing) or swap a fraction of their loans against a risk-free asset xb
t (qualitative
easing). We assume that xb
t is impaired in that it pays no return when retained in the loan
portfolio. Lending banks face pecuniary costs of default represented by a quadratic cost
function !
2
￿
(1 ￿ ￿t￿1)
￿
Dbd
t￿2
￿t￿1 + d￿
￿￿2
. Quadratic formulation prevents indeterminacy in
the ￿rst order condition (A.14); d￿ stands for a ￿xed costs of default which are independent
from the total amount of the defaulted interbank loans (1 ￿ ￿t￿1)
Dbd
t￿2
￿t￿1 .
Similarly to deposit banks lending banks increase own funds by a share of pro￿ts that
are not redistributed to households vb￿b
t; a small proportion of funds ￿b is put into an
insurance scheme, which is motivated by the fact that lending banks face losses on their
loans to ￿rms in accordance with ￿rms￿defaults ratio (1 ￿ ￿t). A fraction ￿b of the ￿rms￿
defaulted amount is reimbursed by the insurance. In case of substantially increasing default
rate among ￿rms, lending banks may be supported by the equity capital $b provided by
the central bank.
First order conditions are presented in Appendix.
1.2.4 Central bank
The monetary authority conducts its policy according to a Taylor-type policy rule:
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At times of ￿nancial distress it can use unconventional instruments: liquidity injections
M
(￿)
t (quantitative easing) and/or qualitative monetary easing x
(￿)
t aimed at supporting the
both types of banks and ￿rms. We model all unconventional monetary tools as AR(1)
processes:
xl
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t￿1 + "xl
t (1.17)
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M
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f
t￿1 + "Mf
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It is assumed that the deposit, interbank and commercial loan markets clear in the
long run. However, in the short run the central bank may inject liquidity such that:
Ml
t = Dl
t ￿ Dh
t (1.22)
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t ￿ Dbd
t (1.23)
M
f
t = L
f
t ￿ Lb
t (1.24)
In addition, the central bank may impose tax on deposit holdings in order to overcome
the zero bound on the policy interest rate. We model this tax rate as an AR(1) process
with the steady state value T = 0 :
Tt = ￿TTt￿1 + "T
t (1.25)
By assumption, the central bank ￿nances liquidity injections, capital injections to
banks, asset swaps and payo⁄s from the insurance scheme by collecting contributions
from banks and by raising the deposit tax. Therefore, any liquidity creation beyond the
￿nanced amount is equivalent to expansion of the monetary base in the economy and thus
generates in￿ ation.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Calibration
In the calibration we push our model towards a steady state with very low interest rates
(around 0:5%) and yields on the market book (1%) in order to simulate an environment
of low asset returns.
Real sector
We normalize employment to 0:2 and use Cobb-Douglas production function with labor
share = 2=3. We utilize the assumption that capital stock is 10 times higher than produc-
tion and set depreciation rate at 3%. This implies an investment ratio to output of 0:3 and
allows us to avoid a negative search cost ￿ on the defaulted amount. ￿a, the autoregression
coe¢ cient for the technology equation (1.8), is equal 0:95 which is a standard in the RBC
literature.
We set the value for the default rate of ￿rms equal 5% (an therefore ￿t = 0:95 in
steady state) which is inferred from the US courts and the Bureau of Labor Statistics
quarterly pre-crisis data on business bankruptcies. The data are based on the number
of non-￿nancial corporations that go bankrupt. This enables us to deduct values for ￿
(￿rms default cost parameter) and
_
m (households leisure utility parameter). Both ￿rms
￿xed default cost parameter and the smoothing parameter for deposits are set close to 0
(￿ = 0:01;df = 0:001), in order to eschew any dynamic e⁄ects (positive ￿ enforces ￿nding a
steady state value for Dh
t ). We also introduce a penalty parameter for setting prices above
the economy-wide level of 50, which we obtain by comparing the elasticity of in￿ ation to
the real marginal cost in our model with the slope coe¢ cient of the log-linear Phillips
30curve using a Calvo approach. Expressed as
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿ , where ￿ is the probability of not
resetting the price, this slope coe¢ cient is found in the literature to be around 0:75 (see
discussion of the frequency of price adjustment in Faia and Monacelli (2007), for instance).
Banking sector
In order to simulate the environment of low interest rates we set the deposit rate at
_
r
l = 0:35% and assume that the market book o⁄ers a mere ￿ = 1%, which lies below
the average quarterly return of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index from 1980Q1 to
2010Q3 (1:96%). However, this assumption may actually be somehow questionable due to
possible assets bubbles when interest rates, i.e. borrowing costs are extremely low.
We set lending banks default rate ￿ = 0:98 which is derived from the pre-crisis data
provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. These data encompasses the
number of bank failures. Furthermore, when calibrating the model we impose Dl=Lb to
be around 2, Dbd=Lb = Dbs=Lbaround 0:5, which is in line with pre-crisis statistics of the
Federal Reserve System. The market book for each bank equals ￿rm loans:
_
B
b
=
_
B
l
= Lb.
The weights of bank assets are aligned to the Basel agreement: wb = 0:8 and wl = 0:05.
Capital ratio is set at k = 8% and leverage ratio at h = 4%. Banks are supposed to allocate
half of their pro￿ts to own funds (vb = vl = 0:5) and the remaining 50% are distributed
to the households. The insurance scheme is assumed to enable banks to recover 80% of
bad loans; in exchange, banks must pay premia of around 6￿7% of their funds (￿b = 0:06
and ￿l = 0:07, due to di⁄erences in default rates for ￿rms and lending banks) in order to
bene￿t from this provision. The parameter of ￿xed default costs for lending banks d￿ is
equal to 0:001.
Other parameters - default cost parameter ! and own funds utility parameters for both
bank types, dFb , dFl , bFb and bFl - are inferred from the restrictions mentioned above.
Central bank
Taylor-type monetary policy rule contains parameters that are set according to speci￿-
cations used in the literature and satisfy the Taylor rule principle (￿r = 0:7, Qp = 1:2,
Qy = 0:05). Regression parameters for all unconventional monetary tools (￿(￿)) are set to
0:85.
1.3.2 Impulse responses
In this section we examine dynamic properties of our model by means of impulse response
analysis. We investigate how shocks propagate through the system and a⁄ect the key
macroeconomic variables. Our analysis starts with a short review of impulse responses
to innovations in technology and monetary policy and then it passes on to inspection of
shocks induced by unconventional monetary policy actions.
31Standard analysis: technology and monetary policy
Figure A.1 in Appendix shows that a positive technology shock has positive e⁄ects on
consumption, capital, output and GDP. In the short run all interest rates and in￿ ation
increase, but after about 10 periods they all fall below their initial steady state levels.
Interbank, deposit and ￿rms￿lending rates react in a less pronounced way than the policy
rate due to the adjustment costs of changing those rates.
Following the positive technology shock, demand for capital increases and is matched
by a rising supply of loans to the ￿rms. On the impact of the shock, pro￿ts of banks
grow; however, ￿rms￿pro￿ts initially decline before returning to their pre-shock steady
state level. This is due to rising capital costs caused by more expensive loans which also
drives up the marginal cost. On the one hand, increase in the borrowing rate for capital
reduces ￿rms￿pro￿ts. On the other hand, ￿rms are subject to constraints set by price
adjustment cost when trying to pass on the loan burden to consumers. Finally, positive
technology shock leads to falling default rates for ￿rms and lending banks; interest rates
and in￿ ation decrease in the long-run as a result of higher productivity and output.
When compared to Dib (2010), we observe responses to the technology shock in our
model to be generally in line with his results. Notable exceptions are in￿ ation and the
policy rate where slightly di⁄erent patterns of reaction can be observed. Dib (2010) ￿nds
that both fall immediately after the shock occurs and return gradually to their initial
steady state levels thereafter. Yet, it seems to be reasonable that after a positive technology
shock interest rates should increase. Two arguments speak in favor for this notion. First,
central bank would increase its policy rate to close the output gap; second, higher demand
for ￿rm loans leads to an increase in interbank borrowing and thus to a rising demand for
deposits. Consequently, the interest rates for these aggregates should increase.
As shown in Figure A.2 in Appendix, an expansionary monetary policy shock produces
persistent moves in in￿ ation and interest rates (except for the policy rate itself whose
shock we model as an AR(1) process). After the monetary policy shock, consumption
and capital increase; output stays almost unchanged; GDP grows, however, the e⁄ects
on it seem to fade away relatively quickly. On the impact of the expansionary monetary
policy shock banks￿pro￿ts expand; in case of lending banks this is due to rising demand
for commercial loans and improving solvency within ￿rms. On the other hand, deposit
banks￿pro￿ts increase. This is due to the fact that the interest rate for their liabilities is
decreasing stronger than the interest rate for their assets. Reaction of in￿ ation is somehow
puzzling as we would expect it to rise after a decrease in the policy rate. This is presumably
attributable to the model setup in which production sector simultaneously marks up its
production. Falling interest rates throughout the economy contribute to the reduction
in marginal cost for ￿rms, i.e. reduction in capital costs weights out rising labor cost.
However, ￿rms￿pro￿ts tend to decrease temporarily on the impact of the monetary policy
shock as initially the build-up in capital is not matched by an increase in output.
Dib (2010)￿ s analysis points to decreasing industrial loans and a short-run increase
32in the ￿rms￿borrowing rate after the expansionary monetary policy rate shock hits the
economy. In our model, however, this shock leads to a fall in the borrowing rate along
with an increased demand for ￿rms￿loans. We interpret our result as more intuitive since
it recon￿rms the expectation of falling interest rates throughout the whole economy after
a cut in the policy rate.
Unconventional monetary policy
Quantitative monetary easing to banks and ￿rms Figure 1.1 displays impulse
responses after a liquidity injection to lending banks. This shock tends to have only tem-
porary e⁄ects on economic aggregates. It decreases the risk-free rate, in￿ ation, ￿rms￿
borrowing rate, deposit rate and the interbank interest rate. Figure 1.1 shows that fol-
lowing a liquidity shock, output and GDP rise, yet their reaction - like for most of the
variables - is not persistent. This e⁄ect is due to the persistence of liquidity itself as it is
an AR(1) process with lag parameter ￿Mb. Since we assume that in the steady state the
interbank market clears, liquidity injections are equal to zero in the long run. Imbalances
in the interbank market after the liquidity shock are then quickly forced to equilibrium by
the movement in the interbank interest rate and an adjustment in default rate of lending
banks. Liquidity injection to lending banks seems to crowd out interbank loans and to
improve lending bank pro￿ts as they choose to default on a portion of their interbank
borrowing given cheaper re￿nancing from the central bank. Deposit bank pro￿ts improve
as well due to falling deposit rates.
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Figure 1.1: Responses to positive quantitative monetary easing shock to lending banks.
33Our results generally recon￿rm the ￿ndings of Dib (2010). Output, consumption,
in￿ ation, policy rate and other aggregates show the same pattern of behavior after the
shock, however, they di⁄er in persistence.
Liquidity injections to deposit banks serve as an instrument of supporting interbank
market by strengthening the liquidity position of deposit banks (for instance, in case
of signi￿cant deposit withdrawals). As shown in Figure A.3 in Appendix such liquidity
injections to deposit banks generate responses that are quite similar to those following a
quantitative monetary easing shock to lending banks. Yet its impact on GDP, consumption
and in part on output tends to be of limited duration.
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Figure 1.2: Responses to positive quantitative monetary easing shock to ￿rms.
Notable is also a non-negative e⁄ect, as opposed to quantitative easing to lending
banks, on lending bank default rate. In addition, even though Ml
t is injected at rt > rl
t
and thus above the initial re￿nancing cost, deposit bank pro￿ts rise and so does their
capital, which by de￿nition is partly cumulated from retained earnings. Lowering the
price of this liquidity injection even further would, of course, have a positive in￿ uence on
deposit bank pro￿ts, leaving its impact on other aggregates unchanged.
As illustrated in Figure 1.2, liquidity supply directed at ￿rms improves output but has
only a limited impact on GDP and consumption. When the central bank lends directly
to ￿rms, this action tends to crowd out bank loans to ￿rms and to decrease lending on
the interbank market. Motivated by cheaper ￿nancing, ￿rms decide to default on some
of its bank loans which in turn forces some of the lending banks to dishonor their debt.
Altogether, impact to GDP is almost nil; only capital Kt and lending banks capital Fb
t
34increase but all other components fall.
Qualitative monetary easing to banks Responses to a qualitative easing shock to
banks are presented in Figures 1.3 and A.4 in Appendix. Contrary to quantitative easing,
responses are mostly persistent. As a result of qualitative easing shock, policy rate and
all other interest rates decrease, and in￿ ation follows the same pattern of behavior.
The persistence of responses to the positive qualitative monetary easing shock in in-
￿ ation, policy rate and the deposit rate does not stand in line with Dib (2010). This is
probably due, to the way how qualitative (and quantitative) monetary actions enter into
his model: it happens through a Leontief loan production function, where lending banks
either use interbank borrowing plus liquidity injections or bank capital plus liquidity re-
ceived from asset swaps. While in our paper after a qualitative shock interest rates fall,
loan supply increases, marginal cost decreases and thereby reduces in￿ ationary pressure,
Dib￿ s ￿ndings show almost no increase in loan supply accompanied by rising interest rates
and an increase in in￿ ation.
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Figure 1.3: Responses to positive qualitative monetary easing shock to lending banks.
In our setup, the e⁄ects of assets swap tend to resemble the results for the traditional
monetary policy shocks, with the same de￿ ationary mechanism as before. As lending
banks are relieved from impaired loans, they pick up on more lending causing the ￿rms￿
borrowing rate to go down. As a result ￿rms accumulate more capital, decide to default
less on their lending, increase output (in the long run) and adjust their prices downwards
in order to stimulate demand. Eventually, risk-free rate falls due to the fact that the
35Taylor rule according to which monetary policy is conducted puts more weight on in￿ ation
changes than on the output ￿ uctuations.
All variables bar loans to lending banks react similarly to the quantitative easing aimed
at deposit banks as they did in case of this type of central bank action addressed at the
lending banks (see Figure A.4 in Appendix). The possibility for deposit banks to swap
their interbank loans has the same impact on the balance sheet of deposit bank as swaps
of ￿rm loans have on the balance sheet of lending banks: when the central bank absorbs
impaired loans from banks￿balance sheet (and thus improves deposit banks capital ratio),
they instantly expand their lending on the interbank market at a lower price which, in
turn, enhances solvency of lending banks.
When we compare the impulse responses for both types of banks, we observe that the
solvency of ￿rms, in both cases, increases remarkably in the short run and remains above
its steady state in the medium to long run. However, the solvency of lending banks is
decreasing when lending banks are allowed to swap their assets, but is strongly increasing
in the short run and it remains above its steady state over the long horizon when deposit
banks are the pro￿teers of the qualitative easing. This result indicates that qualitative
monetary easing measures aimed at deposit banks can improve the stability of the ￿nancial
system.
Capital insurance payments to banks As Figure 1.4 shows, insurance payout to
lending banks￿improves their solvency and has a persistent e⁄ect on the economy. It also
increases loans to ￿rms, raises their production capital marginally and that in turn leads
to a raise in output. Since the Taylor rule is driven by output and in￿ ation, the growth
of output results in an increase of the policy rate. The subsequent rising in interest rates
have an ambiguous impact on economy: they increase the marginal cost of capital for ￿rms
which are now trying to substitute capital with labor; in addition, higher interest rates
make consumption less desirable and therefore push households towards more labor supply
resulting in lower wage. As marginal cost increases, ￿rms mark up the prices letting policy
interest rate to climb up even further. As commercial loan costs pick up ￿rms choose to
default on some of their debt. Deposit and lending banks pro￿ts fall since in steady state
their liabilities (deposits and interbank loans) outweigh their assets (interbank loans and
loans to ￿rms) in absolute terms, which leads to losses in case of rising interest rates.
We observe in Figure A.5 in Appendix that a similar mechanism is at work in case
of an increase in deposit banks￿ equity. Generally, the responses tend towards rising
interest rates, in￿ ation and marginal cost of production whereas consumption, wage and
production capital tend to fall. However, after an initial pick-up in credit supply to the
economy, loans tend to fall in both real and ￿nancial sectors and as the level of interest
rates raises, both ￿rms and lending banks choose to default on more of their debt. The
marginal increase in GDP seems to result from a small rise in the deposit banks￿capital,
as other components of GDP tend to fall.
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Figure 1.4: Responses to positive capital shock to lending banks.
Deposit tax Introducing a tax of 0:1% on deposits induces an expected fall in deposits
but it otherwise has a strong positive impact on the economy. It raises GDP and output
quite persistently, curbs interest rates and in￿ ation and improves solvency rates of both
￿rms and lending banks. It encourages more lending and strengthens banks￿capital and
pro￿ts.
Summing up, in our framework qualitative monetary easing impulses tend to produce
more persistent changes in aggregates and their impact is similar to an expansionary
monetary policy. A quantitative easing shock is likely to be more e⁄ective in the short
run (in terms of changes in output and GDP) but does not seem to a⁄ect variables in
the long run. It also turns out that a positive liquidity shock bene￿ts both lending and
deposit banks regardless of type of bank this action was initially aimed at. Qualitative and
quantitative actions aimed solely at saving banks lead to higher solvency rates for lending
banks suggesting better ￿nancial stability e⁄ects on the economy. However, liquidity
injections tend to put more short-term strain on ￿rms￿ pro￿ts than it is the case for
qualitative easing or expansionary monetary policy shocks.
Capital injections to banks in form of insurance payments tend to raise output and
GDP but they also contribute to an increase in interest rates and in￿ ation. Their impact
on default rates is mixed. Imposing a tax rate on deposits lower interest rates, boosts
GDP, output and pro￿ts but decreases consumption.
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Figure 1.5: Responses to positive deposit tax shock.
1.4 Experiments
In this section we intend to simulate crisis conditions and then consider the role of central
bank￿ s instruments of unconventional monetary policy in moderating the crisis.
We conduct experiments with two versions of our model: the basic one, where default
rates are endogenously chosen by ￿rms and lending banks and another version in which
default rates are exogenously given as AR(1) processes:
￿t = ￿￿￿t￿1 + "￿
t (1.26)
￿t = ￿￿￿t￿1 + "￿
t (1.27)
The timeline looks as follows: in period one a shock that introduces a downturn of the
economy occurs. In the ￿rst scenario it is a two standard deviations negative productivity
shock; in the second version of the model with exogenous default rates we let the ￿rms￿
and lending banks￿solvency ratios fall by 2:5% and 5% respectively. This is supposed to
replicate the origin of the ongoing ￿nancial crisis. In period two central bank steps in with
its unconventional policy actions. We assume that in each case it commits 5% of GDP into
its unconventional policy tools. We then evaluate the welfare e⁄ects simply by comparing
present values of future consumption and GDP once central bank anti-crisis actions have
been put in place. In particular, we take into account:
38￿ liquidity injections to banks and ￿rms,
￿ asset swaps with both types of banks,
￿ switching the regulatory regime to the environment where capital ratio k is a function
of output gap such that:
(1 + kt) = (1 + k)
￿
Yt
Yt￿1
￿Qk
exp
￿
"k
t
￿
(1.28)
￿ direct capital injections to lending and deposit banks,
￿ switching the regulatory regime to the environment with leverage ratio h.
1.4.1 Perfect foresight of monetary policy
In the ￿rst case we run experiments in a deterministic context. We assume that agents
have full foresight, they know when a shock is going to occur and how the central bank
is going to react to it. Consequently, agents can specify in advance what actions they
want to take in future given the shock and the central bank commitment to a particular
monetary policy measure. In terms of computation, accounting for perfect foresight of
monetary policy corresponds to running a single dynare ￿le with economy entering a crisis
in period one (either negative technology shock or a positive innovation in default rates of
lending banks and ￿rms) and a monetary policy action occurring at some time thereafter.
Table 1.1 presents results for our basic model with endogenous default rates. It reveals
that all unconventional policy measures seem to be e⁄ective. With a notable exception of
qualitative instruments, all policy actions mitigate adverse e⁄ects of a negative productiv-
ity shock on GDP and consumption7. Liquidity injections to ￿rms seem to work best. The
￿ ipside of unconventional policy actions is the increased volatility of GDP and in￿ ation,
at least when quantitative monetary actions are considered. On the other hand, none of
the unconventional policy measures tends to impact consumption volatility negatively.
Table A.1 in Appendix shows a summary for the version of our model with exogenous
default rates. Here, we allow default rates for ￿rms and lending banks to fall by 2:5 and
5 percent, respectively. Again, all central bank policy actions tend to reduce negative
impact on GDP and consumption. Quantitative easing to banks contributes to the rising
7The impact of both the quantitative and qualitative monetary policy depends, of course, not only on
the amount of money devoted to those measures but also on their price. In our model, we assume that
the policy rate, rt, de￿nes the cost of liquidity injections and the return of asset swaps (both types of
the unconventional monetary policy actions have di⁄erent balance sheet e⁄ects, since liquidity injections
a⁄ect liabilities whereas qualitative easing a⁄ects assets). If the central bank would use a higher markup,
it would enhance the impact of the qualitative easing and dampen the e⁄ects of liquidity injections. Now,
comparing how both instruments of the central bank perform in our experiments, we conclude that the
impact of qualitative easing is more sensitive to conditions at which the central bank o⁄ers it rather than
to the amount of money that is commited. It is apparent that for an economy facing a period of low
interest rates liquidity injections are more desirable that asset swaps as long as the central bank deploys
its policy instruments at market prices.
39Table 1.1: GDP and consumption loss for a model with endogenous solvency rates
basis scenario Mb
t +Ml
t M
f
t xb
t+xl
t k(Y ) $bFb
t +$lFl
t
regulatory regime without leverage ratio (bFb = bFl = 0)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -17.23% -8.80% -8.24% -17.10% -16.98% -16.51%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.556% 1.237% 1.200% 0.555% 0.549% 0.533%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -10.95% -7.98% -7.43% -10.90% -10.89% -10.98%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.180% 0.136% 0.141% 0.179% 0.179% 0.181%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.042% 0.723% 1.041% 0.041% 0.058% 0.043%
regulatory regime with leverage ratio (bFb = bFl = 10)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -17.21% -10.02% -5.91% -16.64% -16.97% -16.53%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.554% 1.213% 1.171% 0.544% 0.547% 0.531%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -10.94% -8.51% -6.81% -10.73% -10.88% -10.98%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.180% 0.145% 0.152% 0.176% 0.179% 0.181%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.031% 0.339% 0.816% 0.031% 0.041% 0.032%
Note: Table shows present value of GDP and consumption loss as well as variation in GDP, consumption
and in￿ ation rate after positive shocks to default rates and subsequent central bank actions. First
column shows results for a basis scenario consisting of a negative two standard deviations technology
shock in a model with endogenous solvency rates. Consequent columns present results of quantitative
easing to banks, quantitative easing to ￿rms, qualitative easing to banks, regime switch to output driven
capital ratio and capital injection to banks, respectively, amounting to 5% of GDP each. T = 30.
volatility of GDP and in￿ ation whereas the same policy measure aimed at non-￿nancial
￿rms moderates both the downturn and the variability of GDP. In addition, making de-
fault rates exogenous seems to smooth GDP but it introduces slightly more variation into
consumption and in￿ ation.
In the regulatory regime with leverage ratio, results stay broadly in line with those
from the scenarios without limits on bank leverage (both in case of endogenous as well
as of exogenous default rates). It is worth noticing, that increased requirements on bank
capital tend to make recessions less severe and the GDP less volatile.
When we look at in￿ ation variability, liquidity injections tend to substantially increase
the volatility of in￿ ation whereas qualitative easing actions slightly reduce it. It seems
that the central bank that is keen on using unconventional policy tools faces a di¢ cult
task of ￿nding a proper mix of its policy instruments and it has to take into account
the ability of those tools to reverse recession, their destabilizing impact on some of the
macroeconomic aggregates and the horizon of the monetary policy. Results from Tables
1.1 and 1.2 suggest, that the central bank that puts more weight on targeting in￿ ation
should use more qualitative easing tools. On the other hand, central bank which primarily
focuses on GDP should apply quantitative easing instruments. Therefore, the in￿ ation
40targeting central bank would observe a higher output gap when trying to manage in￿ ation
in the short run whereas central bank that stabilizes GDP in the long run would produce
an excessive in￿ ation variability8.
Table A.2 in Appendix reports results for a model with endogenous solvency rates and
a homogenous banking sector. We ￿nd that shutting down one part of the banking sector
makes recessions more severe in terms of GDP and consumption loss. Standard deviation
of GDP and consumption rises whereas the variability of in￿ ation decreases slightly. We
conclude that having a heterogenous banking sector enhances economy￿ s resilience against
economic downturns and moderates the variation in the most macroeconomic aggregates.
In addition, the heterogeneity of banks also improves the e⁄ects of monetary policy actions.
1.4.2 Unexpected change in monetary policy
Table 1.2: GDP and consumption loss for a model with endogenous solvency rates
basis scenario Mb
t +Ml
t M
f
t xb
t+xl
t $bFb
t +$lFl
t
regulatory regime without leverage ratio (bFb = bFl = 0)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -17.23% -8.48% -6.56% -17.09% -16.50%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.556% 1.209% 1.156% 0.554% 0.533%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -10.95% -7.95% -7.00% -10.90% -10.98%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.180% 0.133% 0.142% 0.179% 0.181%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.042% 0.580% 0.715% 0.040% 0.043%
regulatory regime with leverage ratio (bFb = bFl = 10)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -17.20% -10.35% -5.38% -16.61% -16.53%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.554% 1.205% 1.152% 0.542% 0.532%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -10.94% -8.64% -6.75% -10.72% -10.99%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.180% 0.145% 0.153% 0.176% 0.181%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.031% 0.239% 0.850% 0.030% 0.032%
Note: Table shows present value of GDP and consumption loss as well as variation in GDP, consumption
and in￿ ation rate after positive shocks to default rates and subsequent central bank actions. First
column shows results for a basis scenario consisting of a negative two standard deviations technology
shock; consequent columns present results of quantitative easing to banks, quantitative easing to ￿rms,
qualitative easing to banks and capital injection to banks, respectively, amounting to 5% of GDP each. T
= 30. Model with endogenous solvency rates.
Now we turn our attention to a case in which monetary policy actions are not pre-
determined. We assume that the central bank did not commit to unconventional monetary
policy actions so that they cannot be foreseen by the agents of the economy before they
8See discussion on the policy horizon in Smets (2003).
41occur.
We simulate such a setup by letting the economy enter a recession at t = 1 in the ￿rst
dynare ￿le dynare ￿le but not allowing for any unconventional monetary policy action to
take place at that time. Then we start another dynare ￿le that uses values of variables
from the former dynare ￿le as initial values. However, this new dynare ￿le allows for
some unconventional monetary policy action to enter the model from the very beginning
of the simulation. Had no monetary policy action occurred in the second ￿le, running such
an experiment would produce exactly the same impulse responses as for the basic crisis
scenarios used in the case of the perfect foresight. Therefore, we see in Table A.1 that the
results for the basic scenario are the same as in the world with perfect monetary policy
foresight. In addition, results for di⁄erent monetary policy actions seem to resemble the
outcome in the previous case of perfect foresight: we observe that most unconventional
policy instruments tend to moderate recessions by limiting losses in GDP and consumption.
Their impact on variability of the macroeconomic aggregates reveals similar patterns of
increased volatility of GDP and in￿ ation.
Table 1.3: GDP and consumption loss for a model with endogenous solvency rates with
zero-bound on the policy rate
expected change unexpected change
basis scenario Mb
t +Ml
t M
f
t Mb
t +Ml
t M
f
t
regulatory regime without leverage ratio (bFb = bFl = 0)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -17.23% -11.30% -10.18% -10.76% -9.00%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.556% 1.234% 1.195% 1.228% 1.176%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -10.95% -8.93% -8.49% -8.81% -8.21%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.180% 0.150% 0.162% 0.148% 0.167%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.042% 0.575% 0.747% 0.758% 0.992%
regulatory regime with leverage ratio (bFb = bFl = 10)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -17.21% -10.55% -8.15% -10.41% -10.19%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.554% 1.215% 1.174% 1.206% 0.952%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -10.94% -8.69% -7.94% -8.67% -8.58%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.180% 0.148% 0.171% 0.146% 0.159%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.031% 0.314% 0.971% 0.237% 0.651%
Note: Table shows present value of GDP and consumption loss as well as variation in GDP, consumption
and in￿ ation rate after positive shocks to default rates and subsequent central bank actions. First
column shows results for a basis scenario consisting of a negative two standard deviations technology
shock; consequent columns present results of quantitative easing to banks and ￿rms, under perfect
foresight or unexpected change in the monetary policy, respectively, amounting to 5% of GDP each. T =
30. Model with endogenous solvency rates.
42When comparing Table 1.2 with Table 1.1 we conclude that the e⁄ects of qualitative
easing and capital injections are generally insensitive to the assumption on how agents
form their expectations about future monetary policy actions. On the other hand, uncer-
tainty about central bank￿ s unconventional policy actions seems to matter more in case
of liquidity injections. In particular, quantitative easing to non-￿nancial ￿rms is more
e⁄ective when it is coming unexpectedly whereas liquidity injections aimed at banks seem
to work the same way as under full commitment. However, this tendency for quantitative
easing to ￿rms is reversed when additional supervisory requirements regarding the leverage
ratio are considered. Yet as observed in the case of perfect foresight, liquidity injections to
banks and ￿rms have a stronger e⁄ect on GDP and consumption when the leverage ratio
of banks is not targeted.
Table A.3 in Appendix shows results of the unexpected unconventional policy actions
in a model with exogenous solvency rates. Here, both direct lending to ￿rms (best) and
banks (second best) outperform other unconventional monetary policies in terms of GDP
(7.52% and -1.48% respectively) and consumption smoothing (1.74% and -0.20% respec-
tively). However, they also increase variation in consumption and in￿ ation. Contrary to
capital injections or qualitative monetary actions, quantitative policy instruments are more
e⁄ective when unexpected by the agents of the economy; they tend to soften recessions
but they exaggerate the variability of all variables at the same time.
As illustrated in Table 1.3, the presence of the lower bound on the policy rate consid-
erably weakens the e⁄ects of liquidity injections for the economy. For a commitment of 5%
of GDP to the quantitative easing to banks, 2,50% of the future GDP are foregone due to
interest rates hitting the zero-bound. In case of liquidity injections to non-￿nancial ￿rms
the recovery in GDP is by 1,94% percentage points lower as compared to the economy
where the lower bound on interest rates is not binding. However, in an economy with very
low interest rates, the e⁄ects of quantitative monetary policy may improve either due to
increased capital requirements or as a result of unexpected policy actions. It should also
be noted that though smoothing consumption, liquidity injections tend to substantially
increase the variability of GDP and in￿ ation.
What recommendations for the monetary policy can be derived from this analysis?
This actually depends on the objective of the central bank. If price stability is on its
watch list then the focus should be directed towards the qualitative easing tools. If the
central bank wants to address GDP growth, it should make use of liquidity injections.
In addition, our ￿ndings indicate that commitment to unconventional monetary policy
actions plays a rather subordinated role. Unexpected policy changes improve the e⁄ec-
tiveness of quantitative instruments to some extent, yet they leave the potential of other
unconventional monetary tools almost unchanged. However, for the economy operating at
very low interest rates, the role of agents￿expectations gains on importance and additional
capital requirements improve the e⁄ectiveness of the quantitative monetary easing.
431.4.3 Estimation of the policy rule
We take the baseline version of our model with endogenous solvency rates to data and
estimate it employing Bayesian approach with Metropolis algorithm. In particular, we use
three observable variables: industrial production (Yt), policy rate (rt) and in￿ ation (￿t)
and concentrate on estimating parameters of the policy rule given in Equation (1.16) as
well as the estimation of shocks in our model. The sample contains US data running from
1997M7 to 2009M12.
Draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters are obtained by a random
walk version of the Metropolis algorithm. We run 2 parallel chains each of length 10,000.
The scale factor is set so that the acceptance rate lies between 20 and 30 percent. We allow
for eight shocks in our system: technology shock ("A
t ), monetary policy shock ("r
t), deposit
tax shock ("T
t ), quantitative easing shock to saving banks ("Ml
t ), quantitative easing shock
to lending banks ("Mb
t ), quantitative easing shock to non-￿nancial ￿rms ("Mf
t ), qualitative
easing shock to saving banks ("xl
t ) and qualitative easing shock to lending banks ("xb
t ).
Figure A.5 depicts the respective distributions for the policy rule given in Equation (1.16)
whereas Table A.7 in Appendix presents results for all parameters under this study.
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Figure 1.6: Prior and posterior distributions.
In particular, mean and standard deviation of the prior distributions together with the
posterior mean, median and the respective 95 percent probability intervals are reported
in Table A.6. In conformity with our observations from the impulse response analysis
the outcome indicates that shocks in our model can generally be divided into two groups:
more persistent innovations (technology shock and both qualitative easing shocks) and
44less persistent innovations (monetary policy shock, deposit tax shock, quantitative easing
shocks). The 97 percent probability bands for the posterior distributions enclose most of
the mean values we use for calibration of the model. However, concerning the parameters of
the monetary policy equation we ￿nd that the mean of the policy rate (
_
r) lies considerably
below the calibrated value. In addition, the coe¢ cient of indexation to in￿ ation (Qp) is
just above one and the parameter of mean-reversion in policy rate (￿r) point at a higher
degree of smoothing than initially assumed. Only in case of the output sensitivity (Qy)
does the policy rate seem to adjust to industrial production growth at the prespeci￿ed
level of around 0.05.
1.5 Conclusion
The ongoing ￿nancial crisis revealed that standard DSGE models need to account for ￿-
nancial sectors of the economy. Recent research work9 proposes models with heterogenous
banking sector that are able to capture ￿nancial frictions and their transmission mech-
anism in the economy. We follow this approach and extend a relatively simple model
of de Walque et al. (2009) by introducing a nominal dimension, several monetary shocks
and changes in the rules of the ￿nancial supervision. In particular, this setup enables us
to study impact of unconventional monetary policy actions at times of low interest rates
when various capital adequacy requirements are in force.
We show that in this framework qualitative monetary easing impulses tend to produce
more persistent changes in aggregates and their impact on GDP and consumption, though
limited in magnitude, is similar to the expansionary monetary policy. Quantitative mone-
tary easing shock, on the other hand, is more e⁄ective in the short run (in terms of changes
in output and GDP) but does not seem to a⁄ect variables in the long run. When tax rates
are imposed on cash holdings persistent changes in the economy are observed. Equity
injections to banks achieve rather modest results. A direct capital payout to ￿nancial
institutions diminishes consumption, raises in￿ ationary pressure and results in small and
temporary positive responses of output and GDP. Yet, equity injections to lending banks
are able to substantially improve the solvency rates in the ￿nancial sector.
Our experiments in Section 4 also support the general result that the quantitative
monetary policy actions are superior to other tools. In terms of consumption and GDP
losses, direct credit to ￿rms outperforms the unconventional actions aimed at banks. In
addition, we conclude that in cases when capital ratio is tied to the output gap or when
banks receive equity injections GDP ￿ uctuations get smaller. In general, we observe that
if ￿nancial institutions are supposed to meet additional capital adequacy requirements
GDP volatility is smaller and recessions are less extreme.
Future work could consist of introducing other ￿scal policy tools into the model. It
would also be of interest to model richer ￿nancial markets with other ￿nancial interme-
9Dib (2010) and Gerali et al. (2010).
45diaries, like brokers and so called shadow banks10. Recent research suggests that the
analysis of their balance sheets could be used for prediction of economic activity and
in￿ ation dynamics11.
10We refer to ABS issuers, ￿nance companies and funding corporations as ￿shadow banks￿ .
11See Adrian et al. (2010).
46Chapter 2
Financial Integration and the
Term Structure of Interest Rates
2.1 Introduction
The standard framework of modelling the yield structure uses a set of latent factors that
are supposed to describe behavior of the term structure. Though found to explain term
structure movements (Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Dai and Singleton (2000)) and docu-
mented to have good forecasting power (Du⁄ee (2002) and Diebold and Li (2006)), such
models pose di¢ culties to the interpretation of results because there is no clear under-
standing of what the factors actually mean in economic terms. Models with latent factors
fail to relate the dynamics of the yield curve to the macroeconomic environment the term
structure is a part of. This is in particular the case for open economies, which are in￿ u-
enced by both internal and external business cycles, and where interest rates may depend
on expectations about macroeconomic variables from abroad. In this paper, I introduce
a model that addresses those shortcomings and attains outstanding predictive ability for
yields.
The seminal work of Ang and Piazzesi (2003), which augmented a traditional three-
factor a¢ ne term structure model by incorporating macroeconomic variables within a no-
arbitrage regime, inspired a whole stream of literature on models that link the mechanics
of the entire yield curve to some key economic factors. Those models, however, are essen-
tially concerned with the case of a closed economy where the term structure is treated as a
domestic matter that is not directly related to ￿nancial considerations outside the country
in question. My objective in this paper is to evaluate the yield curve of an economy in￿ u-
enced by spillovers from abroad by means of a structural cointegrated vector autoregressive
model nested within a no-arbitrage a¢ ne term structure setup. Cointegrated VAR mod-
els are speci￿cally designed to account for short-run and long-term interactions between
macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables. This framework allows to study macroeconomic
relationships and ￿nancial linkages between markets, sectors and countries. No-arbitrage
a¢ ne term structure model provides a methodology of evaluation of the yield curve dy-
47namics under assumptions of consistent bond pricing and interaction between key macro
factors and interest rates.
Interest rates combine expectations of future rates, in￿ ation and real activity as well
as adjustment for risk. Therefore, understanding their dynamics is important both empir-
ically and economically. As Ang et al. (2006) argue, the yields tell us a lot about future
economic activity since they form a transmission channel between the monetary policy,
real activity, in￿ ation and asset prices. Monetary policy shocks impact mostly the short
end of the yield curve1 that is linked through expectations of the future evolution of the
short-term interest rate and risk premia with yields for longer maturities, which in turn
determine savings and investment decisions in the economy. Short-term interest rate in-
￿ uences movement in other asset prices through costs of borrowing and changes in wealth.
In addition, yields a⁄ect exchange rates via interest rate parity conditions and thus con-
stitute a channel of rapid demand and price adjustments in the international context, at
least in case of open economies with ￿ exible exchange rate regimes2.
This paper relates to the econometric literature on cointegrated VAR systems and
to the literature on term structure models. As with respect to the former, it builds
on Pesaran and Shin (2002) and draws from Assenmacher-Wesche and Pesaran (2008),
where the model was applied to analyse the degree of international interdependencies
of the Swiss economy. It also relates to Pesaran et al. (2004), Dees et al. (2007) and
Galesi and Sgherri (2009), were global VAR models were used to address the issue of syn-
chronization of international business cycles and to analyse the transmission mechanism
of real and ￿nancial shocks across borders. On the term structure side, this paper takes
on ideas ￿rst introduced to the literature by Ang and Piazzesi (2003).
Recent macro-￿nance research provides a lot of insight into relationship between the
real sector and yields. H￿rdahl et al. (2006) and Dewachter and Lyrio (2006) explore an
approach of a joint model of the term structure and the macroeconomy and conclude
that macro factors are useful for explaining and forecasting government bond yields.
Ang et al. (2006) ￿nd that such models provide better out-of-sample forecasts for GDP
growth. As Moench (2008) argues, exploiting larger macroeconomic information sets im-
proves the model predicting power even further.
As shown in the literature, dynamics of the term structure are closely related to be-
havior of exchange rates. Backus et al. (2001), Dewachter and Maes (2001) and more
1For instance, Clarida et al. (2000) show that simple monetary policy rules explain well the dynamics
of short-term interest rates.
2In practice, exchange rate movements often deviate signi￿cantly from what interest rate di⁄erentials
would suggest. This empirical property - the forward premium anomaly - stands for mechanism in which
currencies with high interest rates tend to appreciate against currencies with lower interest rates, rather
than depreciate as unconvered interest rate parity (UIP) would suggest.
The reason for this fact may be that investors demand a risk premium, separate from the one that
requires a higher interest rate, to compensate them for investing in a foreign currency. As this risk
premium ￿ uctuates, it may reverse the e⁄ects of the changes in interest rates. Another explanation may
be related to in￿ ation and purchasing power parity (PPP). It implies that real exchange rates should stay
quite constant, while allowing nominal rates to vary. Then nominal interest rates should be higher in
countries with higher in￿ ation rates. PPP seems to hold over very long term and to support UIP; in the
short run, however, currencies ￿ uctuate and depart from the implied long-term equilibrium.
48recently Diez de los Rios (2009), for instance, examine the forward premium anomaly and
exchange rate forecasts in the context of term structure models. However, these papers
use primarily latent factors in two-country models and thus leave unanswered the question
of the impact of macroeconomic fundamentals in a multilateral setup.
This paper extends the existing research program by evaluating the relationship be-
tween macroeconomic aggregates and interest rates for an open economy. It accounts
for economically relevant and statistically signi￿cant co-relations between variables and
explores trade-based linkage between countries and its impact on key macro-factors and
the term structure. Contrary to recent study of Spencer and Liu (2010) who also call into
question the standard closed economy macro-￿nance speci￿cation, the model in this paper
does not use latent factors, it is ￿ exible at the speci￿cation of the country-dimension and
facilitates consistent modelling of stationary and non-stationary variables simultaneously.
The framework I use is able to overcome the dimensionality problem often faced by global
macroeconomic empirical models by modelling links between countries through foreign
variables calculated as averages of macroeconomic aggregates of the partner economies.
In contrast to latent factors, those foreign variables have a natural theoretical interpre-
tation. Moreover, this speci￿cation allows a transparent long-run theoretical structure
and permits testing and imposing, if necessary, short-run overidentifying theoretical re-
strictions. The model in this paper ￿ts well the yield curve in-sample and shows a sound
ability to forecast interest rates out-of-sample. In its basic setting it is capable, to a
great extent, to outperform a generalized version of Nelson-Siegel model put forth by
Diebold and Li (2006) which has been documented to be particularly useful for interest
rate predictions. Moreover, by comparison to a case of closed economy it is shown that
external macroeconomic variables contain a lot of information that helps to explain the
dynamics of the domestic term structure.
Having produced an empirical model that successfully captures the importance of real
and ￿nancial spillovers between economies for the term structure, the paper examines
whether the model accounts for the expectations hypothesis. I follow the approach of
Dai and Singleton (2002) for analysing regressions of the yield change on the yield spread
as initially proposed in work of Campbell and Shiller (1991). The model is able to cap-
ture risk-premium adjusted yield changes by reproducing the coe¢ cients implied by the
expectations hypothesis. In addition, the framework presented in this paper is used to
examine the relation between the term structure and exchange rates. I ￿nd that the model
successfully replicates empirical ￿ndings and accounts for the forward premium anomaly
characterized by regression from Fama (1984). Moreover, the model is able to reconcile
the uncovered interest rate parity implications once the implied exchange rate risk premia
are considered.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the model
and explains its parametrization and the estimation method. Section 3 reports results
of the estimation, describes expectation hypothesis tests, discusses the relation between
interest rates and exchange risk premia, and documents the dynamic properties of the
49model. Section 4 presents out-of-sample forecasting results and compares them with yield
projections for a closed economy model. Last section concludes.
2.2 Methodology and data
The open economy is modelled in a VAR approach that follows Pesaran and Shin (2002)
and Assenmacher-Wesche and Pesaran (2008). This model relates the core macroeconomic
variables to current and lagged values of a number of key foreign country-speci￿c variables.
Spillovers from abroad to the open economy enter the regression in a way that allows to
separate the relationships between variables into short-term and long-run relations.
On top of the VAR process that governs the dynamics of macroeconomic factors an
a¢ ne no-arbitrage framework is used to examine behavior of the term structure. This setup
does not require to model the dynamics of macro variables and yields jointly, nevetheless
it does allow for feedback between them.
A standard small open economy model usually accounts for ￿nancial linkage between
the basis economy and the rest of the world by means of conditions describing the con-
nection between domestic and foreign interest rates and the domestic rate of the expected
in￿ ation. The model used in this paper goes beyond that setup in that it allows for in-
teractions between real macroeconomic variables and considers both short- and long-term
e⁄ects. It assumes a multi-country open economy framework that consists of countries
which may di⁄er in size but are otherwise isomorphic, i.e. have similar structure. Due to
this assumption the exposition below is set to focus mainly on the "home" country. Such
a speci￿cation does not require to explicitly specify whether the home country is a small
open economy that participates in world markets without being able to alter world prices,
interest rates or incomes through its policies. Yet, as the number of countries in the model
N gets large, the conditions unter which the model is estimated provide a formal de￿nition
of a small open economy. In this regard, Switzerland - for which I estimate the model
later on - can certainly be considered as a small open economy in the global context.
Following the discussions from Abel and Bernanke (2001), the theoretical constraints,
as applicable to a small open economy, could then be considered when setting up the model
and de￿ning relationships between economic aggregates. In particular, one can expect that
domestic and global currency demand and supply factors in￿ uence the exchange rate of
a small open economy. A growth in foreign liquidity or income would raise demand for
domestic goods and currency leading to a strengthening of the domestic currency in value.
Higher real rates of return on domestic assets, e.g. interest rates, equity returns and
property values, would also stimulate the demand for domestic currency as more investors
would favor investing in the domestic market. Increases in domestic in￿ ation rates and
income, on the other hand, would cause the demand for foreign goods to raise and the
purchasing power to fall. This, in turn, would result in a decline in the value of the
domestic currency.
502.2.1 Structure of the model
Macroeconomic factors
The model for state variables comprises of a structural cointegrated vector autoregres-
sion (called V ECX￿ henceforth) that embeds domestic (or endogenous) variables xt and
country-speci￿c foreign variables x￿
t whereas the latter are assumed to be weakly exogenous
to the open economy.
Weak exogeneity refers to foreign variables in the sense that they a⁄ect the domestic
variables contemporaneously but they are not a⁄ected by disequilibria in the domestic
economy. However, foreign variables could be a⁄ected by lagged changes of domestic and
foreign variables. Technically speaking, in error correcting regressions of changes in foreign
variables in the V ECX￿ model none of the lagged error correction terms associated with
the domestic economy should be statistically signi￿cant. Therefore - in the context of
V ECX￿ - weak exogeneity di⁄ers from the notion of "Granger (Non)Causality" which
would imply that none of the domestic variables be allowed to enter the regression for
the foreign variables. Granger and Lin (1995) refer to weakly exogenous I (1) variables as
"long-run" forcing3.
After grouping both the domestic and the foreign-speci￿c variables in one vector
zt =
￿
xt
x￿
t
￿
(2.1)
and assuming that fztg
1
0 is generated by a vector autoregression
 
I ￿
p X
i=1
￿iLi
!
(zt ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿t) = ut
where L stands for a lag operator, and de￿ning matrices ￿ = (
Pp
i=1 ￿i ￿ I) and
￿i = ￿
Pp
k=i+1 ￿k, the model can be rewritten in its error-correction form as
￿zt = a0 + a1t ￿ ￿zt￿1 +
p￿1 X
i=1
￿i￿zt￿i + ut (2.2)
with
3A variable is said not to Granger-cause another variable if it does not contain information about the
forecastability of that variable. This feature is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for weak exogeneity since it
is a predictive feature which is not useful for parameter inference.
In fact, the de￿nition of weak exogeneity, as initially introduced in Engle et al. (1983), aims at the
e¢ ciency of estimation. For instance, in bivariate context with the joint distribution depicted as the
product of a marginal distribution and a conditional distribution:
f (x;y) = f (yjx)f (x) = f (xjy)f (y)
x is de￿ned to be weakly exogenous for the purpose of estimating the parameters of interest if there is no
loss of information when one ignores the details of the marginal distribution f (x) when making inferences
about the parameters of the conditional distribution f (yjx).
51a0 = ￿￿￿ + (￿ + ￿)￿ (2.3)
a1 = ￿￿￿
￿ = I ￿
p￿1 X
i=1
￿i
In this speci￿cation, matrix ￿ contains long-run multipliers and the matrices f￿ig
p￿1
i=1
include short-run parameters.
Partitioning of the error term ut conformably with zt as ut = (u0
xt;u0
x￿t)
0 and its
variance matrix as
￿ =
 
￿xx ￿xx￿
￿x￿x ￿x￿x￿
!
(2.4)
allows to express uxt conditionally in terms of ux￿t as
uxt = ￿xx￿￿￿1
x￿x￿ux￿t + vt (2.5)
where vt ￿ iid(0;￿vv), ￿vv = ￿xx ￿ ￿xx￿￿￿1
x￿x￿￿x￿x, is uncorrelated with ux￿t by
construction.
Furthermore, substitution of (2.5) into (2.2) together with similar partitioning of the
remaining parameters in (2.2), i.e. a0 = (a0
x0;a0
x￿0)
0, a1 = (a0
x1;a0
x￿1)
0, ￿ = (￿0
x;￿0
x￿)
0,
￿i = (￿0
xi;￿0
x￿i)
0, i = 1;:::;p ￿ 1, and the assumption that x￿
t are weakly exogenous (thus
￿x￿x = 0) provide a possibility to subdivide the model into a conditional model for the
endogenous variables xt and a marginal model for the weakly exogenous variables x￿
t. The
former is written as
￿xt = c0 + c1t ￿ ￿xzt￿1 + ￿￿x￿
t +
p￿1 X
i=1
￿i￿zt￿i + vt (2.6)
where c0 = ax0 ￿￿xx￿￿￿1
x￿x￿ax￿0 and c1 = ax1 ￿￿xx￿￿￿1
x￿x￿ax￿1 and the matrix ￿ reads
as:
￿ =
 
￿x
￿x￿
!
=
 
￿xx ￿xx￿
0 0
!
(2.7)
The marginal model for the exogenous variables (assuming that x￿
t variables are I (1)
but not cointegrated (thus ￿x￿x￿ = 0) so that a linear model in ￿rst di⁄erences is appro-
priate4) takes the following form:
4To test for cointegration among the exogenous variables I estimate a system with lag order of two, an
unrestricted constant and a restricted trend and ￿nd no cointegration at the 10 percent level of signi￿cance.
52￿x￿
t = ax￿0 +
p￿1 X
i=1
￿x￿i￿zt￿i + ux￿t (2.8)
In order to eschew a possibility of having quadratic trend in the model due to variables
in levels with unit root5, a restriction is placed on linear trend such that
c1 = ￿x￿ (2.9)
Then the error-correction equation of the conditional model for the endogenous vari-
ables in V ECX￿ can be expressed as:
￿xt =
￿
c0 ￿ ￿x[zt￿1 ￿ ￿(t ￿ 1)] + ￿￿x￿
t +
p￿1 X
i=1
￿i￿zt￿i + vt (2.10)
where
￿
c0 = c0 + ￿x￿ (2.11)
Matrix ￿x can be rewritten as
￿x = ￿x￿0 (2.12)
where ￿x is a kx ￿ r loading matrix of rank r, ￿ is a (kx + kx￿) ￿ r matrix of coin-
tegrating vectors of rank r. ￿x speci￿es the number of long-run relationships that exist
among domestic variables xt and country-speci￿c foreign variables x￿
t. If no cointegrating
relationships exist (2.10) collapses to a V AR regression in ￿rst di⁄erences.
The full-system V ECX￿ arises from the conditional model for ￿xt that is augmented
by the marginal model of ￿x￿
t. This is written as
￿zt = a0 + a1t ￿ ￿￿0zt￿1 +
p￿1 X
i=1
￿i￿zt￿i + H￿t (2.13)
where ￿ is de￿ned by (2.12) and
5For instance, if we consider a version of the model of order 1:
(I ￿ A1L)(zt ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿t) = ut
with ut
iid ￿ (0;￿u) and (I ￿ A1L) = A(L), and re-write it to:
A(L)zt = a0 + a1t + ut
where a0 = ￿￿￿ + A1 and a1 = ￿￿￿, we can re-formulate it again to:
￿zt = C (L)(a0 + a1t + ut) = b0 + b1t + C (L)ut
with C (L) de￿ned as C (L)A(L) = (1 ￿ L)I.
Now, re-expressing last equation for ￿zt in levels we obtain:
zt = z0 + b0t + b1
t X
s=1
s +
t X
s=1
C (L)us = z0 + b0t + b1
t(t + 1)
2
+
t X
s=1
C (L)us
53￿ =
 
￿x
0
!
; ￿i =
 
￿i + ￿￿x￿i
￿x￿i
!
; a0 =
 
c0 + ￿ax￿0
ax￿0
!
; a1 =
 
c1
0
!
; (2.14)
￿t =
 
vt
ux￿t
!
; H =
 
Ikx ￿
0 Ikx￿
!
; Cov (￿t) = ￿￿￿ =
 
￿vv 0
0 ￿x￿x￿
!
(2.15)
Finally, Equation (2.13) without time trend can be rewritten as
zt = ￿ +
p X
i=1
￿izt￿i + H￿t (2.16)
where ￿ = a0, ￿1 = I(kx+kx￿) ￿￿￿0 +￿1, ￿i = ￿i ￿￿i￿1, i = 2;:::;p￿1, ￿p = ￿￿p￿1.
For lag order p > 1, equation (2.16) can be reformulated to V AR(1) in companion form,
i.e.:
_
zt =
_
￿ + f￿ig
_
zt￿1 +
_
H
_
￿t (2.17)
with f￿ig de￿ned as:
f￿ig =
0
B B
B B
B B
B
@
￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ::: ￿p
1 0 0 ::: 0
0 1 0 ::: 0
. . .
... ... ...
. . .
0 ::: 0 1 0
1
C C
C C
C C
C
A
(2.18)
Adding the term structure
Term structure model suggested in this paper is built upon the idea that domestic capital
markets of an open economy are closely related to their external counterparts. If this is
true, domestic term structure of interest rates cannot be independent of the external world
macroeconomic factors or foreign interest rates. However, at this point I propose a mod-
elling choice of estimating domestic term structure given internal and external processes
of macroeconomic factors - as opposed to an alternative approach to study dynamics of
domestic and foreign yields jointly under assumption of e¢ cient international capital mar-
kets. In addition, due to the focus on the term structure of an open economy estimation
of term structures of external economies in separate models is beyond the scope of this
paper6.
6Studying term structure model of all economies would involve assessment of currency risk and currency
risk premia could be expected to contribute considerably to the variation in yields across economies. This
model embraces the possibility of such linkage between currency risk premia and term structure by explicitly
incorporating exchange rates into the factors, i.e. using them as sources of market risk. As shown below,
the model successfully accounts for the forward premium anomaly and the UIP condition.
54As internal and external shocks hit the open economy, yields are driven by the dynamics
captured by the factors zt modelled as the V ECX￿ system in (2.16). Impact of state
variables on yields is assumed to conform with the no-arbitrage condition. More precisely,
a process for the short rate can be written as
rt = ￿0 + ￿0
1zt (2.19)
and the nominal pricing kernel7 as
Mt+1 = exp
￿
￿rt ￿
1
2
￿0
tH￿￿￿H0￿t ￿ ￿0
tH￿t+1
￿
(2.20)
= exp
￿
￿￿0 ￿ ￿0
1zt ￿
1
2
￿0
tH￿￿￿H0￿t ￿ ￿0
tH￿t+1
￿
￿t are the market prices of risk, which are assumed to be a¢ ne in the underlying state
variables zt, i.e.
￿t = ￿0 + ￿1zt (2.21)
In order to keep the model parsimonious, I restrict the market prices of risk to depend
only on contemporaneous observations of the series in the V ECX￿ model. To that end I
assume that both domestic variables as well as their foreign counterparts are being priced8.
In an arbitrage-free market, the price of a n-months to maturity zero-coupon bond in
period t must equal the expected discounted value of the price of an (n ￿ 1)-months to
maturity bond in period t + 1
p
(n)
t = Et
h
Mt+1p
(n￿1)
t+1
i
(2.22)
Since yields are a¢ ne in the state variables, bond prices p
(n)
t are exponential linear
functions of the state vector
7I de￿ne the dynamics of the nominal pricing kernel in line with the structure introduced in
Du¢ e and Kan (1996) and applied, among others, by Ang and Piazzesi (2003), H￿rdahl et al. (2006) and
Moench (2008). The pricing kernel is a process
Mt = exp(￿rt)
 t+1
 t
with  t denoting the Radon-Nikodym derivative that transforms the equivalent martingale measure into
the physical measure.  t is assumed to follow the lognormal process  t+1 =  t exp
￿
￿
1
2￿
0
t
_
￿￿t ￿ ￿
0
t
_
"t+1
￿
and is driven by the shocks
_
"t in the state variables characterized by the covariance matrix
_
￿.
8It should be noted that in this formulation the domestic stochastic discount factor (or pricing kernel)
does depend upon foreign sources of uncertainty. This statement conforms with the general result of asset
pricing models for open economies which argue that foreign risk aversion matters for the domestic asset
prices. In addition, international asset pricing models, that are typically constructed as the aggregation
of a family of standard (single-country) models such as, for example, the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), usually postulate some degree of market integration, i.e. signi￿cance of foreign or international
sources of risk.
55p
(n)
t = exp
￿
An + B0
nzt
￿
(2.23)
where the scalar An and the vector Bn depend on the time to maturity n. Therefore,
following Ang and Piazzesi (2003), no-arbitrage restriction holds when An and Bn are
computed recursively by following equations
An = An￿1 + B0
n￿1
￿
￿ ￿ H￿￿￿H0￿0
￿
+
1
2
B0
n￿1H￿￿￿H0Bn￿1 ￿ ￿0 (2.24)
Bn = B0
n￿1
￿
f￿ig ￿ H￿￿￿H0￿1
￿
￿ ￿0
1 (2.25)
where f￿ig denotes the companion form of the parameter matrix on the vector of
lagged state variables, de￿ned in Equation (2.18), in case of the system in Equation (2.16)
with lag order p > 1. Given the price of an n-months to maturity zero-coupon bond, the
corresponding yield is thus obtained as
y
(n)
t = ￿
logp
(n)
t
n
= an + b0
nzt (2.26)
where an = ￿An=n, A0 = ￿0 and bn = ￿B0
n=n, B0 = ￿1 de￿ne the parameters in the
last equation9.
Altogether, the term structure model of an open economy is an a¢ ne term structure
model that has V ECX￿ as a state equation and it is completely characterized by equations
(2.6), (2.8) and (2.16) along with (2.24)-(2.26).
2.2.2 Data
I estimate the model for the Swiss economy. A set of domestic variables
xt = fet;gdpt;￿t;rt;cpit ￿ cpi￿
tg
contains a trade-weighted exchange rate (et), real output (gdpt), in￿ ation (￿t), a short
term interest rate (rt) and the ratio of domestic to foreign price levels (cpit ￿ cpi￿
t). The
underlying variables are built in a following way:
et = ln
0
@
M X
j=1
wjFXjt
1
A, gdpt = ln(GDPt=CPIt), rt = Rt=1200
￿t = ln(CPIt=CPIt￿1), cpit = ln(CPIt)
where
CPIt = consumer price index during period t,
FXjt = spot exchange rate with country j,
9See Appendix for derivations.
56Rt = nominal short-term rate of interest per annum,
GDPt = nominal gross domestic product,
M = number of partner economies,
wj = trade-based weight of country j.
A set of country-speci￿c foreign variables consists of selected domestic variables￿coun-
terparts
x￿
t = fgdp￿
t;r￿
t;dtg
and (the log of) the oil price (dt) which is assumed to be exogenous for the base
economy.
The dataset runs from July 1991 until September 2009 on a monthly frequency10. It
comprises Bloomberg data for exchange rates and IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics
data for output at market prices and consumer price indices. Quarterly GDP is interpo-
lated from monthly industrial production (from IMF￿ s IFS and Eurostat) using technique
proposed in Salazar et al. (1997) and Mitchell et al. (2005), except for Switzerland, where
no GDP index is employed11. Utilizing industrial production as the only indication of
GDP may lead to exaggeratedly volatile output ￿gures, however, since for many countries
no reliable monthly data on consumption, private services or public spending is readily
available, industrial production aggregates are uniformly used to preserve some degree of
consistency throughout the data. When not previously performed, series are adjusted for
seasonality using the Census X12 procedure12.
Yield data for maturities of 1, 3, 6, 12, 24, 60 and 120 months are taken from Bloomberg
and include interbank interest rates for maturities up to 1 year and swap rates for longer
maturity horizons. Oil prices are represented by DJ UBS-Crude Oil Total Return Sub-
Index.
The V ECX￿ model in this paper resorts to trade-based weights for the purpose of
construction of foreign-speci￿c variables13. Trade weights are computed from IMF￿ s Di-
rection of Trade Statistics quarterly data for the period from Sep. 1990 until Sep. 2009
10The sample begins in July 1991 due to the fact that no data for interest rates for longer maturities
were available prior to that date.
11As opposed to data-based techniques which in general rely on mathematical interpolation,
Salazar et al. (1997) and Mitchell et al. (2005) present a model-based approach which refers to methods
developed by Chow and Lin (1971, 1976) and makes explicit use of conditional expectations.
In short, the authors assume that the hypothetical vector of high frequency endogenous variables which
are observed only in low frequency can be linked to strictly exogenous regressors (indicators) by a linear
model. This regression is then solved by minimizing the sums of squares of the residuals subject to
the constraint that the interpolated high frequency values in each sub-period sum up to the known low
frequency totals. The model is estimated numerically by solving non-linear ￿rst order conditions subject
to some initial values and the desired degree of accuracy.
12See page http://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/ for more information.
13Due to importance of the ￿nancial sector for the Swiss economy ￿nancial weights, or a mixture of
them and the trade-based weights, should theoretically provide a better choice. Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) reports, as a part of BIS Quarterly Review (tables 9B and 6A), cross-country bank
lending exposure data which could be used as a proxy of ￿nancial (or banking) linkages between countries.
However, those data are not available for all partner economies of Switzerland for the time period under
study.
57for Switzerland￿ s 10 most important trading partners: Germany, France, Italy, the United
States, the United Kingdom, Austria, the Netherlands, Japan, Spain and Sweden. For the
purpose of estimation average weights from the sample are put to use.
Since the data in the model stretch for almost 20 years, structural breaks are quite
likely to be found in the time series. Even though the V ECX￿ models tend to be quite
robust to the possibility of structural change as compared to reduced form VARs, I per-
form several stability tests following Dees et al. (2007) and consider statistics that are
based on the residuals of the individual equations of the country-speci￿c error correction
models. To this account I include maximum OLS cumulative sum (CUSUM) statistic of
Ploberger and Kraemer (1992) (denoted as PK sup) as well as its mean square version
(PK msq), tests for parameter constancy against non-stationary alternatives proposed by
Nyblom (1989) and, ￿nally, sequential Wald type tests of a one-time structural change at
an unknown change point. The latter tests include Quandt (1960) likelihood ratio statistic
(QLR), the mean Wald statistic of Hansen (1992) and a test based on the exponential av-
erage proposed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994) (APW). In addition, heteroscedasticity-
robust version of the tests are reported.
Table B.2 in Appendix presents results of the tests computed at the 5% signi￿cance
level; critical values are derived from bootstrap samples. The tests document some evi-
dence of structural instability in the data. In particular, in￿ ation and price level di⁄erential
seem to undergo structural changes. However, when robust variant of the statistics are
considered, it becomes more apparent that the instability tends to mainly a⁄ect error
variances. In order to deal with the problem of unstable error variances I use robust stan-
dard errors when investigating the impact e⁄ects of foreign variables and impulse response
functions.
2.2.3 Estimation
Estimation procedure in this paper follows the consistent two-step approach suggested by
Ang et al. (2006). First, estimates of parameters (￿;f￿ig;￿￿￿) governing the dynamics
of the model factors are obtained by running V ECX￿. Second, given the estimates from
the ￿rst step, the parameters ￿0 and ￿1 which drive the evolution of the state prices of
risk are estimated by minimizing the sum of squared ￿tting errors of the model.
Estimation of the V ECX￿ model in the ￿rst step involves:
￿ constructing country-speci￿c foreign variables x￿
t, where x￿
t =
M P
j=1
wjxjt, M denotes
the number of partner economies and wj the weight of country j,
￿ selection of an appropriate lag order,
￿ identi￿cation of the cointegration rank given existence of I(1) variables and sub-
ject to reduced rank restriction; V ECX￿ model from (2.16) is estimated in its
error-correction form using Johansen￿ s reduced-rank procedure (Johansen (1992)
58and Johansen (1995)). In particular, cointegrating vectors are assumed to be exactly
identi￿ed and the regression is performed by restricting the trend coe¢ cients into
the cointegrating space, while allowing the intercept coe¢ cients to be unrestricted
in levels,
￿ ML estimation of the long-run parameters ￿ from (2.12) subject to over-identifying
restrictions; estimates of ￿ under exactly identifying restrictions are herewith used
as a starting point.
This procedure considers economically meaningful over-identifying restrictions that
conform with theoretical priors. To that end I run preliminary sub-system ARDL re-
gressions of the four long-run relations I might ￿nd in the data: purchasing power parity
(PPP), output gap between domestic and foreign output (GAP), uncovered interest rate
parity between domestic and foreign interest rate (UIP) and long-run interest rate rule
(LIR). Except for LIR all coe¢ cient estimates are signi￿cant and have the expected signs14.
Thus, in accordance with those preliminary results of tests for existence of long-run rela-
tionsships between variables in the data, I impose PPP, GAP and UIP:
PPP: et ￿ (cpit ￿ cpi￿
t) = ￿PPP + "PPP
t
GAP: gdpt = ￿GAP + ￿GAPgdp￿
t + "GAP
t
UIP: rt ￿ r￿
t = ￿UIP + "UIP
t
In the second step of the model estimation, for a given set of parameters
￿
^
￿;
^
f￿ig;
^
￿￿￿
￿
,
the model implied yields
^
y
(n)
t =
^
an+
^
b
0
nzt are computed and the sum of squared errors (S)
is minimized with respect to ￿0 and ￿1 where S is given by
S =
T X
t=1
N X
n=1
￿
^
y
(n)
t ￿ y
(n)
t
￿2
(2.27)
In order to achieve fast convergence of (2.27) I adopt procedure from Moench (2008):
￿rst, parameters ￿0 are estimated assuming that risk premia are constant over time, i.e.
￿1 are zero. Then these estimates are taken as starting values in the second round of
estimation in which all parameters ￿0 and ￿1 are evaluated freely.
Order of integration
The underlying assumption of the V ECX￿ model estimation is that of the unitary order of
integration for all variables included in the model. Table 2.1 presents results for augmented
Dickey-Fuller GLS test proposed by Elliot et al. (1996).
Not surprisingly, exchange rate, output, short term interest rate and oil price are
unambiguously I(1) processes. In case of in￿ ation its test statistic suggests no unit root
in levels. Yield spread and price level di⁄erential, on the other hand, are considered not
14See Appendix for results of ARDL regressions.
59Table 2.1: ADF-GLS unit root test results
y
(120)
t ￿
_
r et gdpt ￿t rt cpit￿cpi￿
t gdp￿
t r￿
t dt
level -1.81 -1.64 -0.52 -3.72 -1.11 -1.80 0.39 -1.11 -1.58
￿ -2.18 -2.80 -2.09 -1.67 -4.03 -0.84 -4.69 -4.05 -3.72
￿2 -1.37 -2.76 -0.99 -0.93 -1.54 -0.53 -2.11 -5.06 -22.31
Note: Statistics for level variables are based on regressions including linear trend; statistics for ￿rst and
second di⁄erences include only intercept term. The 95% critical values are -3.4328 and -1.9422,
respectively.
to be stationary in ￿rst di⁄erences. Overall, however, it seems reasonable to regard most
of the series under consideration approximately as I(1) variables.
Testing weak exogeneity
Another assumption of the model - weak exogeneity of the country-speci￿c foreign variables
x￿
t - can be tested by running ￿rst-di⁄erence regressions of the foreign variables and testing
the joint signi￿cance of the country-speci￿c error-correction terms in these regressions.
This translates to conducting following regression for each element l of x￿
t
￿x￿
t;l = ￿l +
r X
j=1
￿j;lECM
j
t￿1 + ￿l￿xt￿1 + ￿l￿x￿
it￿1 + "t;l (2.28)
where ECM
j
t￿1 are the estimated error-correction terms associated with the r cointe-
grating relations. The hypothesis of joint signi￿cance, ￿j;l = 0, is veri￿ed by means of an
F-test.
Table 2.2: Results of F-tests for weak exogeneity
critical value gdp￿
t r￿
t dt
3.087 0.547 4.472 0.170
Note: Bold numbers denote signi￿cance at 5%.
Weak exogeneity is not rejected for foreign output and the oil price. In case of foreign
short term interest rate the F-test results support rejection of null hypothesis of weak
exogeneity at 5%. This result may suggest a stronger ￿nancial rather than real linkage
of the Swiss economy with the rest of the world. In fact, in the wake of tightening trade
and ￿nancial interdependencies among economies it would be reasonable to assume most
or even all macroeconomic variables to be endogenously determined, as the number of
countries under study grows.
602.2.4 Identi￿cation of shocks
The structural cointegrated approach presented in this paper builds upon variables di-
rectly observed in the economy. Contrary to DSGE modelling, which - for the purpose of
derivation of the long-run, steady-state relations of the macroeconomics - starts with the
intertemporal optimization problem faced by the agents of the economy and solves the
Euler ￿rst order conditions, V ECX￿ works directly with the arbitrage conditions which
provide intertemporal links between prices and asset returns. DSGE approach￿ s strength
lies in the explicit identi￿cation of unobserved macroeconomic disturbances as shocks to
tastes, technology, policy, demand or supply so that a statement on the form of the short-
term dynamics can be formulated; this is, however, achieved at the expense of strong
assumption regarding the functional form of underlying processes. V ECX￿, on the other
hand, assumes that the economic theory is more likely to provide a coherent guide to the
long-run characteristics of the macroeconomy and it is less con￿dent about the short-term
dynamics.
The di¢ culty of the structural cointegrated VAR approach concerns the disability to
account for the identi￿cation of the shocks which are unobservable by nature. However, if it
is the case that economic theory is insu¢ ciently well-de￿ned to provide credible identifying
restrictions on the short-run behaviour of economic agents, this approach can be capable
of providing su¢ cient information about the dynamics of the model as well as being
informative about the consequences of shocks rather than the precise reasons behind their
occurance. By using generalized impulse response functions V ECX￿ provides a method
of coherent analysis of shocks in observable macroeconomic aggregates which is invariant
to the ordering of the variables. From this point of view, the structural cointegrated VAR
analysis does not require economic identi￿cation of shocks. The identi￿cation problem
arises only when it is further required to decompose the e⁄ects of the shocks in the observed
variables into unobserved theoretical concepts. In this case VAR approach has to be
accompanied by additional restrictions from the economic theory.
Following the exposition in Garratt et al. (2006), a more detailed a priori modelling of
expectations, production, consumption, technology etc. and of the short-run dynamics is
required. That is, further restriction must be placed on the contemporaneous relationships
among variables, for instance, to a model given in equation (2.2):
A￿zt =
_
a0 +
_
a1t ￿
_
￿￿0zt￿1 +
p￿1 X
i=1
_
￿i￿zt￿i + ￿t (2.29)
where A represents a matrix of contemporaneous structural coe¢ cients,
_
a0 = Aa0,
_
a1 = Aa1,
_
￿ = A￿,
_
￿i = A￿i, and ￿t = Aut are the structural shocks (for instance, to
policy rate or to technology) which are serially uncorrelated and have zero means and a
positive de￿nite covariance marix ￿ = A￿A0. Restrictions on A incorporate description
of decision rules followed by the agents and identify their use of information and the exact
61timing of the information ￿ ows15.
In a structural vector autoregression framework, using restrictions on the contempo-
raneous relationships between variables, as captured by the matrix A, can be combined
with other methods of identi￿cation of shocks. Dungey and Fry (2009) nest three iden-
ti￿cation methods, short-run restrictions, sign restrictions and long-run restrictions, in
a model with ￿scal, monetary and other macroeconomic variables. In particular, they
use short-run restrictions on the non-￿scal variables, identify ￿scal policy shocks using a
minimal set of sign restrictions and leave other relationships to be determined by data.
These restrictions are then applied in conjunction with information from the cointegrat-
ing relationships between macroeceonomic variables to model the long run in a way that
accounts for both permanent and transitory shocks in a model with both stationary and
non-stationary data and allows the use of cointegrating relations as a means of identi￿ca-
tion as in Pagan and Pesaran (2008).
Another aspect of the identi￿cation of shocks in a V ECX￿ model concerns the exact
identi￿cation of shocks of all observable variables - both demestic and foreign. To that end,
Dees et al. (2007) propose identi￿cation scheme of Sims and Zha (2006) where di⁄erent
ordering of variables is considered.
2.3 Model properties
2.3.1 In-sample ￿t
Figure 2.1 shows observed yields together with their ￿tted counterparts. In general, the
model is able to recover observed data, however, its ability to do so weakens with the
increasing maturity horizon. Apparently, the model fails to adequately account for high
volatility at the long end of the yield curve; in other words, variables in the V ECX￿
model lack a factor that would properly explain changes in time of the slope of the term
structure.
Therefore, in order to induce a better ￿tting of the yield curve I introduce a new factor,
yield spread measured as y
(120)
t ￿
_
r, i.e. long-term yield adjusted by the long-run mean of
the short-term interest rate, into the underlying model of macro factors16. As a result of
15Garratt et al. (2006) in chapters 5 and 10 elaborate on implementation of such restrictions in case
of a monetary policy shock. Identi￿cation of this disturbance includes a formulation of the monetary
authority￿ s decision problem, a derivation of the policy rate, an expression of the policy rate￿ s reaction
function and, ￿nally, a speci￿cation of the structural interest rate equation.
16Note that y
(120)
t ￿
_
r can easily be computed but it is not directly observed by the agents of the economy.
Therefore there is no inconsistency in pricing of yields between equations (2.16) and (2.26) when this factor
is considered, since y
(120)
t ￿
_
r is assumed to be observed with measurement error. However, if y
(120)
t ￿ rt
would instead be introduced into the underlying model of macro factors, additional constraints on an and
bn should be imposed so that under both (2.16) and (2.26) y
(120)
t is consistently priced:
a120 = 0, b120 = ￿1 + ￿2
where ￿1 and ￿2 are vectors of zeros with a 1 in the ￿rst and ￿fth element, respectively. Yet, estimation
of a model with many macroeconomic factors (i.e. possibly high column size of bn in case of VAR in
companion form) and yields ranging to very long maturities together with non-linear constraints (due to
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Figure 2.1: In-sample ￿t of the yield curve from the V ECX￿ a¢ ne term structure model.
this amendment the set of domestic variables changes to
xt =
n
y
(120)
t ￿
_
r;et;gdpt;￿t;rt;cpit ￿ cpi￿
t
o
As shown in Figure 2.2, direct modelling of the slope enhances the ability of the model
to reproduce the actual term structure.
Overall, the model ￿ts the data well even though it does not involve any latent yield
curve factors as traditional a¢ ne models do. After having explicitly accounted for the
slope of the yield curve, it captures the cross-sectional variation of the yields aptly, with
a somehow better in-sample ￿t at the short and the long end of the yield curve.
2.3.2 Expectation hypothesis tests
Expectation hypothesis states that the yield on an n-period bond should increase when
the spread between the same yield and the short-term rate widens. This means that a
regression of the yield change yn￿1
t+1 ￿ yn
t on the yield spread (yn
t ￿ rt)=(n ￿ 1) should
produce a coe¢ cient of 1. However, numerous empirical studies found a signi￿cant neg-
ative relationship which gets more negative for increasing maturities. As the study of
Campbell and Shiller (1991) shows for the US data, those regression coe¢ cients can be as
the fact that an and bn have to be computed recursively) does not seem to be computationally practicable.
As Joslin et al. (2010) show, imposition of the no-arbitrage restriction will not in￿ uence the conditional
forecasts of the pricing factors in any canonical Gaussian dynamic term structure model. They argue that
an improvement in forecasting would rather come from auxiliary constraints on the physical distribution
of the pricing factors, such as the number of risk factors that determine risk premia, for instance. In this
paper, results from the out-of-sample yield projections con￿rm empirically this claim.
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Figure 2.2: In-sample ￿t of the yield curve from the V ECX￿ a¢ ne term structure model with
the yield spread.
big as ￿5 for 10-year bond.
In an attempt to reconcile this ￿nding with the predictions implied by the expecta-
tions hypothesis Dai and Singleton (2002) show that a large subclass of a¢ ne dynamic
term structure models generates such negative regression coe¢ cients. They document
that the risk premiums (and associated expected excess holding period returns ern
t =
Et
￿
ln
￿
pn￿1
t+1 =pn
t
￿
￿ rt
￿
) implied by a¢ ne term-structure models with unobservable factors
match the values of the coe¢ cients obtained from OLS regressions on actual yield data
(they denote this test als LPY (i)). In addition, Dai and Singleton (2002) are able to
recover the coe¢ cients of unity, that are consistent with the expectation hypothesis, by
running regressions of the risk-premium adjusted yield changes yn￿1
t+1 ￿ yn
t + ern
t =(n ￿ 1)
onto the yield spread (test denoted as LPY (ii)). In this paper, I follow this approach and
estimate both types of the Campbell and Shiller-like regressions:
LPY (i) : yn￿1
t+1 ￿ yn
t = const: + ￿n [(yn
t ￿ rt)=(n ￿ 1)] + residual
LPY (ii) : yn￿1
t+1 ￿ yn
t + ern
t =(n ￿ 1) = const: + ￿￿
n [(yn
t ￿ rt)=(n ￿ 1)] + residual
where by using short interest rate equation (2.19) and the bond pricing formula (2.22)
one-period holding premium en
t can be written as:
ern
t =
￿
B0
n￿1H￿￿￿H0￿0 ￿
1
2
B0
n￿1H￿￿￿H0Bn￿1
￿
+
￿
B0
n￿1H￿￿￿H0￿1
￿
zt (2.30)
64Table 2.3: Campbell-Shiller regression results for the sample data
yn￿1
t+1 ￿ yn
t = const: + ￿n [(yn
t ￿ rt)=(n ￿ 1)] + residual
whole sample
maturity 3M 6M 12M 24M 60M 120M
￿n -0.607 -0.654 -0.860 -0.209 0.277 -0.026
s.e. (0.234) (0.363) (0.514) (0.693) (1.062) (1.393)
t-stat(￿n = 0) -2.590 -1.803 -1.671 -0.301 0.260 -0.018
t-stat(￿n = 1) -6.857 -4.559 -3.615 -1.745 -0.681 -0.736
￿rst half of the sample
￿n -0.239 -0.209 0.138 0.154 1.176 0.369
s.e. (0.378) (0.545) (0.722) (0.923) (1.386) (1.701)
t-stat(￿n = 0) -0.633 -0.384 0.192 0.167 0.849 0.217
t-stat(￿n = 1) -3.277 -2.220 -1.194 -0.917 0.127 -0.371
second half of the sample
￿n -1.667 -1.706 -3.302 -2.327 -3.156 -1.320
s.e. (0.267) (0.495) (0.831) (1.299) (1.947) (2.750)
t-stat(￿n = 0) -4.371 -3.444 -3.969 -1.792 -1.621 -0.480
t-stat(￿n = 1) -8.118 -5.462 -5.171 -2.562 -2.135 -0.844
Note: s.e. is the estimated standard error; t-statistics are reported for H0 : ￿n = 0 and H0 : ￿n = 1.
Table 2.3 shows results of the LPY (i) test on the sample data. When the whole
sample is taken into account, the evidence seems to be less compelling than results of
Campbell and Shiller (1991). Except for the horizon n = 60, the estimated slope coe¢ -
cient tends to negative but it is not decreasing with maturity. In general, the expectations
hypothesis puzzle appears to be less severe for the Swiss data under study when com-
pared to the data for the US-yields reported by both Campbell and Shiller (1991) and
Dai and Singleton (2002).
Though conforming with results for European data as reported by Hardouvelis (1994),
Gerlach and Smets (1997), Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) and H￿rdahl et al. (2006), for in-
stance, the validity of this ￿nding appears to be limited in the light of evidence coming
from results of regressions run for sub-samples of the Swiss data. As shown in Table 2.3,
slope coe¢ cient derived from regression for the ￿rst part of the data tends to positive
and rising whereas the coe¢ cient for the second half of the data gets far more negative.
Notably, this e⁄ect is most pronounced for long-term maturities which are modelled with
swap rates. This may be an issue of the quality of the data on the swap rates, which might
actually have not been available in the past but could have instead been generated using
the expectations hypothesis assumptions17.
Furthermore, when tested under LPY (i), the model does not seem to generate the
pattern observed in the sample data, at least not in the case of short maturities. As
17I cross-check these results by estimating the Campbell and Shiller-like regressions using another set
of data, obtained from the Swiss National bank, and ￿nd similar parameter estimates. As before, the
coe¢ cient on the yield spread does not decrease with maturity and it tends to be positive for longer
horizons, especially in the ￿rst half of the sample.
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Figure 2.3: Campbell-Shiller regression results for the model implied data.
presented in Figure 2.3, the model implied coe¢ cient ￿n tends to be positive and not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 1. However, the good news is that the model succeeds in
ful￿lling the LPY (ii) test and it is able to reproduce the coe¢ cients implied by the
expectations hypothesis18.
2.3.3 Term structure and exchange rate risk premium
The same factors that determine risk premia of interest rates in domestic and foreign cur-
rencies may possibly a⁄ect risk premium in exchange rates. Yields and exchange rates may
both depend on expectations about the same macroeconomic variables. Recent macro-
economic literature on interest rates and exchange rates19 suggests therefore to examine
interest rates and exchange rates jointly. This paper facilitates a similar approach since
both the exchange rate (et) as well as the foreign short-term interest rate (r￿
t) are among
the macroeconomic factors. I examine the relation between term structure and exchange
rates by analysing the forward premium anomaly and by estimating the model implied
exchange rate risk premia.
The forward premium anomaly for one period ahead is characterized by the following
regression from Fama (1984):
et+1 ￿ et = ￿e + ￿e (rt ￿ r￿
t) + "e
t+1 (2.31)
where et is the logarithm of nominal exchange rate (Et) and rt ￿r￿
t is the interest rate
di⁄erential between domestic and foreign one-period interest rate. Uncovered interest rate
parity predicts that
^
￿e = 0 and
^
￿e = 1, however, Fama (1984) and others document the
point estimates of beta that are negative which constitutes the existence of the forward
18As already indicated by H￿rdahl et al. (2006), the success of the model in matching LPY depends on
the assumptions related to the market prices of risk. Speci￿cally, the ￿1 matrix which links variations in
prices with di⁄erent sources of risk plays a crucial role in the performance of the model in terms of the
LPY (i) test. For instance, it turns out that the interactions generated by some o⁄-diagonal elements of
￿1 are very important. However, in this paper I do not pursue an analysis of the statistical signi￿cance
of the elements of this matrix as proposed by Du⁄ee (2002) but instead let all elements of ￿1 enter the
estimation.
19See for instance Backus et al. (2001), Dewachter and Maes (2001) or Diez de los Rios (2009).
66premium anomaly. Consistent with the literature I obtain in case of the monthly data
used in this paper
^
￿e = ￿3:50 with a 95% con￿dence interval of [￿6:90;￿0:08]. Using
the parameter estimates from the model I simulate exchange rates 10.000 times and ￿nd
the mean of
^
￿e = ￿3:49 and the corresponding 95% con￿dence interval = [￿4:73;￿2:39].
Thus the model successfully replicates empirical ￿ndings and accounts for the forward
premium anomaly.
If markets are complete, exchange rates equalize the di⁄erences between domestic
and foreign pricing kernels, Mt and M￿
t , respectively. Backus et al. (2001) show that the
exchange rate obeys the no-arbitrage condition and can be derived for one holding period
as:
￿et+1 = m￿
t+1 ￿ mt+1 (2.32)
where small scripts denote logs.
Using Equation (2.20) for the nominal pricing kernel allows to write down the expected
change in exchange rate from Equation (2.32) as:
￿et+1 = (rt ￿ r￿
t) +
1
2
￿
￿0
tH￿￿￿H0￿t ￿ ￿￿0
t H￿￿￿H0￿￿
t
￿
+
￿
￿0
tH ￿ ￿￿0
t H
￿
￿t+1
Et [￿et+1] = (rt ￿ r￿
t) +
1
2
￿
￿0
tH￿￿￿H0￿t ￿ ￿￿0
t H￿￿￿H0￿￿
t
￿
The expected change in exchange rate equals to the di⁄erence rt ￿ r￿
t between the
domestic and foreign exchange rates and the foreign exchange risk premium, which is a
quadratic function of macroeconomic factors zt and is determined by the same risk factors
as the term structure of interest rates. In a risk neutral world, with ￿t = ￿￿
t = 0, UIP
suggests that the expected change in exchange rate equals the interest rate di⁄erential.
On the other hand, UIP should hold when accounted for the exchange risk premium.
In this speci￿cation, shocks to macroeconomic factors, represented by ￿￿￿, in￿ uence
both the domestic and foreign markets. Transmission channel of shocks is therefore deter-
mined by the structure imposed on the model in Equation (2.16). In particular, foreign
variables a⁄ect equilibria of the domestic economy and they additionally in￿ uence the
domestic variables contemporaneously. On the other hand, shocks in the domestic vari-
ables do not alter the equilibria in the foreign economy, however, lagged changes of both
domestic and foreign variables are allowed to a⁄ect it. As expected, I ￿nd that regressing
the risk adjusted change in exchange rate on the interest rate di⁄erential, in analogy to
Equation (2.31), allows to recover positive values of beta. While beta from this regression
generally does not equal unity, obtaining positive beta does not seems to depend on the
speci￿cation of foreign market prices of risk. In general, however, the condition speci￿ed
in Equation (2.32) is only valid under the assumption of complete markets; with the inter-
national ￿nancial markets being not complete, it is possible to recover he nominal pricing
kernels from asset market data by choosing ￿t and ￿￿
t in such a way that Equation (2.32)
67holds, but this choice will not be unique. As Brandt et al. (2006) show, Equation (2.32)
remains valid for the incomplete markets when the market prices of risk are chosen such
that the variance of the nominal pricing kernels is minimized. For this case I recover beta
parameter estimate
^
￿e = 1:19 with a 95% con￿dence interval of [￿4:20;6:58].
2.3.4 Dynamics
Generalized impulse response functions
This paper examines the dynamics of the model by undertaking analysis of the gener-
alized impulse response functions (GIRFs). In this application, two di⁄erent shocks are
simulated:
￿ a negative one standard error shock to the domestic GDP,
￿ a positive one standard error shock to the foreign short term interest rate.
The scope of this simulation is to assess the impact of shocks in macroeconomic vari-
ables on interest rates. In addition, since Swiss economy is linked to its partner economies,
this analysis should provide insights on how cross-boarder spillovers propagate and how
they a⁄ect yields. In what follows I therefore concentrate on responses of the term struc-
ture.
GIRFs, as proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998)
for vector error-correcting models, di⁄er from Orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions
(OIRFs) in that they do not orthogonalize residuals of the system but instead take histor-
ical correlations among variables into consideration, captured by the estimated variance-
covariance matrix. Thus, contrary to OIRFs, GIRFs do not require any economic re-
strictions and they are invariant to the ordering of the variables in the system. To that
respect, GIRFs provide insight on how shocks propagate between countries and variables
and unveil potential macroeconomic interdependence between economies. However, since
the shocks are not identi￿ed, GIRFs do not supply information about the causal relation-
ships among variables. Nevertheless, this disadvantage seems to be negligible compared
to the di¢ culty of applying OIRFs in a multilateral context, since there is practically no
reasonable and intuitive method to order many countries in the model.
Negative one standard error shock to domestic GDP As Figure 2.5 depicts,
responses of interest rates to a negative one standard deviation shock in GDP are uniformly
negative, persistent and signi￿cant only in the short-run. Yields react with a sudden drop,
which is pronounced at most in the middle of the yield curve, and then settle around the
level of a third of the initial impact. The longer the maturity is, the less perceptible is
this pattern of reaction. In general, the impact of GDP shock on yields is very limited.
The pattern of response across maturities comes to some degree at a surprise, since one
would expect the volatility weight to rest overwhelmingly on the short end of the yield
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses of macro factors to a negative one standard error shock to domestic
GDP, with 68% con￿dence bands.
curve rather than in the middle of it. Presumably this phenomenon can be attributed
to the fact, that only 1-month and 120-month yields interact with macro factors directly
through relationships modelled in the V ECX￿ system whereas the remaining ones connect
via market prices of risk, that could be misspeci￿ed to some extent.
Positive one standard error shock to foreign short term interest rate Contrary
to previous perturbation, a positive one standard deviation shock to the foreign short
term interest rate has a signi￿cant impact (at the 68% con￿dence level) over the whole
impulse response horizon across the yields up to 60-months. In addition, performance
pattern of yields is similar in scale but decreasing in magnitude across maturities. Yields
rise uniformly, with the biggest increase for 1-month interest rate up to a level of 200 basis
points. The overall magnitude of impact at the long end of the yield curve is much smaller
- approaching a range between 20 and 25 basis points.
Generalized forecast error variance decomposition
Generalized forecast error variance decomposition (GFEVD) shows to what extent return
variability in one variable can be explained by the innovations from other aggregates in
a VAR system. Results of this analysis for yields in case of one standard error shock to
domestic GDP are reported in Table 2.4.
The data point at quite di⁄erent dynamic behavior of interest rates across maturities.
In the ￿rst two periods following domestic GDP shock, is can be observed that the real
ouput contribution to the forecast error variance appears to be evenly spread between
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses of yields to a negative one standard error shock to domestic GDP,
with 68% con￿dence bands.
yields in the short run. However, In the long run the relative contribution of the ouput
shock tends to propagate towards one maturity block only: 12/24-month horizon. In
addition, the contribution patterns di⁄er between yields: 1-, 12- and 24-month maturities
have U-shaped forecast error variance patters, 3- and 6-month horizons show decresing
ones whereas long-term maturities are characterized by bell-shaped like variance patterns.
In seems that in the short run real output shock contribution to the forecast error variance
a⁄ects primarily short-term yields, but then it shifts to the long-term block of maturities
and eventually it recedes towards the middle of the yield curve.
Table 2.4: GFEVD: a negative one standard error shock to domestic GDP
Months
0 1 2 6 12 24 36 48 60
Yields 1M 0.65 0.25 0.20 0.09 0.27 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.42
3M 0.93 0.41 0.36 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
6M 1.31 0.45 0.42 0.31 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17
12M 1.76 0.47 0.46 0.72 1.17 1.41 1.46 1.49 1.50
24M 2.23 0.68 0.71 1.45 2.59 3.15 3.26 3.29 3.29
60M 0.53 1.04 1.05 0.90 0.53 0.30 0.25 0.23 0.23
120M 0.00 0.62 0.59 0.32 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
Note: Percentage of k-step ahead forecast error variance of the historical shock to foreign short term
interest rate. Percentages do not sum up to 100 since 113 grid points of the yield curve are omitted.
Table 2.5 reports GFEVD following a positive one standard error shock to foreign
short term interest rate. In this case for both short-run and the long-term the relative
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses of macro factors to a positive one standard error shock to foreign
short term interest rate, with 68% con￿dence bands.
contribution to the forecast error variance tends to spread to yields of maturities between
6 and 24 months and it seems to stay quite stable over time. In general, the most of the
variance after the foreign interest rate shock can be attributed to the yields in the middle
of the curve; notably, 1- and 120-month yields remain almost una⁄ected by the short term
foreign interest rate shock.
Table 2.5: GFEVD: a positive one standard error shock to foreign short term interest rate
Months
0 1 2 6 12 24 36 48 60
Yields 1M 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
3M 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
6M 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.65
12M 1.99 1.97 1.95 1.90 1.89 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88
24M 3.20 3.14 3.09 3.02 3.00 2.99 2.97 2.96 2.96
60M 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34
120M 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Note: Percentage of k-step ahead forecast error variance of the historical shock to foreign short term
interest rate. Percentages do not sum up to 100 since 113 grid points of the yield curve are omitted.
2.4 Out-of-sample forecasts
Forecasting performance is examined over the time interval from June 2001 to Septem-
ber 2009. It is a rolling exercise, i.e. at each time point t model parameters ￿ =
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses of yields to a positive one standard error shock to foreign short
term interest rate, with 68% con￿dence bands.
f￿;f￿ig;￿￿￿;￿0;￿1g are estimated and k-month forecast of the yield curve is calculated.
At each later point in time t+j the model is re-estimated using the same number of obser-
vations and yields for k-horizon are forecast. RMSE from the Nelson-Siegel model (NS),
as speci￿ed in Diebold and Li (2006), serves as benchmark. In particular, the benchmark
model can be written in state space form as
y
(n)
t = H￿t + ut
￿t = ￿ + F￿t￿1 + vt
where the yield curve factors are enclosed in ￿t = (levelt;slopet;curvaturet)
0, matrix H
collects factor sensitivities, ut ￿ iid(0;￿u), vt ￿ iid(0;￿v) and the model is solved using
Kalman ￿lter. NS is a not arbitrage-free term structure model widely used in ￿nance,
known for its sound out-of-sample forecasting performance. As Table 2.7 reveals, NS is
capable of exceptionally good yield curve ￿tting.
Table 2.6 summarizes RMSE ratios relative to the benchmark model obtained from the
forecasts. In several cases the model outperforms NS speci￿cation. Generally speaking,
it works better for shorter maturities and mid-term forecasting horizons. In particular, it
outperforms NS for 1-month yield in forecasts 2 up to 12 months ahead; for 3, 6 and 12-
month yields in forecasts 3 up to 12 months ahead; and for 12, 60 and 120-month yields in
forecasts 6 and 12 months ahead. The model tends to retain comparable predictive power
with NS across all yields for longer forecasting horizons; it fails however at the 1-month
ahead horizon.
72Table 2.6: Out-of-sample term structure forecasts
Yields
1M 3M 6M 12M 24M 60M 120M
Horizon 1 month 1.073 1.160 1.216 1.355 1.473 1.269 1.225
2 months 0.960 1.011 1.017 1.073 1.186 1.103 1.080
3 months 0.867 0.903 0.905 0.926 1.027 1.025 1.033
6 months 0.846 0.873 0.857 0.848 0.949 0.989 0.970
9 months 0.894 0.907 0.884 0.853 0.917 0.960 0.944
12 months 0.949 0.952 0.926 0.887 0.914 0.931 0.900
18 months 1.069 1.059 1.034 0.998 1.020 1.014 0.941
Note: Table entries are RMSE ratios relative to the Nelson-Siegel model; the out-of-sample period is Jun.
2001 to Sep. 2009.
In order to assess the empirical importance of openness I compare the results of estima-
tion and the forecasting power of the baseline model for the open economy to a speci￿cation
for a closed economy. The closed economy model consists of a vector error-correction sys-
tem that includes domestic slope factor, GDP, in￿ ation and short-term interest rate, and
omits all foreign variables:
xt =
n
y
(120)
t ￿
_
r;gdpt;￿t;rt
o
The system is estimated in analogy to Equation (2.6) by exploring long-run relations
between domestic variables only. Table 2.7 shows a comparison of the sums of squared
￿tted errors from Equation (2.27) for the model for an open and closed economy. Even
though the closed economy model is more parsimonious and attains a very good ￿t of
the 3-month and 120-month maturities, it misses a lot of information about the term
structure of yields for maturities in between. Foreign macroeconomic factors seem to
improve the ability of the model to capture the dynamics of the curvature of the term
structure considerably. It can also be observed that the ￿t obtained for the open economy
model improves a lot when foreign macroeconomic factors are taken into account, i.e.
when the market prices of risk are not restricted to domestic factors only.
As shown in Table 2.8, out-of-sample forecasting performance of the ATS model of a
closed economy is weak in terms of RMSE and considerably inferior when compared to its
peers. Though improving with the projection horizon, the forecasting results do not match
even nearly those of the NS model or the open economy ATS model. In particular, the
magnitude of error increases for short projection horizons and the short end of the yield
curve, which points at a poor ability of the V ECM system to account for the dynamics
of the domestic short-term interest rate. Overall, these ￿ndings call into question the
standard closed economy macro-￿nance speci￿cation of the term structure.
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Yields
1M 3M 6M 12M 24M 60M 120M total
NS Model 2.15 0.60 0.81 1.53 1.20 1.37 0.76 8.42
ATS Closed Economy 0.00 4.33 10.07 21.87 26.95 17.54 0.62 81.38
ATS Open Ec., restr. 0.00 8.80 15.31 24.33 40.03 34.05 35.14 157.66
ATS Open Ec., unrestr. 0.00 5.15 8.03 11.89 12.98 5.45 1.76 45.26
Note: Table reports sum of squared errors from the estimation of market prices of risk for a given
maturity horizon (in squared percentage points). SSE are reported for Nelson-Siegel model and a¢ ne
term structure models of a closed economy, an open economy with market prices of risk restricted to
domestic factors only and an open economy with market prices of risk that include both domestic and
foreign macroeconomic factors.
Table 2.8: Out-of-sample term structure forecasts for the closed economy model
Yields
1M 3M 6M 12M 24M 60M 120M
Horizon 1 month 10.88 10.30 8.96 6.63 4.48 3.31 3.99
2 months 11.80 11.08 9.15 6.71 4.71 3.73 4.39
3 months 11.62 10.41 8.56 6.24 4.56 3.83 4.48
6 months 7.87 7.01 5.89 4.57 3.78 3.52 3.77
9 months 4.65 4.17 3.66 3.19 2.92 3.00 3.08
12 months 2.97 2.77 2.59 2.49 2.35 2.53 2.73
18 months 2.20 2.11 2.03 2.01 1.92 2.11 2.39
Note: Table entries are RMSE ratios relative to the Nelson-Siegel model; the out-of-sample period is Jun.
2001 to Sep. 2009.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of the term structure for an open economy based on the
idea that domestic capital markets of an open economy are closely related to their exter-
nal counterparts. Therefore, the paper argues that the external macroeconomic factors
in￿ uence signi￿canly the domestic term structure of yields. To account for the in￿ uence
of spillovers from abroad and their e⁄ects on domestic transmission channels between
monetary policy, economic activity and asset prices, a structural cointegrated VAR ap-
proach is used to model macroeconomic factors, short rate and yield spread. Then the
term structure is built given restrictions implied by the no-arbitrage condition. Contrary
to previously proposed macro-￿nance models of the term structure, the model suggested
here explicitly accounts for ￿nancial and real spillovers between economies.
Put to data for the Swiss economy, the model explains the dynamics of yields well.
It also does a good job at predicting yields out-of-sample. It outperforms Nelson-Siegel
model across all maturities and for horizons up to 12 months ahead. In addition, the
model facilitates a relation between yields and exchange rates and accounts for the forward
74premium anomaly. Moreover, it is capable of capturing the impli￿cations of the uncovered
interest rate parity by recovering positive coe¢ cients on interest rate di⁄erential between
domestic and foreign short-term interest rates once the exchange rate risk premium is
considered. The model speci￿cation for a closed economy fares far worse in terms of both
the forecasting performance and the term structure ￿t which underlines the importance
of openness in modeling the dynamics of the term structure.
The model presented in this paper could be further improved by a more elaborate mod-
elling of the underlying market prices of risk. Improvements in terms of better predicting
power could also be expected once short-term dynamics in the V ECX￿ model of macro
factors are estimated subject to restrictions using Bayesian priors. This model can also
be integrated within a Global VAR (GVAR) setup so that the term structures of foreign
economies could be examined simultaneously with the yield curve of the base economy.
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Decoupling of Economies?
Evidence from a Global VAR
Analysis of Regional Spillovers
3.1 Introduction
During past decades economies have undoubtedly become more intertwined and complex.
In the course of globalization, national borders and regional di⁄erences have proved to
be less relevant as businesses increasingly started to operate in a single global market.
As the process of increasing economic interdependence advanced, emerging markets have
constantly increased their share in the world productive activity and account now for
roughly a quarter of world output and a major share of the global growth. Their share
of total world exports is almost 50%; they consume over a half of the world￿ s energy
and generate four-￿fths of the growth in oil demand. With economies becoming more
interlinked through ￿ ow of goods and money across national borders, emerging markets
tie closer together with the developed countries, making both more dependent on each
other￿ s economic performance.
Yet what recent developments in the global economy made apparent is that some
economies seem to divert. Output ￿gures reported in mid 2009 by Asia￿ s emerging
economies and BRICs (a widely used acronym referring to Brazil, Russia, India and China)
showed an impressive bounce, while the US GDP still fell. It seems that when America
su⁄ers from ￿nancial crisis, emerging economies slow down but they are unlikely to be
derailed; economic growth in emerging markets is observed to hold up even in face of a
global downturn and it shows signs of a strong recovery while developed economies still
su⁄er from economic turmoil. Such evidence for emerging markets clearly runs against
the idea of increased synchronization of business cycles across the world.
Stronger trade and ￿nancial linkages should contain decoupling of markets through
integration of the real economy and consolidating e⁄ects of ￿nancial interconnections.
Decreasing transport costs of shipping, declining tari⁄s, internationally integrated pro-
76duction, widely accessible information about production opportunities in foreign countries
and international movement of workers - all that makes the world more closely correlated.
Global ￿nancial markets tend to be even more tightly linked - through a rise in cross-
country listings, cross-border ownership, international composition of equity and bond
portfolios, to name just a few factors. Financial channels of integration tend to play an
important role in transmission of shocks between economies. For instance, tightening liq-
uidity conditions lead to banks pulling out their assets what quickly transmits the shocks
abroad.
In the many channels of the international distribution of shocks commodity prices
count as important means of transmission of spillovers. Shocks to those common global
factors may put additional strain on economies; yet an increased demand for commodities
bene￿ts their suppliers, i.e. emerging markets, and helps to o⁄set the e⁄ects of weakening
exports to developed countries. On the other hand, falling prices of commodity stocks
in the wake of recession can have damaging e⁄ects on exports and output of commodity
producers. In case of ￿nancial markets, new correlations across ￿nancial assets and limited
impact of disruptions on emerging economies are being observed. Emerging markets show
performance patterns in stock prices similar in scale to those of the developed countries;
they tend to rebound quicker and their ￿nancial markets appear to be less volatile than
previously known.
After all, having more integration and less synchronization at the same time does not
have to be so much of a contradiction. International trade tends to promote specialization
which weakens the correlation between economies. In addition, globalization and decou-
pling can be reconciled once such factors as improved ￿nancial and political policies, lower
in￿ ation due to improved monetary policy, improvement in the ￿scal discipline and large
currency reserves in the emerging markets have been taken into account. As many emerg-
ing economies are turning from being net foreign borrowers to net lenders with current
account surpluses, they tend to be less vulnerable to capital out￿ ows than they used to
be. Moreover, many emerging markets have a nearly balanced budgets which leave enough
room for a ￿scal stimulus in case of an economic downturn.
Recent empirical studies, however, do not provide unambiguous guidance concern-
ing the impact of increased trade and ￿nancial linkages on the co-movement among
macroeconomic aggregates across countries. They also present di⁄erent conclusions about
the temporal evolution of co-movement properties of the main macroeconomic variables.
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) look at the ￿nancial linkage and suggest that it can result in
a higher degree of business cycle co-movement by generating large wealth e⁄ects. How-
ever, ￿nancial links can also decrease the cross-country output correlations since they
promote specialization of production through the reallocation of capital according to coun-
tries￿comparative advantage. Helbling and Bayoumi (2003), Heathcote et al. (2004) and
Doyle and Faust (2005) ￿nd no change or even falling correlations between macroeconomic
aggregates of G-7 countries over time. Kose et al. (2003), on the other hand, study the
correlations between the ￿ uctuations in individual country aggregates (output, consump-
77tion, and investment) for a sample of 76 economies and suggest that both trade and
￿nancial linkages have a positive impact on cross-country output and consumption corre-
lations. Imbs (2006) shows that ￿nancial sector contributes to an increase in international
correlations in both consumption and GDP ￿ uctuations, with the latter e⁄ect being larger
than the former. Kose et al. (2008) employ a Bayesian dynamic latent factor model in
order to examine changes in business cycles over time and document that the degree of co-
movement of business cycles of major macroeconomic aggregates across the G-7 countries
has increased during the globalization period. Akin and Kose (2008) examine the nature
of growth spillovers between developed economies and developing countries driven by the
process of rising international trade and ￿nancial ￿ ows. They ￿nd evidence of a falling
impact of the economic activity in industrial economies on the developing countries and
document a set of stylized facts that indicate intensifying intra-group growth spillovers.
As a result, the nature of economic interactions between those groups of countries is said
to "have evolved from one of dependence to multidimensional interdependence". Study of
Kose et al. (2008) gives support to the idea that business cycle among industrial economies
and among emerging ones converge within each group, but it also ￿nds evidence for di-
vergence between those groups. Rising trade and ￿nancial integration seem not to be
associated with global convergence in business cycles but instead lead to emergence of
group-speci￿c cycles. However, by taking only ￿ uctuations in a few macroeconomic vari-
ables into consideration, the paper focuses on the real side of the economies only and it
lacks incorporation of ￿nancial aggregates.
The objective in this paper is to evaluate the degree of synchronization or decoupling in
international business cycles across economies within a global vector autoregressive model
(GVAR). This study relates to the empirical literature on international business cycles
and economic spillovers between countries, in particular to Akin and Kose (2008) and
Kose et al. (2008), and it also builds on the econometric literature on GVAR models. As
with respect to the latter, it draws from Pesaran et al. (2004), Pesaran and Smith (2006)
and Dees et al. (2007), where global VAR models were applied to analyse international
interdependencies using trade-based linkage parameters. It also relates to the research
work of Galesi and Sgherri (2009), where ￿nancial weights based on BIS data1 were used,
the focus, however, was limited to the USA and a number of European economies only.
My paper puts the questions of decoupling and globalization into the GVAR framework.
It extends the existing research program by enriching the panel dimension of the model
(40 countries under analysis are grouped into several regions according to the MSCI Barra
classi￿cation) and by including both ￿nancial and trade-based linkage in order to model
the international interdependencies in a more precise way. Set of variables comprises of
aggregates for the real sector as well as the ￿nancial one and property markets. Oil price
index is included as a common global variable.
1Bank for International Settlement (BIS) disseminates consolidated banking sector statistics for on-
balance sheet ￿nancial claims on the rest of the world. The quarterly data cover contractual lending by
the head o¢ ce and all its branches and subsidiaries on a worldwide consolidated basis.
78In order to accommodate the possibility of structural breaks in data, which is readily
potential given the time span and the cross-country dimension of the model, I conduct
tests of structural stability of parameters and analyse the impact of di⁄erent weighting
schemes used to produce foreign country-speci￿c variables. Furthermore, to address a
frequent critique of utilizing constant or averaged weights in GVAR systems I incorporate
time-varying weights into the model and set up a submodel for weights which can be
used for projections of changes in interlinkages between countries in the impulse response
analysis. This model allows for feedback between macroeconomic variables and weights
and thus accounts for the dynamic character of links between economies. In essence,
employing time-varying weights leads to time-varying parameters of the GVAR system.
In general, GVAR models are speci￿cally designed to account for an interaction be-
tween large number of countries and spillovers between real and ￿nancial sectors. This
framework allows to study macroeconomic relationships and ￿nancial linkages through
such variables as interest rates and equity prices and provides a comprehensive tool for
analysis of cointegration among ￿nancial markets and real sectors. Therefore, by employ-
ing this estimation tool I expect to address the following questions: Are there common-
alities in the dynamics of the real and ￿nancial aggregates across countries and regions?
What is the impact of both trade and ￿nancial linkages on the global business cycles?
The analysis in this paper is concerned with the international transmission channels of
real and ￿nancial shocks. First of all, this transmission mechanism includes the impact of
international trade on the aggregate supply and demand. Changes in disposable income
and real exchange rates across economies in￿ uence terms of trade and the demand in
the domestic economy. Growth in foreign liquidity or income raises demand for domestic
goods and currency leading to a strengthening of the domestic currency in value. The
second transmission channel operates through ￿nancial interrelations. Impact of ￿nancial
linkages relates to capital ￿ ows that simply follow return di⁄erentials. Higher real rates
of return on domestic assets, e.g. interest rates, equity returns and real estate property
values, stimulate the demand for domestic currency as more investors favor investing in
the domestic market. Increases in domestic in￿ ation rates and income, on the other
hand, cause the demand for foreign goods to raise and the purchasing power to fall.
Third, ￿nancial aggregates respond to changes in business cycles and expectations about
future real activity, both domestic and foreign. On the other hand, ￿nancial conditions,
e.g. interest rates and asset prices, in￿ uence economic growth though credit cycles and
wealth accumulation. Moreover, the rising prominence of emerging economies re-orders
the international transmission channels in that it adds speci￿c macroeconomic factors
that presumably in￿ uence the global business cycles. Those factors include high economic
growth and rapidly increasing base of the global demand, but also underdeveloped ￿nancial
markets, higher in￿ ation, exchange rate and capital controls and a speci￿c structure of
exports.
In this paper, I report two major results about the degree of synchronization among
developed, emerging and frontier economies. First, the ￿ndings suggest that the devel-
79opment in international ￿nancial markets and cross-border trade activity seem to expand
the transmission of shocks abroad and to amplify business cycle ￿ uctuations to regions
where the integration is greater, especially as a result of asset price movements. Impulse
responses of real sectors tend to mildly support the idea of decoupling of economies, show-
ing evidence of slightly di⁄erent paths of economic performance across regions. Second,
￿nancial linkages tend to substantially alter the dynamics of the macroeconomic aggre-
gates across economies by adding moderation and, to some extent, more disattachement
among regions. As more countries join the single global market, new linkage constellations
and spillover patterns emerge. Contrary to the convergence hypothesis, rising trade-based
and ￿nancial linkages seem to partly endorse group-speci￿c business cycles. However,
parameter uncertainty and nuanced but substantial impact of the modeling strategy in
construction of weakly exogenous variables must be taken into account when interpreting
the results.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief description of GVAR
framework, discusses the outcome of Monte Carlo experiments and presents structural
stability tests of the data used in the analysis. Section 3 reports results of the estimation
of the model, including the analysis of dynamic characteristics through impulse responses
and variance decompositions. Section 4 elaborates on counterfactuals and the model for
time-varying weights while the last section concludes.
3.2 Methodology and data
The spillover e⁄ects are modelled in a GVAR approach that follows Pesaran et al. (2004),
and Dees et al. (2007). This model admits inclusion of a relatively large number of coun-
tries and modeling co-movement in ￿nancial and real variables. In this approach individual
vector error correction models are linked to each other by country-speci￿c foreign variables
in each country￿ s VAR.
Empirical models usually su⁄er from heavy parametrization when the number of coun-
tries is relatively large compared to the time dimension. Global macroeconomic literature
proposes two methods of dealing with this problem: (i) data shrinkage, as for instance in
factor models, (ii) shrinkage of the parameter space, e.g. as developed in spatial models.
However, those methods in general and the factor models in particular have the disad-
vantage that they bring about identi￿cation problems or information loss. Factor models
usually do not use or test for long-run cointegrating relations and loose therefore a lot of
the long-run information contained in data. Estimated factors tend to be di¢ cult to inter-
pret in economic terms, particularly when there are many variables for many countries. In
addition, factors that are crucial for one country may get ignored when accounting for only
a small part of the global variance. Increasing the number of factors reduces the attraction
of the procedure and makes the interpretation of results more di¢ cult. GVAR models,
on the other hand, address all those shortcomings; they represent a way to overcome the
dimensionality problem by modeling links between countries through foreign variables cal-
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advantage of employing foreign variables with a natural theoretical interpretation and us-
ing the information in trade patterns or ￿nancial linkages. Moreover, GVAR models allow
a transparent long-run theoretical structure and permit testing and imposing, if necessary,
short-run overidentifying theoretical restrictions.
In my paper country-speci￿c foreign variables are constructed by means of both trade-
based and ￿nancial weights so that the importance of the ￿ ow of good and money has been
accounted for. Mixed weights are calculated according to the relative size of the ￿nancial
sector in a country as indicated by stock market capitalization, private bond market capi-
talization and bank assets relative to GDP. Using mixed weights represents an original con-
tribution to the GVAR modeling framework; Pesaran et al. (2004) and Dees et al. (2007)
employ weights based on cross-country trade ￿ ows while Galesi and Sgherri (2009) use
￿nancial weights only. Vansteenkiste (2007) uses weights based on geographical distances
whereas Hiebert and Vansteenkiste (2007) adopt weights calculated from sectoral input-
output tables for various industries.
3.2.1 Structure of the model
The GVAR model presented here comprises of 40 countries which are modelled individually
as vector autoregressions. Each country￿ s VAR embeds country domestic variables xit,
country-speci￿c foreign variables x￿
it and a global common variable dt, whereas the latter
two are assumed to be weakly exogenous to the global economy2. In particular, each
country i is modelled as a V ARX￿ (p;q;s), that is a VAR augmented by weakly exogenous
I (1) variables, with p, q and s being lag order terms for xit, x￿
it and dt respectively; in
case of V ARX￿ (1;1;1), presented here for the sake of simplicity, the model is given by
xit = ai0 + ai1t + ￿ixit￿1 + ￿i0x￿
it + ￿i1x￿
it￿1 + ￿i0dt + ￿i1dt￿1 + "it (3.1)
for t = 1;2;:::;T and i = 1;2;:::;N. ￿i is a ki ￿ k￿
i matrix of coe¢ cients associated
to lagged domestic variables, ￿i0 and ￿i1 are ki ￿ k￿
i matrices of coe¢ cients related to
contemporaneous and lagged foreign variables, respectively, while ￿i0 and ￿i1 are ki ￿ s
matrices of coe¢ cients associated to contemporaneous and lagged global common variable.
ai0 is a ki￿1 vector of ￿xed intercepts, ai1 is a ki￿1 vector of coe¢ cients of the deterministic
time trend and "it is a a ki ￿ 1 vector of country-speci￿c shocks assumed to be serially
uncorrelated with a zero mean and a non-singular covariance matrix ￿ii = ￿ii;lm where
2Weak exogeneity refers to foreign variables in the sense that they a⁄ect the domestic variables con-
temporaneously but they are not a⁄ected by disequilibria in the domestic economy. However, foreign
variables could be a⁄ected by lagged changes of domestic and foreign variables. Technically speaking, in
error correcting regressions of changes in foreign variables in the model none of the lagged error correction
terms associated with the domestic economy should be statistically signi¢ cant. Therefore - in the context
of partial single￿ country sub-systems of the GVAR - weak exogeneity di⁄ers from the notion of "Granger
(Non)Causality" which would imply that none of the domestic variables be allowed to enter the regression
for the foreign variables. Granger and Lin (1995) refer to weakly exogenous I (1) variables as "long-run"
forcing.
81￿ii;lm = cov("ilt;"imt) and
"it ￿ i:i:d:(0;￿ii) (3.2)
It is also assumed that
E
￿
"it;"0
jt0
￿
=
(
￿ij for t = t0
0 for t 6= t0
)
(3.3)
which allows for cross-country correlation among the idiosyncratic shocks. As a result,
GVAR model facilitates interactions among the di⁄erent economies through (i) contem-
poraneous relationship between domestic variables xit, foreign country-speci￿c variables
x￿
it and a global common variable dt, with their lagged values and (ii) contemporaneous
interrelation between the shocks in country i and the shocks in country j, as characterized
by the cross-country covariances ￿ij, where ￿ij = cov("it;"jt) = E
￿
"it;"0
jt0
￿
, for i 6= j.
The global VAR representation arises directly from the individual country-V ARX￿
equations. After grouping both the domestic and the foreign-speci￿c variables in one
vector
zit =
￿
xit
x￿
it
￿
(3.4)
each country￿ s model can be rewritten as
Aizit = ai0 + ai1t + Bizit￿1 + ￿i0dt + ￿i1dt￿1 + "it (3.5)
where
Ai = (Iki;￿￿i0) and Bi = (￿i;￿i1) (3.6)
Then, by grouping all domestic variables in one vector
xt =
0
B B
B B
@
x1t
x2t
. . .
xNt
1
C C
C C
A
(3.7)
and due to the fact that country speci￿c foreign variables are constructed as weighted
averages it is possible to express following identity
zit = Wixt , i = 1;2;:::;N (3.8)
where Wi is a country-speci￿c link matrix constructed on basis of mixed ￿nancial and
trade statistic-based weights.
Reformulation of (3.5) leads to following equation
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and, ￿nally, to the GVAR(1) model by simply stacking all country equations to
Gxt = a0 + a1 + Hxt￿1 + ￿0dt + ￿1dt￿1 + "t (3.10)
where
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Provided that G matrix is not singular, one can restate the model as
xt = b0 + b1 + Fxt￿1 + ￿0dt + ￿1dt￿1 + ut (3.13)
where
b0 = G￿1a0 , b1 = G￿1a1 , F = G￿1H , ￿0 = G￿1￿0 , ￿1 = G￿1￿1 , ut = G￿1"t
(3.14)
3.2.2 Estimation
Due to a considerable dimension of the GVAR model, estimation of (3.13) cannot be ac-
complished by means of a standard VAR estimation procedure. It would involve evaluation
of a number of parameters that cannot be supported even for high values of T3. How-
ever, this complication can be tackled in a special procedure that rests upon estimation of
each country￿ s partial model separately and computation of the country speci￿c weights
wij from the empirical data (rather than getting their estimates out of the model). This
procedure can be justi￿ed when following conditions hold:
3High N-dimension leads to problems with consistent estimation of the model and issues of endogeneity
of country-speci￿c country variables. The literature suggests to either shrink the parameter space or de￿ ate
the data in order to guarantee consistency. Chudik and Pesaran (2009) propose - for so called in￿nite-
dimensional VARs (IVAR) - to shrink part of the parameter space in the limit as the number of endogenous
variables (N) tends to in￿nity. Bussiere et al. (2009), on the other hand, pay particular attention to the
modeling strategy; they test the number of long-run relationships in di⁄erent subsets of country-speci￿c
models.
83￿ The global model is dynamically stable, i.e. eigenvalues of the matrix F lie either
on or inside the unit circle,
￿ The weights wij used to construct foreign variables x￿
it are relatively small such that
N X
j=0
w2
ij ￿! 0 , as N ￿! 1 , 8i (3.15)
￿ The cross-dependence of the idiosyncratic shocks must be su¢ ciently small
PN
j=1 ￿ij;lm
N
￿! 0 , as N ￿! 1 , 8i;l;m (3.16)
where ￿ij;lm = cov("ilt;"jmt) is the covariance of the variable l in the country i with
the variable m in the country j.
All of those requirements are met in my GVAR model. First, the model is dynamically
stable, as the moduli of the 201 eigenvalues of the F matrix are all within the unit circle.
In particular, the number of eigenvalues lying on the unit circle is 53. Second, the mixed
weights are relatively small, i.e. they are su¢ ciently "granular" for each country as none
of them is too close to one. The largest observed weights, when taken from the middle of
the sample, are 0.6697 for the weight of the USA towards Canada and 0.4449 for Germany
towards Austria. Third, the idiosyncratic shocks are weakly correlated; the value for the
average correlation from the third condition listed above equals 0.0034.
Overall, estimation of the GVAR model involves:
￿ constructing country-speci￿c foreign variables x￿
it,
￿ selection of the appropriate lag orders of the domestic, foreign and global variables,
￿ identi￿cation of the cointegration rank for each country￿ s model given existence of
I(1) variables and subject to reduced rank restriction; each country-V ARX￿ model
from (3.1) is estimated in its error-correction form using Johansen￿ s (Johansen (1992)
and Johansen (1995)) reduced-rank procedure. In particular, in the model applied
in this paper regressions are performed by restricting the trend coe¢ cients into the
cointegrating space, while allowing the intercept coe¢ cients to be unrestricted in
levels.
Each country￿ s V ARX￿ model is estimated under an assumption that a process fvitg
1
0
de￿ned as:
vit =
￿
zit
dt
￿
=
0
B
@
xit
x￿
it
dt
1
C
A (3.17)
is generated by a vector autoregression for country i
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I ￿
p X
s=1
DisLs
!
(vit ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿t) = ￿it (3.18)
where L stands for a lag operator.
De￿ning matrices ￿i = (
Pp
s=1 Dis ￿ I) and ￿is = ￿
Pp
k=s+1 Dik, the model can be
rewritten in its error-correction form as
￿vit = ai0 + ai1t ￿ ￿ivi;t￿1 +
p￿1 X
s=1
￿is￿vi;t￿s + ￿it (3.19)
with
ai0 = ￿￿i￿i + (￿i + ￿i)￿i (3.20)
ai1 = ￿￿i￿i
￿i = I ￿
p￿1 X
s=1
￿is
In this speci￿cation, matrix ￿i contains long-run multipliers and the matrices f￿isg
p￿1
s=1
include short-run parameters.
Then, by restricting the trend coe¢ cients into the cointegrating space, while allowing
the intercept coe¢ cients to be unrestricted in levels, i.e. ai1 = ￿i￿i, the error-correction
equation in each country-V ARX￿ (1;1;1) model takes following form
￿xit = ci0 ￿ ￿i[vit￿1 ￿ ￿i(t ￿ 1)] + ￿i0￿x￿
it + ￿i0￿dt + "it (3.21)
where
vit￿1 =
￿
zit￿1
dt￿1
￿
and ci0 = ai0 + ￿i￿i (3.22)
Matrix ￿i can be written as
￿i = ￿i￿0
i = (Ai ￿ Bi;￿￿i0 ￿ ￿i1) (3.23)
where ￿i is a ki ￿ ri loading matrix of rank ri, ￿i is a (ki + k￿
i + s) ￿ ri matrix of
cointegrating vectors of rank ri. ￿i speci￿es the number of long-run relationships that exist
among domestic variables xit, country-speci￿c foreign variables x￿
it and the common global
variable dt. If no cointegrating relationships exist, (3.21) collapses to a V AR regression in
￿rst di⁄erences.
The speci￿cation of cointegrating relationships a⁄ects substantially the stability of the
GVAR system as well as the behavior of impulse response functions. Therefore I addi-
tionally consider estimation of smaller GVAR systems with di⁄erent subsets of countries.
Since around 8% of foreign country-speci￿c time series are indicated by tests not to be
85weakly exogenous (as reported in Table C.5 in Appendix) I also examine sub-systems with
only some of the foreign variables. Furthermore, I compare the outcome of the Johansen
procedure with results of ARDL regressions (for each country i) of long-run relations that
may possibly be found in the data, i.e. output gap between domestic and foreign output,
uncovered interest rate parity between domestic and foreign interest rate, long-run interest
rate rule, domestic and foreign equity premia, long-run relations between domestic and
foreign equity and housing markets and long-run relation between domestic credit and
GDP. Finally, I conduct Monte Carlo experiments to investigate the issue of the speci￿-
cation of the cointegrating relations further. Results of these MC exercises are reported
in Section 2.4.
3.2.3 Identi￿cation of shocks
The GVAR approach presented in this paper builds upon variables directly observed in
the economy. Contrary to DSGE modeling, which - for the purpose of derivation of the
long-run, steady-state relations of the macroeconomics - starts with the intertemporal op-
timization problem faced by the agents of the economy and solves the Euler ￿rst order
conditions, V ARX￿ subsystems work directly with the arbitrage conditions which provide
intertemporal links between prices and asset returns. DSGE approach￿ s strength lies in
the explicit identi￿cation of unobserved macroeconomic disturbances as shocks to tastes,
technology, policy, demand or supply so that a statement on the form of the short-term
dynamics can be formulated; this is, however, achieved at the expense of strong assump-
tions regarding the functional form of underlying processes. GVAR approach, on the other
hand, accepts that the economic theory is more likely to provide a coherent guide to the
long-run characteristics of the macroeconomy and it is less con￿dent about the short-term
dynamics.
The di¢ culty of the GVAR approach concerns the disability to account for the iden-
ti￿cation of the shocks which are unobservable by nature. However, if it is the case that
economic theory is insu¢ ciently well-de￿ned to supply credible identifying restrictions on
the short-run behavior of economic agents, this approach can be capable of providing su¢ -
cient information about the dynamics of the model as well as being informative about the
consequences of shocks. Rather than seeking the precise reason behind the occurrence of
shocks, using generalized impulse response functions within GVAR establishes a method
of coherent analysis of shocks in observable macroeconomic aggregates which is invariant
to the ordering of the variables. From this point of view, the GVAR analysis does not
require economic identi￿cation of shocks. The identi￿cation problem arises only when it
is further required to decompose the e⁄ects of the shocks in the observed variables into
unobserved theoretical concepts. In this case VAR approach has to be accompanied by
additional restrictions from the economic theory.
Following the exposition in Garratt et al. (2006), a more detailed a priori modeling of
expectations, production, consumption, technology etc. and of the short-run dynamics is
86required. That is, further restriction must be placed on the contemporaneous relationships
among variables, for instance, to a model for country i given in equation (3.19):
Ai￿vit =
_
ai0 +
_
ai1t ￿
_
￿i￿0
ivi;t￿1 +
p￿1 X
s=1
_
￿is￿vi;t￿s + !it (3.24)
where Ai represents a matrix of contemporaneous structural coe¢ cients,
_
ai0 = Aiai0,
_
ai1 = Aiai1,
_
￿i = Ai￿i,
_
￿is = Ai￿is, and !it = Ai￿it are the structural shocks (for instance,
to policy rate or to technology) which are serially uncorrelated and have zero means
and a positive de￿nite covariance matrix ￿i = Ai￿￿iA0
i. Restrictions on Ai incorporate
description of decision rules followed by the agents and identify their use of information
and the exact timing of the information ￿ ows4.
In a structural vector autoregression framework, using restrictions on the contempo-
raneous relationships between variables, as captured by the matrix Ai, can be combined
with other methods of identi￿cation of shocks. Dungey and Fry (2009) nest three iden-
ti￿cation methods, short-run restrictions, sign restrictions and long-run restrictions, in
a model with ￿scal, monetary and other macroeconomic variables. In particular, they
use short-run restrictions on the non-￿scal variables, identify ￿scal policy shocks using a
minimal set of sign restrictions and leave other relationships to be determined by data.
These restrictions are then applied in conjunction with information from the cointegrat-
ing relationships between macroeceonomic variables to model the long run in a way that
accounts for both permanent and transitory shocks in a model with both stationary and
non-stationary data and allows the use of cointegrating relations as a means of identi￿ca-
tion as in Pagan and Pesaran (2008).
Another aspect of the identi￿cation of shocks in V ARX￿ sub-systems of the GVAR
model concerns the exact identi￿cation of shocks of all observable variables - both do-
mestic and foreign. To that account, Dees et al. (2007) propose identi￿cation scheme of
Sims and Zha (2006) where di⁄erent ordering of variables is considered.
3.2.4 Monte Carlo experiments
Monte Carlo experiments are conducted in order to examine properties of cointegration
tests and the stability of cointegrating relations among variables. In the baseline Monte
Carlo experiment I use the GVAR model parameters as the data generating process for
N = 40 countries under study. Assuming that the residuals are randomly distributed with
variance-covariance matrix equal to the estimate from the data, R = 10000 replications of
the model are generated and each time number of cointegrating relations is tested using
the Johansen procedure. Then, as an alternative to the baseline experiment, a smaller
4Garratt et al. (2006) in chapters 5 and 10 elaborate on implementation of such restrictions in case
of a monetary policy shock. Identi￿cation of this disturbance includes a formulation of the monetary
authority￿ s decision problem, a derivation of the policy rate, an expression of the policy rate￿ s reaction
function and, ￿nally, a speci￿cation of the structural interest rate equation.
For further reference see also Binder et al. (2010).
87model of N0 = 10 countries is considered in order to assess e⁄ects of the panel dimension
of the GVAR on performance of cointegration statistics. In each case two speci￿cations
of both models are allowed for - with lag order speci￿ed in advance or determined by an
information criterion - so that the impact of augmentation of the VAR by possible lags is
taken into account.
In addition, I design further Monte Carlo experiments to address the issue of di⁄erent
speci￿cation of weights for foreign variables and to examine the signi￿cance of a structural
break in data arising from the recent ￿nancial crisis. First, I test the impact of weights
by running two Monte Carlo simulations - one with trade-based weights and one with a
time-varying weighting scheme. Second, by using GVAR parameters and the variance-
covariance matrix for a model estimated from the sample that ends in November 2007
I assess robustness of the model with respect to structural breaks in the data. As done
before, both the panel dimension (N) as well we the impact of augmentation induced by
a possible lag order are taken into consideration. Table C.16 presents results of all MC
experiments.
The ￿ndings of the baseline experiment suggest that in case of the trace statistic, which
has been used to determine the number of long-run relations, the size of the cointegration
test is quite poor (10,50%) while the power is good (95,72%). Weak size property means
that the trace statistic tends to overestimate the number of cointegrating relations for
the model. The outcome of the MC investigation also implies that the trace statistic
underperforms slightly the maximum eigenvalue statistic both in terms of size (10,02%)
and power (99,40%). However, when a larger subset of countries is considered, performance
of the maximum eigenvalue test depletes (size increases to above 17% and power decreases
slightly to 98,25%) whereas the trace test retains its qualities for size and improves in
power (10,21% and 98,61%, respectively). This result is broadly in line with ￿ndings in
the literature which suggest that the trace statistic should usually be preferred because it
is more robust to departures from the assumption of normality of residuals.
Outcome for the MC experiment with parameter estimates stemming from a shorter
data sample does not di⁄er substantially from previous results except for the maximum
eigenvalue statistic in case of N = 10 countries (8,08% size versus 10,02% and 91,44%
power versus 99,40%). Maximum eigenvalue test seems to sporadically outperform the
trace statistic, in particular when the cross-country dimension of the model is small.
Moreover, using trade-based weights instead of mixed weights does not alter the overall
picture of tests￿performance; when compared to the baseline experiment, size and power
improve for both statistics in case of the smaller sample but they worsen slightly as a result
of an increased panel dimension. In addition, Table C.16 shows that using time-varying
weights for construction of the foreign variables considerably improves the e¢ ciency of
both cointegration tests in case of small N-dimension. Time-varying weights lead to zero-
defect power while letting the tests￿size to stay largely below 10%. However, as the
cross-county dimension increases, size of the maximum eigenvalue statistic weakens by
reaching almost 18%.
88Overall, it should be noted that these results stem from a speci￿c formulation of the
GVAR model which, in reality, must not match the true data generating process. In
particular, during all replications correct number of lags was imposed. The evidence in
the literature (among others Mackinnon et al. (1999)) documents that the accuracy of the
cointegration tests depends heavily on the sample size, the number of lags in the vector
autoregression and the data-generating process. Therefore, it can be expected that the
true test performance is likely to be worse than the results shown in the ￿rst four columns
of Table C.16.
As shown in the last four columns of Table C.16, when the assumption of known lag
order in the model is alleviated and lag order is allowed to be speci￿ed by an information
criterion, size and power of cointegration tests tend to worsen, regardless of the weighting
scheme or existence of structural breaks. Trace statistic, however, tends to improve in
both size and power (for instance in case of the baseline model 11,29% versus 14,37% for
size and 96,56% compared to 94,63% for power) as the number of countries in the model
(N) increases. Results for the maximum eigenvalue statistic, on the other hand, point at
a worse performance of that test when N gets larger and the lag order in the model is not
prespeci￿ed but instead determined in each replication by a criterion.
3.2.5 Data
A vector of domestic variables
xit =
￿
eq0
it;cc0
it;re0
it;ir0
it;gdp0
it
￿0 (3.25)
contains a real equity price index (eqit), a real credit to economy (ccit), comprising
public and private sector loans, a real housing market index (reit), a short term interest
rate (irit) and real output (gdpit). The underlying variables are built in a following way:
eqit = ln(EQit=CPIit), ccit = ln(CCit=CPIit), reit = ln(REit=CPIit), (3.26)
irit = 1=12 ￿ ln(1 + Rit=100), gdpit = ln(GDPit=CPIit)
where
EQit = nominal equity price index of country i during period t (total return index),
CPIit = consumer price index,
CCit = total nominal credit to economy,
REit = nominal housing market index,
Rit = nominal rate of interest per annum,
GDPit = nominal gross domestic product.
A vector of country-speci￿c foreign variables consists of domestic variables￿counter-
parts
89x￿
it =
￿
eq￿0
it;cc￿0
it;re￿0
it;ir￿0
it;gdp￿0
it
￿0 (3.27)
for all countries except for the base economy in the model (the United States) for
which x￿
it omits real output gdp￿
it. Since the base economy is considered to be dominant,
it is expected that its foreign output index is not going to be weakly exogenous. Indeed,
test of weak exogeneity re-con￿rm this assumption later on.
In order to facilitate a possibility of feedback from economies to the common global
variable, dt is assumed to be endogenous for the base economy; in case of the remaining
countries it is considered to be exogenous.
The choice of data in this paper conforms with the standard proceedings in the lit-
erature except for the fact that in addition to the main macroeconomic aggregates ￿-
nancial variables such as equity prices, housing market indices and short term inter-
est rates are employed. For instance, Kose et al. (2008) concentrate on output, invest-
ment and consumption; Imbs (2006) analyse GDP, consumption and merchandise exports;
Heathcote et al. (2004) study ￿ uctuation in GDP, consumption, investment, employment
and the changes in the US foreign direct investments. The empirical macroeconomic VAR
literature, on the other hand, usually includes output, short term interest rates, in￿ ation,
equity prices and exchange rates into the analysis5. This speci￿cation of variables allows
to examine the intra-sectoral spillovers between the real activity, credit supply in the econ-
omy and the ￿nancial system, represented by bond, equity and real estate markets. In
this paper, the choice of variables allows to account for the relationship between credit
supply, interest rates and output (e.g. increase in investment and output as a result of
raising credit supply in response to falling interest rates), reaction of bond (i.e. short term
interest rates) and equity markets to output growth, the relation between interest rates,
credit supply, and the equity and housing markets (i.e. the in￿ uence of liquidity conditions
on asset prices), and the interrelationship between the real activity and commodity prices.
The dataset runs from January 1999 until March 2009 on a monthly frequency. It
comprises Bloomberg data for stock prices (MSCI country indices) and 1-month interbank
interest rates. The data on total credit to economy, output at market prices and con-
sumer price indices come from IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics. Quarterly GDP
is interpolated from the monthly industrial production (from IMF￿ s IFS and Eurostat)
using technique proposed in Salazar et al. (1997) and Mitchell et al. (2005), except for
Australia, where no GDP index is employed6. Utilizing industrial production as the only
5See for instance Pesaran et al. (2004), Dees et al. (2007) and Galesi and Sgherri (2009).
6As opposed to data-based techniques which in general rely on mathematical interpolation,
Salazar et al. (1997) and Mitchell et al. (2005) present a model-based approach which refers to methods
developed by Chow and Lin (1971, 1976) and makes explicit use of conditional expectations.
In short, the authors assume that the hypothetical vector of high frequency endogenous variables which
are observed only in low frequency can be linked to strictly exogenous regressors (indicators) by a linear
model. This regression is then solved by minimizing the sums of squares of the residuals subject to
the constraint that the interpolated high frequency values in each sub-period sum up to the known low
frequency totals. The model is estimated numerically by solving non-linear ￿rst order conditions subject
to some initial values and the desired degree of accuracy.
90indication of GDP may lead to exaggeratedly volatile output ￿gures, however, since for
many countries no reliable monthly data on consumption, private services or public spend-
ing is readily available, industrial production aggregates are uniformly used to preserve
some degree of consistency throughout the data. When not previously performed, series
are adjusted for seasonality using the Census X12 procedure7.
Housing market indices are taken from Datastream (FTSE EPRA NAREIT or DJTM
Real Estate; if none of them was available, DJTM Construction was adopted as a proxy
for housing market). In case of the United States NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market
Index (HMI) is applied.
Oil prices are represented by DJ UBS-Crude Oil Total Return Sub-Index.
The GVAR model in this paper resorts to both trade-based and ￿nancial weights for
the purpose of construction of foreign-speci￿c variables. Trade weights are computed from
IMF￿ s Direction of Trade Statistics quarterly data. Financial weights are derived from
cross-country bank lending exposures data (also on quarterly basis) reported by BIS as a
part of BIS Quarterly Review (tables 9B and 6A). The weights data run from December
1998 till March 2009. Calculation of mixed weights employs data from the Financial
Structure Dataset of the World Bank as of January 2009. For the purpose of estimation
mixed weights from the middle of the sample are put to use.
While conducting regional impulse response analysis, impulse response functions are
aggregated according to weights based on yearly PPP data from Penn World Tables (1998
to 2007) for all countries under study.
Since the data in the model stretch over 10 years and include a number of develop-
ing economies which were subject to signi￿cant political, social and structural reforms,
structural breaks are quite likely to be found in the time series. Even though the GVAR
can accommodate co-breaking through the single-country V ARX￿ submodels that may
be more robust to the possibility of structural changes as compared to reduced form single
equation models, the presence of structural instability in data could have a considerable
impact on the parameters of the model. Therefore I perform several stability tests following
Dees et al. (2007) and consider tests that are based on the residuals of the individual equa-
tions of the country-speci￿c error correction models. To this account I include maximum
OLS cumulative sum (CUSUM) statistic of Ploberger and Kraemer (1992) (denoted as PK
sup) as well as its mean square version (PK msq), tests for parameter constancy against
non-stationary alternatives proposed by Nyblom (1989) and, ￿nally, sequential Wald type
tests of a one-time structural change at an unknown change point. The latter tests include
Quandt (1960) likelihood ratio statistic (QLR), the mean Wald statistic of Hansen (1992)
and a test based on the exponential average proposed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994)
(APW). In addition, heteroscedasticity-robust version of the above tests are reported.
Table C.17 presents results of the tests computed at the 5% signi￿cance level. Critical
values are computed using bootstrap samples obtained from the GVAR model. The tests
indicate a considerable evidence of structural instability in the data. In particular, equity
7See page http://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/ for more information.
91prices and interest rates seem to undergo structural changes. However, when robust variant
of the statistics are considered, it becomes apparent that the instability mainly a⁄ects error
variances and its impact on the coe¢ cient estimates is rather limited. In order to deal with
the problem of unstable error variances I use robust standard errors when investigating
the impact e⁄ects of foreign variables and impulse response functions.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 The mixed weights
The mixed weights are used to compute country-speci￿c foreign variables x￿
it which repre-
sent both ￿nancial in￿ uence of a partner economy for a given country and a trade-based
interlinkage between the two. In particular, foreign variables are speci￿ed as averages
x￿
it =
N X
j=1
wijxjt (3.28)
where
wii = 0 , and
N X
j=1
wij = 1 , 8i = 1;2;:::;N (3.29)
Financial weights are calculated from the BIS data on bank lending exposures; trade
weights are based on trade direction statistics of the IMF. The mixed weights are con-
structed in proportion to the relative size of the ￿nancial sector in the economy of the
domestic country for a given time period. This size is measured according to following
parameters of the ￿nancial structure disseminated by the World Bank:
￿ claims on domestic real non-￿nancial sector by deposit money banks as a share of
GDP,
￿ value of listed shares to GDP,
￿ private domestic debt securities issued by ￿nancial institutions and corporations as
a share of GDP.
Aggregation weights for regions are based on averages of Purchasing Power Parity
GDPs of all countries under study, for the period 1997 to 2007.
Due to addition of the ￿nancial weights, the mixed weights tend to be more volatile
than their trade-based counterparts. When compared over time, linkage patterns reveal
interesting integration characteristics, which are similar for both trade-based and ￿nancial
weights.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 reveal, with a notable exception of developed countries, a shift
towards tighter links within economies from the same group. Emerging markets tend to
gain on importance regardless of the origin of their partner economy. Frontier markets and
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Figure 3.1: Direction of interdependencies over time, based on trade weights.
emerging economies seem to grow together whereas developed markets have a disposition
to loosen the bonds among themselves. In addition, ￿nancial weights illustrate "￿ ight to
quality" in a slightly more pronounced way than the trade-based weights as the links to
developed markets seem to have picked up a little bit lately, which suggest that developed
economies tend to be a favoured ￿nancial partner at times of economic turmoil.
The trade-based weights show that the linkage between emerging markets has risen
particularly strong. During the period under study the intra-group trade of emerging
economies nearly doubled - from 18% in September 1999 to 33% in March 2009. At the
same time emerging markets￿trade with the developed countries declined from almost
80% to 65%. Similar proneness characterizes trade links of the frontier markets, yet with
a signi￿cantly lower share of trade within this group itself. Overall, the trade statistics
suggest that the centre of gravity for the ￿ ow of goods has been moving in the direction
of emerging markets and, to a lesser extent, frontier markets.
The tendency observed in the structure of ￿nancial and trade-based weights leads
in e⁄ect to results of Kose et al. (2008). The authors apply a dynamic factor model
and identify a few common factors that drive ￿ uctuations in macroeconomic aggregates
on a global scale, within a group of countries and within all variables in one country.
They ￿nd that the global and the country group speci￿c factors account for a signi￿cant
share of ￿ uctuations in output, investment and consumption across countries. The biggest
share is carried by industrial economies but the factor contributions are not equal - they
tend to di⁄er between variables. However, the authors observe a decrease in the average
93contribution of the global factor which supports the hypothesis of decoupling of economies.
Contrary to the declining importance of the global factor, the group-speci￿c factors tend to
gain on importance. While con￿rming that the support for the global convergence weakens,
Kose et al. (2008) ￿nd evidence for a higher degree of synchronization in business cycles
within groups.
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Figure 3.2: Direction of interdependencies over time, based on ￿nancial weights.
3.3.2 Integration properties of the model
The underlying assumption of the GVAR model estimation in this paper is that of the
unitary order of integration for all variables included in the model. Tables C.3 and C.4
present results for augmented Dickey-Fuller GLS test proposed by Elliot et al. (1996). Not
surprisingly, real equity prices, credit and interest rates tend to be unambiguously I(1)
processes. Furthermore, other variables also seem to be unit root processes; only in case
of real housing prices for Russia the test statistic almost equalizes the critical value. This
could be due to a poor quality of the data in case of Russian housing market. Sporadically,
domestic variables in ￿rst di⁄erences turn out to be unit root processes as well. On the
other hand, ADF-GLS tests for country-speci￿c foreign variables deliver a clear picture of
uniformly I(1) processes.
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Another assumption of the model - weak exogeneity of the country-speci￿c foreign variables
x￿
it - can be tested by running ￿rst-di⁄erence regressions of the foreign variables and testing
the joint signi￿cance of the country-speci￿c error-correction terms in these regressions.
This translates to conducting following regression for each element l of x￿
it and dt in each
country i
￿x￿
it;l = ￿il +
ri X
j=1
￿ij;lECM
j
it￿1 + ￿i;l￿xit￿1 + ￿i;l￿x￿
it￿1 + ￿i;l￿dt￿1 + "it;l (3.30)
where ECM
j
it￿1 are the estimated error-correction terms associated with the ri coin-
tegrating relations for the country i with j = 1;:::;ri. The hypothesis of joint signi￿cance,
￿ij;l = 0, is veri￿ed by means of an F-test. Table C.5 reports results of that test.
Weak exogeneity is not rejected for most of the variables. And yet, for as many as
19 of them the F-test results in rejection of null hypothesis of weak exogeneity (19 out
of 238 series, which represents 8% rejection rate). A notable case is Belgium, where test
indicates that the oil price index is not weakly exogenous. Also, in case of Indonesia three
out of ￿ve foreign variables (not counting oil) turn out to be endogenous; for Belgium,
Brazil and Canada there are for each case two foreign variables for which null hypothesis of
weak exogeneity is rejected at 5%. These results may suggest that in a model which aims
at analysis of the global economy by including a large number of countries most or even
all macroeconomic variables should be assumed to be endogenously determined. In fact,
this assumption does not seem questionable in the wake of tightening trade and ￿nancial
linkages among economies.
In general, given that only 8% of foreign variables do not satisfy the weak exogeneity
assumption, I consider such an outcome tolerable and regard the estimation procedure of
each country GVAR as admissible and justi￿ed.
3.3.4 Impact elasticities
Estimation of (3.21) produces estimates of coe¢ cients of country-speci￿c foreign variables
in ￿rst di⁄erences. Those estimates, called impact elasticities, measure the contempora-
neous e⁄ect of foreign variables on the domestic ones and show the extent of co-movement
among variables across di⁄erent countries. Table C.6 reports estimates of the impact
elasticities.
Impact elasticities - when statistically signi￿cant - have a positive sign. The only
exception from this rule is India￿ s real credit to economy, indicating an inverse relation-
ship between India￿ s domestic supply of credit and its foreign counterpart. Elasticities
for real output, equity prices and interest rates generally tend to be signi￿cant, with eq-
uity prices showing the greatest degree of contemporaneous interdependence, whereas real
95GDP, credit and housing prices reveal a rather mixed pattern of statistical relevance.
In particular, the impact elasticities for equity prices are all positive and statistically
signi￿cant for most of the countries. For over a third of them (17 countries), values are
greater than one, i.e. they indicate that the domestic variable overreacts to a variation
in real equity prices abroad. The opposite holds true for the remaining 23 countries for
which impact elasticities are between zero and one. Group of economies where evidence of
overreaction with respect to real equity prices is at hand includes eight developed countries
and nine emerging economies. Overall, results for equity prices suggest a rather strong
co-movement and synchronization across economies.
Most impact elasticities for the credit to economy are statistically not signi￿cant (ex-
cept for nine economies). When being signi￿cant, they reveal in almost half of the case
overshooting behavior of domestic variables with respect to variation in foreign aggregates,
i.e. exactly the same behavior as observed for many equity series.
In case of real estate prices and short-term interest rate around half of the impact
elasticities turn out not to be statistically meaningful. In addition, most of them are
positive but below one, pointing at a very limited presence of overreaction patterns. Thus,
there seems to be only a limited evidence of strong international linkages across countries
concerning both variables.
Impact elasticities for GDP tend to be statistically signi￿cant (24 series) and positive.
Values above one, which suggest overshooting of domestic real output to variation in
foreign GDP, can be observed for Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Malaysia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden, i.e. small economies with an exception of
Spain. Overall, the evidence of international linkages between economies with regard to
real output seems to be somehow stronger than in the case of real credit and short-term
interest rate.
When whole groups of countries are considered, it is di¢ cult to formulate unequivocal
statements about the characteristics of contemporaneous interdependence relationships
resulting from the tests of weak exogeneity. Frontier markets seem to have a tendency
towards overreaction of the real output provided that the estimates of impact elasticities
are signi￿cant whereas the elasticity parameters associated with equity markets in those
countries tend to be statistically irrelevant. Emerging markets overreact in equity prices
but show almost no evidence of statistical signi￿cance of contemporaneous relationships
between domestic and foreign variables for other macroeconomic aggregates. Developed
countries, on the other hand, seem to be a very heterogenous group of economies both in
terms of signi￿cance as well as magnitude of impact elasticities.
3.3.5 Generalized impulse responses
This paper examines the dynamics of the GVAR model by undertaking analysis of the
Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs). In this application, three di⁄erent
shocks are simulated:
96￿ a negative one standard error shock to the US real equity prices,
￿ a negative one standard error shock to the US real GDP,
￿ a positive one standard error shock to the US interest rate.
The scope of this simulation is to assess the extent of cross-boarder spillovers. Since
economies are potentially linked to each other, this analysis should provide insights on how
shocks propagate geographically and how di⁄erent groups of economies react to them.
GIRFs, as proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998)
for vector error-correcting models, di⁄er from Orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions
(OIRFs) in that they do not orthogonalize residuals of the system but instead take histor-
ical correlations among variables into consideration, captured by the estimated variance-
covariance matrix. Thus, contrary to OIRFs, GIRFs do not require any economic re-
strictions and they are invariant to the ordering of the variables in the system. To that
end, GIRFs provide insight on how shocks propagate between countries and variables and
unveil potential macroeconomic interdependence between economies. However, since the
shocks are not identi￿ed, GIRFs do not supply information about the causal relationships
among variables. Nevertheless, this disadvantage seems to be negligible compared to the
di¢ culty of applying OIRFs in the GVAR context, since there is practically no reasonable
and intuitive method to order many countries in the model.
Figures C.1 to C.3 present results for the GIRFs of the baseline setup, i.e. a model
with mixed weights from the middle of the sample. In addition to graphs with con￿dence
intervals at the 68 % signi￿cance level, calculated using sieve bootstrap technique with
1000 replications, ￿gures without con￿dence bands, which are more comprehensible, are
reported in the Appendix. When having taken the con￿dence intervals into account, most
response functions seem not to be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This fact may point
at a low e¢ ciency when estimating a model with many variables and too few monthly
observations. However, it is still worthwhile to focus attention on the dynamic behavior
of responses across all regions8.
Overall, the evidence from the impulse response analysis points at a considerable degree
of synchronization in co-movement of asset prices (equity and real estate markets) across
economies. The dynamics of real activity, on the other hand, are characterized by some
regional di⁄erences. Emerging and frontier markets appear to be more heterogeneous
groups of countries than the industrial economies. The homogeneity of the developed
markets may result from a high degree of ￿nancial and trade-based integration within this
group.
8Bootstrap bands are derived from the global model in Equation (3.13) using the sieve procedure
from Dees et al. (2007); applying bootstrap-after-bootstrap method of Kilian (1998) leads to even wider
con￿dence bands. Tighter con￿dence bands could be obtained for the model with time-varying parameters,
however, I could not simulate them due to computational limitations (simulations involve F matrix of
dimension (p ￿ (k ￿ N + 1)) ￿ (p ￿ (k ￿ N + 1)) ￿ t, with p being maximum lag order of country-speci￿c
submodels and t = 123).
97A negative shock to US equity
Figure C.5 shows evidence of an advanced synchronization in real equity prices among
developed markets and emerging economies. Frontier markets￿stock indices, on the other
hand, repeat the same pattern of reaction to the US equity shock, but on a smaller scale.
However, overall the performance pattern of equities seems to be quite similar in shape
across all economies.
The impact of US equity market shock on total real credit to economy tends to be
negative for all regions but it a⁄ects them in a di⁄erent way. This decrease in credit can
be interpreted as a result of contraction in net worth (equity) or as a signal of expected
fall in output growth (falling GDP). While developed countries go through a relatively
mild fall in credit, emerging markets witness a more pronounced decrease whereas frontier
markets face even steeper a decline of the real credit. It is notable that on impact of the
US equity market shock frontier markets respond by a relatively small decrease of equity
prices and GDP but face the greatest slump in credit in the long run. This could perhaps
indicate at the fact that a considerable part of credit growth in frontier economies is driven
by foreign macroeconomic aggregates.
In case of the housing market both frontier economies and emerging markets tend to
response to the US equity price shock through the same pattern of reaction as the devel-
oped markets do. The di⁄erence concerns the magnitude of reaction: emerging markets
experience the most pronounced decrease of housing prices, developed markets￿response
is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero whereas frontier economies￿response function lies
somewhere between the others. Spread between emerging and frontier markets may in
part be explained by a lower degree of development of the housing market in countries
classi￿ed as frontier markets.
For the real GDP, an initial decline is followed by a subsequent recovery in case of
the frontier economies only. The impact of shock to the US real equity prices results
in persistent fall in output for both developed and emerging countries, with the latter
overreacting in comparison to the former by a considerable amount. This outcome con￿rms
the results of the analysis of impact elasticities.
Interest rates responses show a high degree of co-movement for all three groups of
countries. Feedback of interest rates in emerging markets and frontier economies tends
to be positive whereas a negative response can be observed for the developed markets.
However, all responses tend to be marginal and insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in the
long run. Finally, negative shock to the US equity causes a persistent increase of the oil
price.
Figures C.22 and C.23 from the Appendix present the same impulse response function
for two di⁄erent grouping methods: a more granular MSCI Barra classi￿cation and a
grouping scheme from the IMF working paper of Galesi and Sgherri (2009) - shown in
Tables C.14 and C.15, respectively. The aim of this short analysis is to capture possible
heterogeneity in dynamic behavior within the groups of countries.
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and frontier markets move quite similarly. On the other hand, equity prices in sub-regions
of the developed markets reveal di⁄erences in responses; countries from the Paci￿c re-
gion tend to respond with only a slight decrease in real equity prices whereas USA and
Canada react more markedly. The same is true for developed economies in case of hous-
ing markets and real credit, with the North American region reacting positively to the
negative US equity shock but other developed countries not following the suit. Contrary
to this, responses of the real GDP and short-term interest rate reveal more uniform be-
havior for all sub-regions of the developed countries. Developing markets (emerging and
frontier economies), on the other hand, can be characterized by similar responses in equity
prices and credit but a more nuanced reaction of short-term interest rates and real output.
In particular, Brazil (GDP) and Argentina (interest rates and GDP) prove to be atypi-
cal members of their groups. To that end, striking di⁄erences between frontier markets
Americas (Argentina) and frontier markets Central and Eastern Europe can be observed
for impulse responses of the real output, housing markets and the short-term interest rate.
A negative shock to US GDP
Similarly to the e⁄ects of the previously considered disruption, equity prices across all
regions tend to move in a very aligned way on the impact of US real GDP shock (Figure
C.11). Frontier markets and emerging economies seem to overshoot in the short-run, when
compared to the developed markets; frontier markets show a slightly more pronounced
reaction of equity prices in the long run.
In addition, patterns of impulse response for equity prices and housing markets tend
to coincide, with the latter moving a little bit less synchronized manner than the former.
Overall, the shock to US real GDP gives rise to equity prices, presumably due to expected
loosening of monetary policy; housing prices, on the other hand, increase because of lower
loan costs which make housing more a⁄ordable and stimulate demand for it.
On the impact of the negative US GDP shock, interest rates fall in emerging economies
and frontier markets (in the short-run), however, they increase in the developed markets.
This development seems to conform with the response of GDP in the long-run, but it
stands at odds when reaction of credit is considered. After the US output shock, all
regions tend to stimulate economy by an in￿ ux of credit to the economy, with emerging
markets as the forerunner. The most pronounced hike in credit results in the strongest
recovery of GDP for emerging markets among all three regions - and this occurring after
initial second worst setback. In addition, emerging and frontier markets appear to be more
apt to lower their interest rates in response to possible economic contraction, probably
because they have more scope for such moves due to having inherited a generally higher
level of interest rates from past periods of high in￿ ation. As in the case of the US equity
price shock, negative shock to US GDP sparkles a persistent rise of the oil price.
Figures C.24 and C.25 illustrate impulse responses generated for the more granular
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stand out as more heterogenous groups of countries. In particular, discrepancies between
Brazil and Eastern Europe for emerging markets, and between Argentina and the frontier
markets from the Eastern Europe catch one￿ s eye. Developed markets, on the other hand,
show more of uniform reaction patterns following a negative shock to the US real output.
A positive shock to US interest rate
As shown in Figure C.17, contractionary shock to US interest rate a⁄ects negatively real
equity prices, housing markets and real GDP across all regions. Equity prices move along
a similar pattern across all countries, with a bigger magnitude of the shift observed for
emerging markets and frontier countries. In case of the real estate prices, emerging markets
resemble developed economies more closely whereas frontier markets are characterized by
a more distinct response to the positive US short-term interest rate shock.
On impact of the shock, real GDP in frontier markets plunges by a larger amount in
the short run than its counterparts in other regions do, but it rebounds strongly afterwards
and reaches the long-term level of impulse response of emerging economies after around 80
periods. Again, this outcome recon￿rms broadly results of parameter tests for the impact
elasticities. Credit markets reveal a strong synchronization and similarity of behavior
between developed and emerging markets. Frontier markets, with a severe slump in the
real credit after a positive US interest rate shock, constitute a notable outlier. Interest
rates rise consistently across all regions. In developed markets and frontier economies they
return to the pre-shock level after around 40 periods; a more signi￿cant reaction can be
observed on the other hand for emerging markets where interest rates tend to permanently
deviate from the initial level. Oil prices fall as increasing interest rates indicate slowing
down of economic activity and expected fall in demand for this commodity.
As shown in Figures C.26 and C.27, equable patterns of responses following the negative
US short-term interest rate shock can be observed across all sub-regions for real equity and
the housing market. Credit, real output and interest rate, on the other hand, feature intra-
regional heterogeneity. Most notable are the di⁄erences between American and European
developing markets. In case of the developed markets, substantial discrepancies seem to
emerge for the e⁄ects of the interest rate shock on the real GDP.
3.3.6 Generalized forecast error variance decomposition
Generalized forecast error variance decomposition (GFEVD) shows to what extent return
variability in one aggregate or market can be explained by the innovations from other
variables or markets in the VAR system. These relative contributions measure the impor-
tance of the innovation to a given region￿ s or country￿ s variable to the rest of the system
and as such they can be considered as a useful device to study propagation of shocks
between regions. Results of this analysis for a one standard error shock to the US equity
are reported in Tables C.8, C.9 and C.10. As sums of the contributions of innovations
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shocks, they must be adjusted accordingly.
GFEVD data point at quite di⁄erent dynamic behavior of variables across regions.
Following US equity shock, is can be observed that, among developed markets￿variables,
real equity prices explain most of the forecast error variance in the short run. In the
European developed markets this e⁄ect continues to hold in the long run as well and it
spills over to GDP. Among developed markets, the European countries tend to have the
most variation, with contribution to variance of a historical shock that increases steadily
across all macroeconomic and ￿nancial aggregates. In case of Paci￿c developed markets
the relative contribution to the forecast variance appears to be evenly spread between all
variables, with a somehow stronger emphasis on the aggregate credit.
Emerging markets present a fairly di⁄erent picture of behavior. Here, in the short
term, variability seems to be driven mostly by real credit and interest rates. After two
months real equity prices gain on importance and tend to explain a major share of the
variance of the shock. In case of frontier markets equity prices contribute mostly to the
explanation of the forecast variance; real output tends to play an important role in the
short run whereas real credit and housing market build up their relevance in the long run.
A negative shock to US real GDP results in an evenly spread variation between Amer-
ican and European developed markets in the short run. However, as time passes on,
the variability moves away from the American economies towards the European industrial
countries. For the American markets, the most variance is concentrated on output; in case
of the European counterparts, the innovation to US GDP tends to in￿ uence all macro-
economic aggregates proportionally and its impact on equity markets rises considerably
in the long run. Paci￿c developed markets, on the other hand, seem to be detached from
the impact of shocks in US real GDP.
Following the perturbation in the US GDP, the variability in aggregates from the
emerging markets reaches similar levels as in the case of equity shock. In the ￿rst few
months, the impact is most perceptible for output whereas in the long run more variability
emerges in equity prices and interest rate. When compared to the equity shock, Asian
emerging markets and frontier markets tend to show less sensitivity to innovations in the
US GDP in the short run; in the long run, however, the spillover e⁄ect becomes more
pronounced.
GFEVD data for a positive shock in US interest rate reveal the weakest spillovers
across economies. In particular, the share of variance for the macroeconomic aggregates
from emerging and frontier markets tends to be substantially below the levels observed for
previous innovations. Almost 80 per cent of the variance following the shock stays in the
short run within the developed markets; as before, the innovation contributes primarily
to the variability in European aggregates, in particular interest rates and equity prices.
The variance for the American industrial countries decays gradually whereas the e⁄ects
induced by the US interest rate shock in the European developed markets intensify and
then level o⁄ at around 50 per cent.
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tion reveal the essential share of foreign regions in contribution to the variance of the shock
to US equity. Initially, as much as 85 per cent of the variance can be related to foreign
variables, with the European developed markets usually being the dominant contributor.
In addition, there is a lot of evidence of substantial spillovers between di⁄erent macro-
economic aggregates within European industrial economies, with equity markets, interest
rate and output playing the most important roles. On the impact US shocks, share of the
emerging and frontier economies tends to be stable at around 38 per cent and displays
some intra-regional shifts in proportion of contribution to the variance of the shock over
time. In case of Asian emerging markets, US shocks seem not to contribute signi￿cantly
to innovations in any of the macroeconomic variables of the region at all.
3.4 Counterfactual analysis
GVAR system presented in this paper utilizes foreign country-speci￿c weakly exogenous
variables in modeling the linkage between economies. These variables are calculated from
the data using mixed weights derived from trade-based and ￿nancial international ￿ ows.
Since the weights are supposed to capture spillovers between countries and regions and
to measure the degree of international interdependence, they will in￿ uence the outcome
of the model: parameters, number of cointegrating relations and dynamic aspects of the
GVAR system. Therefore, in order to explore both the impact of the weighting scheme and
the sensitivity of the GVAR with respect to the de￿nition of foreign variables I conduct an
analysis in which di⁄erent weight arrangements come into play. First, I generate GIRFs
using mixed weights from the beginning (average of 1998-1999) and the end of the sample
(average of 2008-2009) and compare them the baseline scenario for GIRFs with mixed
weights from the middle of the sample. Second, I consider making use of trade-based
weights only in order to capture the extent to which ￿nancial weights matter for the
international interdependencies. Third, by shutting down transmission channels related
to di⁄erent foreign variables I examine the importance of distinct transmission channels
for interregional spillovers. All ￿gures are presented in Appendix.
3.4.1 Mixed weights
Figures C.4 and C.6 show impulse responses to the negative on standard error shock to
US equity - for a model version with mixed weights taken from the beginning and from
the end of the sample, respectively. When compared to the baseline case, two observations
can be made. First, beginning of the sample weights tend to introduce a sinusoid shape
into the GIRFs, as data for ￿nancial weights in the beginning is either more scarce or it
underlines weaker ￿nancial integration among some groups of countries. However, impulse
response functions generally retain the characteristics of reaction patterns which can be
observed for all variables when mixed weights from the middle of the sample are used.
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regions in response to the US equity shock. In particular, it can observed that following
the US equity shock real credit and housing market of emerging and frontier markets pool
together whereas in case of real GDP it is developed markets and emerging countries that
share quite a similar response to the shock. Also, end of the sample weights lead to a
long-run recovery in equity prices, contrary to impulse responses generated for the model
with other weighting schemes.
As shown in Figures C.10 and C.12, using di⁄erent points in time for the calculation of
weights has a similar impact on GIRFs when the propagation of a negative US GDP shock
is considered. Mixed weights from the beginning of the sample result in a wave-like reaction
patterns whereas end of the sample weights emphasize persistence and cointegration among
macroeconomic aggregates across the regions. Strikingly, both weighting schemes, when
applied to the model, lead to completely di⁄erent conclusions about the impact of the
shock to US real output. Based on the weights from the late 1990s all variables respond
in an almost unanimous and negative way; end of the sample weights, on the other hand,
produce overwhelmingly positive impulse responses; in particular, real GDP falls in the
short run across all regions but it rises in the long-term.
Impact of a negative one standard error shock to US interest rate results in more
likewise impulse responses regardless of timing of the mixed weights (Figures C.16 and
C.18). It can be observed that using recent weights generates the most erratic feedback of
all variables in terms of the magnitude of reaction to the shock. In particular, a drawdown
following the negative one standard error US interest rate shock tends to be around three
times as large as a drawdown in impulse responses estimated with weights from the middle
of the sample.
In general, weighting scheme seems to considerably a⁄ect the dynamic results of the
GVAR system. Since weights capture temporal interdependencies across regions, they
impact the number of cointegrating relations (see Table C.7 in Appendix) as well as shape,
direction, persistence and variation of the feedback following the shocks simulated in the
model. Depending on the source of innovation, choosing a particular point in time in order
to determine weights may lead to contradictory statements about the system dynamics.
3.4.2 Financial weights
Mixed weights used in this paper are supposed to re￿ ect both trade-based and ￿nancial
linkages between countries and regions. Given increasing global integration they take
into account both ￿ ow of goods and money as transmission channels of spillover across
economies. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine the impact of this duality by studying
dynamics of a GVAR system with foreign country-speci￿c variables calculated using trade-
based weights only.
Figures C.7 to C.9 present GIRFs for a negative one standard error shock to US equity.
It can be noticed that compared to mixed weights impulse responses are larger in scale. In
103case of equity prices, housing market and GDP feedback to the shock indicates a stronger
interrelation and similarity of reaction across regions. In addition, responses of frontier
markets￿real credit and GDP overshoot substantially in contrast to mixed weights. Finally,
reaction of the oil price becomes transient when trade-based weights from the middle of
the sample are concerned.
In case of a negative one standard deviation shock to the US GDP, employing trade-
based weights does not change the magnitude of impulse responses signi￿cantly. The
dynamics of GIRFs stay generally in line with responses generated in the baseline scenario,
with a couple of exceptions constituted by reactions of GDP and credit to the shock. It
can be observed that using trade-based weights from the beginning of the sample in the
model generates persistently decreasing GDP across all regions. As shown in Figures C.13
to C.15, this pattern of reaction changes over time; depending on the timing of weights
response of real output for all regions varies between a persistent decrease and a gradual
increase after 10 to 20 periods following the negative shock to US GDP. Also, impulse
response patterns for real credit in frontier markets seem to evolve over time. Additionally,
both credit and GDP in frontier markets tend to resemble their counterparts from other
groups of economies in terms of dynamic behavior when trade-based weights from the end
of the sample are taken into consideration.
A negative one standard deviation shock to US short-term interest rate in the model
with trade-based weights generates GIRFs which are quite similar to those for the version of
the model with mixed weights (see Figures C.19 to C.21 in Appendix). Dispensing ￿nancial
￿ ows from the calculation of weights does not seem to have any substantial e⁄ect on the
behavior of variables. However, utilizing trade-based weighting scheme leads to rising
interrelation of responses of equity prices and GDP across the regions. In addition, as more
up-to-date weights are used, the range of reaction for all variables increases considerably.
In addition to the impulse response analysis, I compare the impact of shocks for models
with di⁄erent weighting schemes using the forecast error variance decomposition. As shown
in Figures C.4 to C.9, following results can be observed. First of all, ￿nancial weights
alter the patterns of spillovers markedly. For instance, in case of the US equity shock,
deploying mixed weights in the model results in a considerable amount of variability to
move abroad from equity markets in the American industrial economies to equities in the
European developed markets. It also results in a more instantaneous response of emerging
economies to shocks whereas the transmission channel using trade weights takes more time
to carry the impact from the developed to emerging markets. On the other hand, ￿nancial
interrelations seem to transport less of the impact of US innovations to the emerging and
frontier economies when GDP and interest rate shocks are concerned. However, over time
￿nancial linkages tend to bring about an increase in share of the emerging and frontier
markets in the overall variation of macroeconomic aggregates following shocks originating
in the US. In particular, they increase the variance of equities and real estate markets
across the developing countries. In case of industrial economies, ￿nancial interconnections
result in a growing persistence in the variation of economic variables.
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with a trade-based measure for the purpose of weights￿construction seems to results in a
notable change of the dynamics for some of the variables in the GVAR system. In most
cases, enriching trade-based weights with data coming from ￿nancial links leads to evi-
dence of diluted interrelations between macroeconomic variables across regions. Impulse
responses in a model with mixed weights tend to be more moderate in scale. Such results
may indicate at a fact that ￿nancial linkages add yet another dimension of interdepen-
dencies between economies that make transmission mechanism of shocks more subtle and
complex. On the other hand, it is also possible that cross-country bank lending exposures
data capture the ￿nancial interrelationship across regions and economies only to a cer-
tain degree. GVAR model is set to overcome the dimensionality problem faced often in
macroeconomic empirical applications by modeling links between countries through foreign
variables calculated as averages of macroeconomic aggregates of the partner economies.
Yet this advantage seems to come at a cost of considerable dependence on the method
which is employed to calculate foreign variables.
3.4.3 Shutdown of transmission channels
Shutdown of transmission channels involves muting one channel at a time and comparing
the impulse response generated from this scenario with the baseline case where all channels
are operating. This approach amounts therefore to setting to zero columns in matrices
from Equation (3.1) that correspond to foreign variables being muted. The result indicates
the strength of a particular transmission channel in propagation of shocks across borders.
Figures C.28 to C.30 present the impulse responses functions generated by switching o⁄
foreign equity markets, foreign GDP and the foreign short-term interest rate.
The ￿ndings indicate that equity prices constitute an important transmission channel of
spillovers across regions. They tend to amplify the e⁄ects of shocks; this result manifests
itself most notably in the case of interest rate shocks. Spillovers through international
equity prices seem to a⁄ect domestic equity markets, real estate prices and GDP whereas
the impact on real credit and interest rate is more curbed. The evidence for international
interest rates, on the other hand, points at a very limited role as a transmission channels
of shocks between economies. In particular, impulse response functions generated with
the muted interest rate channel virtually do not di⁄er from the responses in the baseline
scenario when US equity or interest rate shocks are considered. The results for transmission
of innovations through foreign GDP suggest a more distinguished role when compared to
the interest rates; however, the GDP channel tends to produce smaller e⁄ects than the
transmission channel of foreign equity prices. Spillovers a⁄ected by changes in foreign
output seem to mostly in￿ uence domestic GDP, real credit to economy and domestic equity
markets. Overall, the results from shutting down various channels of shock transmission
between economies accentuate the prominence of equity markets, which amplify responses
to shocks across all regions and a⁄ect most domestic variables. Foreign output is less
105important but its impact is still considerable; foreign interest rates play no signi￿cant role
in transmission of shocks across borders.
3.5 Time-varying weights
Given the importance of weighting scheme on the parameter estimates and the dynamics
of GVAR I construct a model for weights that allows to capture its dynamic characteris-
tics and incorporate them into the GVAR system so that feedback from macroeconomic
variables to weights (and back from weights to macroeconomic aggregates through country-
speci￿c foreign variables) is facilitated and explored. A time-varying version of the weights
matrix in Equation (3.8), Wit, consists of weights wij;t representing a share of country i
in the total interconnection of country j with the outside world, measured in terms of
trade, ￿nancial ￿ ows or some combination thereof. In case of trade-based weights, wij;t
measures a relative size of imports and exports between country i and j over the total
sum of imports and exports of country j at time t:
wij;t =
flowij;t + flowji;t
PN
i=1 flowij;t +
PN
j=1 flowij;t
(3.31)
where flowij;t represents a trade-based ￿ ow of goods from i to j at t.
Therefore, modeling weights can be accomplished by deploying a model for the under-
lying trade-based ￿ ows. In order to allow for feedback from the macroeconomic variables
in the GVAR model but simultaneously keep the sub-model for weights parsimonious I
utilize an autoregressive distributed lag setup ARDL(p;q1;q2):
flowij;t = a0 +
p X
k=1
￿kflowij;t￿k +
q1 X
n=0
￿ngdpi;t￿n +
q2 X
m=0
￿mgdpj;t￿m + "ij;t (3.32)
Thus, in case of ARDL(1;1;1) estimation of all wij;t terms translates to running
N ￿ (N ￿ 1) OLS regressions from Equation (3.32), each of the following form:
￿flowij;t = a0 + (￿1 ￿ 1)flowij;t￿1 + (￿0 + ￿1)gdpi;t￿1 + (￿0 + ￿1)gdpj;t￿1
+￿0￿gdpi;t + ￿0￿gdpj;t + "ij;t (3.33)
where terms in ￿rst di⁄erences account for contemporaneous impact of innovations in
real output on the trade dynamics. Now, rewriting Equation (3.8) as zit = Witxt leads to
a GVAR model in Equation (3.10) with time-varying parameters:
Gtxt = a0 + a1 + Ht￿1xt￿1 + ￿0dt + ￿1dt￿1 + "t (3.34)
Provided that Gt matrix is not singular for all t, the GVAR(1) system can be written
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xt = b0t + b1t + Ftxt￿1 + ￿0tdt + ￿1tdt￿1 + ut (3.35)
where Ft = G￿1
t Ht￿1 and all other parameters are de￿ned in analogy to Equation
(3.13) as:
b0t = G￿1
t a0 , b1t = G￿1
t a1 , ￿0t = G￿1
t ￿0 , ￿1t = G￿1
t ￿1 , ut = G￿1
t "t (3.36)
To illustrate this approach I estimate a three-country GVAR model for China, Germany
and the USA. I use the set of variables from Equations (3.25) and (3.27) together with
time-varying trade-based weights. Table C.18 in Appendix reports statistics for error-
correcting terms and long-run coe¢ cients equation of all six ARDL regressions. Figures
3.3 and 3.4 show impulse responses to a negative one standard deviation in US GDP for
this model: red line depicts impulse response functions calculated with forecasted weights
whereas blue line represents impulse responses with weights ￿xed at the time when the
GDP shock takes place.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse responses to a negative one standard error shock to US GDP with 95%
con￿dence bands.
As shown in Figure 3.3 di⁄erences between impulse response functions with ￿xed and
time-varying weights are marginal. All responses lie within each other￿ s 95% con￿dence
bands, most of them are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. A negative
one standard deviation shock to US GDP leads to fairly similar reactions of real equity
107prices and housing markets among the three economies. On the other hand, responses
of real credit, short-term interest rates and GDP aggregates di⁄er; China and the USA
respond to contraction in the US GDP by a signi￿cant increase of credit supply but their
adjustments in interest rates tend to be insigni￿cant. Germany, on the other hand, lowers
considerably its short-term interest rate in the long run. Of all three economies, China￿ s
output tends to expand after around 20 months.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse responses to a negative one standard error shock to US GDP with 95%
con￿dence bands.
Figure 3.4 reconsiders impulse response functions to the very same shock but estimated
for a model with data sample ending in November 2007, i.e. before the recent ￿nancial cri-
sis set out. Omitting ￿nancial crisis in estimation tends magni￿es the di⁄erences between
impulse responses derived using constant and projected weights.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper uses GVAR model to address the issue of regional interdependencies and syn-
chronization of business cycles between economies. It utilizes both ￿nancial and trade-
based weights to analyse transmission mechanism of real and ￿nancial shocks across bor-
ders. The paper includes a considerable number of economies and employs key macroeco-
nomic and ￿nancial aggregates in the analysis. In addition, the model with time-varying
parameters is developed which accounts for feedback between macroeconomic variables
and weights that capture interrelationships among countries.
Regional spillovers between developed, emerging and frontier economies are examined
108by means of the analysis of parameter estimates for the impact elasticities, impulse re-
sponse functions and forecast error variance decomposition. The ￿ndings of this paper
suggest that the development in international ￿nancial markets and cross-border trade
activity seem to expand the transmission of shocks abroad and to amplify business cycle
￿ uctuations to regions where the integration is greater, especially as a result of asset price
movements. Impulse responses of real sectors tend to mildly support the idea of decou-
pling of economies, showing evidence of slightly di⁄erent paths of economic performance
across regions.
Impact elasticity estimates from the model presented in this paper suggest strong inter-
national interrelation of equity prices. Credit aggregates, real estate prices and short-term
seem to be more decoupled across regions, and so does real GDP, too. These results are
sensitive with respect to the size of economy; frontier markets and small developed coun-
tries tend to overshoot in the feedback of the real output to external shocks. Emerging
markets overreact in equity prices but show almost no evidence of statistical signi￿cance
of contemporaneous relationships between domestic and foreign variables for other macro-
economic aggregates. As GIRFs and GFEVDs indicate, equity prices and housing markets
are strongly interrelated both across regions and with groups of countries. Yet signi￿cant
di⁄erences within groups can be found for other macroeconomic aggregates, including
credit, interest rates and GDP. Using mixed weights proves to be useful in documenting
changes in the relationship between countries and regions. For instance, in accordance
with the globalization hypothesis, moving away from distant to recent weights suggests
more synchronized responses to shocks across regions. Financial linkages matter, how-
ever, ￿nancial weights tend to substantially alter the dynamics of the GVAR system by
adding moderation and, to some extent, more disattachement among regions. As more
countries join the single global market, new linkage constellations and spillover patterns
emerge between economies. Contrary to the convergence hypothesis, rising trade-based
and ￿nancial linkages seem to partly endorse group-speci￿c business cycles.
These results are only as reliable as the model used to derive them proves to be. The
outcome of cointegration and weak exogeneity tests as well as the results of Monte Carlo
experiments suggest problems with endogeneity of foreign variables and poor size property
of the cointegration statistics for systems with unit root processes.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 First order conditions
Note: for (t + s)-terms expectation operator is omitted for notational convenience.
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A.1.2 Non-￿nancial ￿rms
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119A.1.3 Deposit banks
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A.1.4 Lending banks
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120A.2 Tables
Table A.1: GDP and consumption loss for a model with exogenous solvency rates
basis scenario Mb
t +Ml
t M
f
t xb
t+xl
t k(Y ) $bFb
t +$lFl
t
regulatory regime without leverage ratio (bFb = bFl = 0)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -9.15% -2.70% 5.64% -8.45% -9.13% -8.52%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.471% 0.880% 0.838% 0.464% 0.470% 0.458%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -2.72% -0.51% 1.00% -2.51% -2.72% -2.76%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.240% 0.351% 0.251% 0.241% 0.240% 0.240%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.231% 0.681% 0.859% 0.224% 0.236% 0.234%
regulatory regime with leverage ratio (bFb = bFl = 10)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -8.74% -1.50% 5.69% -7.67% -8.70% -8.15%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.458% 0.905% 0.843% 0.449% 0.456% 0.446%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -2.58% 0.11% 1.12% -2.27% -2.58% -2.63%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.236% 0.353% 0.252% 0.236% 0.235% 0.236%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.178% 0.657% 0.719% 0.175% 0.179% 0.179%
Note: Table shows present value of GDP and consumption loss as well as variation in GDP, consumption
and in￿ ation rate after positive shocks to default rates and subsequent central bank actions. First
column shows results for a basis scenario consisting of a positive 2,5% and 5% shocks to ￿rm and lending
banks default rates, respectively, in a model with exogenous solvency rates. Consequent columns present
results of quantitative easing to banks, quantitative easing to ￿rms, qualitative easing to banks, regime
switch to output driven capital ratio and capital injection to banks, respectively, amounting to 5% of
GDP each. T = 30.
121Table A.2: GDP and consumption loss for a model with no interbank market and endoge-
nous solvency rates
basis scenario Ml
t M
f
t xl
t k(Y ) $lFl
t
regulatory regime without leverage ratio (bFl = 0)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -17.84% -14.24% -16.75% -17.23% -17.17% -17.46%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.581% 1.280% 1.294% 0.566% 0.561% 0.569%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -11.18% -9.87% -10.46% -10.75% -11.04% -11.26%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.185% 0.167% 0.182% 0.178% 0.182% 0.186%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.011% 0.102% 0.123% 0.014% 0.017% 0.010%
regulatory regime with leverage ratio (bFl = 10)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -17.84% -14.29% -16.82% -17.17% -17.13% -17.45%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.581% 1.279% 1.292% 0.564% 0.560% 0.568%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -11.18% -9.92% -10.52% -10.69% -11.03% -11.27%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.185% 0.167% 0.182% 0.177% 0.182% 0.186%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.011% 0.099% 0.118% 0.015% 0.016% 0.010%
Note: Table shows present value of GDP and consumption loss as well as variation in GDP, consumption
and in￿ ation rate after positive shocks to default rates and subsequent central bank actions. First
column shows results for a basis scenario consisting of a negative two standard deviations technology
shock; consequent columns present results of quantitative easing to banks, quantitative easing to ￿rms,
qualitative easing to banks, regime switch to output driven capital ratio and capital injection to banks,
respectively, amounting to 5% of GDP each. T = 30. Model with endogenous solvency rate for ￿rms and
homogenous banking sector which o⁄ers deposits to households, lends to ￿rms and is not subject to
default.
122Table A.3: GDP and consumption loss for a model with exogenous solvency rates
basis scenario Mb
t +Ml
t M
f
t xb
t+xl
t $bFb
t +$lFl
t
regulatory regime without leverage ratio (bFb = bFl = 0)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -9.15% -1.48% 7.52% -8.41% -8.52%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.471% 0.854% 0.963% 0.462% 0.458%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -2.72% -0.20% 1.74% -2.50% -2.76%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.240% 0.335% 0.289% 0.240% 0.241%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.231% 0.530% 0.992% 0.222% 0.234%
regulatory regime with leverage ratio (bFb = bFl = 10)
PT
t=1 ￿t(gdpt￿gdp)
gdp -8.74% -0.26% 7.54% -7.62% -8.16%
￿PT
t=1(gdpt￿gdp)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.458% 0.880% 0.995% 0.447% 0.446%
PT
t=1 ￿t(Ct￿C)
C -2.58% 0.04% 1.65% -2.26% -2.64%
￿PT
t=1(Ct￿C)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.236% 0.331% 0.288% 0.235% 0.236%
￿PT
t=1(￿t￿￿)2
T￿1
￿ 1
2
0.178% 0.759% 0.558% 0.172% 0.179%
Note: Table shows present value of GDP and consumption loss as well as variation in GDP, consumption
and in￿ ation rate after positive shocks to default rates and subsequent central bank actions. First
column shows results for a basis scenario consisting of a positive 2,5% and 5% shocks to ￿rm and lending
banks default rates, respectively; consequent columns present results of quantitative easing to banks,
quantitative easing to ￿rms, qualitative easing to banks and capital injection to banks, respectively,
amounting to 5% of GDP each. T = 30. Model with exogenous solvency rates.
Table A.4: Calibrated parameter values
households ￿rms banks monetary policy
_
r
l
0.0035 ￿ 4.24 k 0.08 ! 367 Qp 1.2
￿ 0.01   50 h 0.04 d￿ 0.02 Qy 0.05
_
D
l
0.39 ￿a 0.95
_
￿ 0.01
_
r 0.0015
￿ 0.9965 ￿ 0.333
_
B
l
0.19
_
B
b
0.19 ￿r 0.7
_
m 3.72 ￿ 0.03 dFl 53.4 dFb 6.71 ￿￿ 1
￿ 103.5 ￿l 0.8 ￿b 0.8 Qk 0.5
df 0.001 ￿l 0.07 ￿b 0.06
vl 0.5 vb 0.5
wl 0.05 wb 0.8
￿M(￿) 0.85 ￿x(￿) 0.85
bFl 10 bFb 10
123Table A.5: Steady state values
Variable De￿nition Value
endogenous default rates exogenous default rates
steady state values bF(￿) = 0 bF(￿) = 10 bF(￿) = 0 bF(￿) = 10
￿ in￿ ation 1.0009 1.0034 1.0003 1.0031
r central bank interest rate 0.0050 0.0154 0.0028 0.0138
rl deposit interest rate 0.0044 0.0070 0.0038 0.0066
i interbank interest rate 0.0091 0.0122 0.0081 0.0111
rb ￿rms￿borrowing interest rate 0.0161 0.0201 0.0154 0.0195
￿ solvency rate: ￿rms 0.9490 0.9490 0.9500 0.9500
￿ solvency rate: lending banks 0.9774 0.9766 0.9800 0.9800
mc marginal cost of production 0.7848 0.8454 0.7720 0.8362
w wage 2.0895 2.0880 2.0907 2.0893
steady state ratios
C=Y consumption to output 0.7138 0.7138 0.7136 0.7135
K=Y capital stock to output 9.8231 9.8098 9.8347 9.8220
￿f=Y ￿rms￿pro￿ts to output 0.0418 0.0418 0.0415 0.0415
￿b=Y lending banks￿pro￿ts to output 0.0051 0.0051 0.0052 0.0051
￿l=Y deposit banks￿pro￿ts to output 0.0013 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013
Fb=Y lending banks￿own funds to output 0.0422 0.0403 0.0427 0.0403
Fl=Y deposit banks￿own funds to output 0.0088 0.0080 0.0095 0.0087
Dl=gdp deposits to GDP 0.6134 0.6157 0.6125 0.6148
Dbs=gdp interbank lending to GDP 0.1192 0.1121 0.1383 0.1358
Lb=gdp ￿rms￿borrowing to GDP 0.2960 0.2969 0.2961 0.2970
Table A.6: Second moments (model with endogenous default rates and no leverage ratio)
Variable ￿
￿ 0.00106
K 0.21568
N 0.00264
Y 0.02222
C 0.01102
w 0.05478
gdp 0.02221
124Table A.7: Prior and posterior distributions of parameters and shocks
prior distribution posterior distribution
parameter distr. mean st.dev. mean 2.50% median 97.50%
"A
t Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0102 0.0089 0.0101 0.0119
"r
t Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0035 0.0031 0.0035 0.0040
"T
t Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0020 0.0016 0.0020 0.0025
"Mb
t Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0035 0.0022 0.0034 0.0050
"Ml
t Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0034 0.0021 0.0034 0.0050
"Mf
t Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0037 0.0022 0.0036 0.0056
"xb
t Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0092 0.0018 0.0074 0.0248
"xl
t Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0080 0.0020 0.0066 0.0188
￿ Gamma 4.24 0.1 4.045 3.879 4.047 4.206
  Gamma 50 1.5 51.815 48.921 51.746 54.932
￿ Gamma 103.5 2.5 101.475 94.001 101.496 108.702
_
m Gamma 3.72 0.1 3.670 3.485 3.667 3.851
! Gamma 367 25 359.384 329.705 357.865 390.533
dFb Gamma 6.71 0.3 6.803 6.188 6.810 7.419
dFl Gamma 53.4 1.5 52.987 50.152 52.978 55.946
￿ Beta 0.3333 0.02 0.334 0.327 0.334 0.341
_
r Gamma 0.0015 0.0005 0.0008 0.0004 0.0007 0.0013
_
r
l
Gamma 0.0035 0.001 0.0036 0.0017 0.0035 0.0057
￿r Beta 0.7 0.15 0.403 0.233 0.407 0.560
Qp Gamma 1.2 0.1 1.025 1.006 1.023 1.051
Qy Beta 0.05 0.02 0.043 0.016 0.041 0.080
Note: Results based on 2 chains, each with 10,000 draws Metropolis algorithm.
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Figure A.1: Responses to positive technology shock.
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Figure A.2: Responses to expansionary monetary policy shock.
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Figure A.3: Responses to positive quantitative monetary easing shock to deposit banks.
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Figure A.4: Responses to positive qualitative monetary easing shock to deposit banks.
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Figure A.5: Responses to positive capital shock to deposit banks.
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B.1 Bond prices
An and Bn are derived as follows:
Plugging the expressions for p
(n)
t and mt from equations (2.20) and (2.23) into equation
(2.22) we get:
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Innovations ￿t of the process for state variables are assumed to be Gaussian with mean
zero and covariance matrix ￿￿￿, therefore:
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129together with equations (2.19) and (2.21) we obtain:
p
(n)
t = exp
0
B
@
￿rt ￿ 1
2￿0
tH￿￿￿H0￿t + An￿1 + B0
n￿1 (￿ + f￿igzt)+
1
2￿0
tH￿￿￿H0￿t ￿ B0
n￿1H￿￿￿H0￿t+
1
2B0
n￿1H￿￿￿H0Bn￿1
1
C
A (B.4)
= exp
 
An￿1 + B0
n￿1 (￿ ￿ H￿￿￿H0￿0) + 1
2B0
n￿1H￿￿￿H0Bn￿1 ￿ ￿0+
￿
B0
n￿1 (f￿ig ￿ H￿￿￿H0￿1) ￿ ￿0
1
￿
zt
!
so that by means of matching coe¢ cients the equation for bond prices can be written
as:
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B.2 Tables
Table B.1: Autoregressive distributed lag models
EC LRC ARDL(p,q)
PPP ￿0:0816
(0:0224)
et = 2:5128
(0:7666)
+ 11:051
(3:569)
cpit ￿ 4:754
(1:810)
cpi￿
t + "t ARDL(1,0,0)
GAP ￿0:0109
(0:0076)
gdpt = ￿0:0476
(0:0202)
+ 1:9272
(0:7687)
gdp￿
t + "t ARDL(4,1)
UIP ￿0:0724
(0:0294)
rt = ￿0:0001
(0:0001)
+ 0:7914
(0:1627)
r￿
t + "t ARDL(1,1)
LIR ￿0:0252
(0:0099)
rt = 0:00002
(0:00002)
+ 0:1939
(0:1991)
￿t + "t ARDL(1,0)
Note: EC denotes error-correcting term, LRC stands for long-run coe¢ cients equation; last column
reports lag order that is chosen according to SBC information criterion; standard errors in brackets take
into account super-consistency (T-consistency) of long-run coe¢ cients.
130Table B.2: Tests of structural change
Test y
(120)
t ￿
_
r et gdpt ￿t rt cpit ￿ cpi￿
t
PK sup 0 0 1 1 0 1
PK msq 0 0 1 0 0 0
Nyblom 0 1 1 1 1 1
robust Nyblom 0 1 1 1 1 1
QLR 0 1 1 1 0 1
robust QLR 0 0 0 1 1 1
MW 0 1 1 1 0 1
robust MW 0 0 0 1 1 1
APW 0 1 1 1 0 1
robust APW 0 0 0 1 1 1
Note: Table display the rejections (1) per variable and test at 5% level.
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C.1 Tables
Table C.1: Lag order in country-speci￿c models
xit x￿
it dt xit x￿
it dt
Argentina 1 1 1 Japan 1 1 1
Australia 1 1 3 Korea 1 1 1
Austria 1 1 1 Latvia 1 1 1
Belgium 1 2 1 Malaysia 1 1 2
Brazil 1 1 3 Netherlands 1 1 1
Bulgaria 1 1 1 Norway 1 1 1
Canada 1 1 1 Poland 1 1 2
China (Mainland) 1 1 4 Portugal 1 1 1
Czech Republic 1 1 1 Russia 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 2 Singapore 1 1 1
Estonia 2 1 1 Slovak Republic 1 1 1
Finland 1 1 1 Slovenia 1 1 1
France 1 1 1 South Africa 1 1 3
Germany 1 1 1 Spain 1 1 1
Greece 2 1 2 Sweden 1 1 1
Hungary 1 1 1 Switzerland 1 1 1
India 1 1 1 Thailand 1 1 1
Indonesia 1 1 1 Turkey 1 1 1
Ireland 1 1 1 United Kingdom 1 1 1
Italy 1 1 1 United States 1 1 1
Note: Bold numbers denote signi￿cance at 5%.
132Table C.2: Unit root test results for global common variable (oil price index)
dt ￿dt
ADF -1,77 -8,62
ADF-GLS -0,03 -2,74
Note: Statistics for level variables are based on regressions including linear trend; statistics for ￿rst
di⁄erences include only intercept term. The 95% critical values are -3.4496 and -1.9436, respectively.
133Table C.3: ADF-GLS unit root test results for domestic variables
eq Aeq cc Acc re Are ir Air gdp Agdp
Argentina -1.32 -8.99 -0.88 -3.46 -1.48 -0.68 -1.72 -3.01 0.12 -2.35
Australia -0.71 -3.32 -0.05 -3.16 -0.01 -1.12 -0.90 -3.82 -2.34 -0.78
Austria -0.09 -2.46 -1.28 -5.59 -0.13 -1.59 -0.72 -3.50 -0.19 -3.26
Belgium -1.19 -7.69 -1.04 -1.17 -0.64 -2.16 -0.72 -3.50 -0.10 -2.32
Brazil -1.61 -3.54 -0.27 -2.85 -0.57 -6.25 -1.90 -2.94 -1.52 -5.27
Bulgaria -0.39 -2.09 -1.18 -4.33 -0.82 -1.72 -0.97 -12.67 -2.34 -2.89
Canada -1.08 -1.99 -2.03 -10.52 -0.47 -2.13 -0.57 -2.32 0.44 -2.18
China (Mainland) -1.91 -3.96 -1.56 -3.48 -1.00 -3.16 -2.00 -3.50 -1.04 -5.44
Czech Republic -1.30 -1.45 -0.22 -3.04 -1.68 -14.48 -0.83 -3.32 -0.28 -1.87
Denmark -1.10 -2.06 -0.89 -1.39 -1.03 -3.42 -1.10 -2.38 0.12 -1.47
Estonia -0.35 -6.08 -0.39 -1.13 -0.06 -1.68 -0.44 0.06 -0.29 -1.09
Finland -1.41 -8.23 -1.43 -3.40 0.00 -2.51 -0.72 -3.50 0.48 -1.43
France -1.10 -2.35 -0.42 -1.48 -0.62 -3.06 -0.72 -3.50 0.17 -2.19
Germany -1.24 -2.13 -1.08 -3.33 -0.59 -1.37 -0.72 -3.50 -0.24 -2.54
Greece -0.84 -1.44 -1.07 -2.38 -0.97 -0.36 -0.72 -3.50 -0.34 -1.22
Hungary -0.44 -2.15 -2.33 -3.28 -1.10 -3.13 -1.68 -16.81 -0.07 -2.24
India -1.28 -3.63 -1.53 -1.70 -1.56 -4.13 -1.13 -2.87 -1.33 -2.55
Indonesia -1.67 -2.77 -1.19 0.12 -2.02 -2.17 -1.84 -6.97 -1.56 -2.90
Ireland -1.01 -2.16 -1.33 -2.72 -1.39 -1.00 -0.72 -3.50 -0.83 -1.64
Italy -0.58 -2.51 -0.91 -1.32 0.07 -1.47 -0.72 -3.50 0.01 -1.19
Japan -0.66 -4.48 -2.45 -2.27 -0.77 -4.06 -1.31 -1.23 -0.01 -4.58
Korea -2.35 -3.24 -1.34 -2.34 -1.28 -2.65 -1.57 -7.36 -0.05 -2.98
Latvia -0.10 -6.18 0.01 -1.55 -0.70 -1.88 -1.20 -2.64 0.99 -1.30
Malaysia -1.89 -1.66 -0.94 -1.72 -1.89 -1.91 -1.74 -2.71 0.32 -2.59
Netherlands -0.97 -3.22 -1.52 -1.49 -1.43 -3.56 -0.72 -3.50 -1.05 -1.76
Norway -0.80 -2.79 -0.88 -2.68 -0.53 -2.21 -0.98 -1.65 -0.57 -2.02
Poland -1.23 -1.34 -0.03 -2.10 -0.84 -2.82 -1.25 -2.45 -0.51 -2.54
Portugal -1.16 -3.29 -0.75 -1.85 -2.22 -0.30 -0.72 -3.50 -1.19 -1.48
Russia -0.73 -0.99 -1.07 -2.77 -3.35 -10.72 -0.70 -2.87 0.84 -1.81
Singapore -1.40 -4.56 -0.33 -2.86 -1.25 -4.43 -1.32 -3.02 -0.28 -2.91
Slovak Republic -0.47 -2.94 -0.14 -3.65 -1.07 -2.35 -0.91 -2.38 -0.80 -1.69
Slovenia -0.04 -1.96 -0.16 -1.99 -1.53 -0.82 -1.30 -5.86 -1.02 -0.71
South Africa -1.57 -3.68 -0.88 -3.51 -1.83 -1.16 -0.80 -3.59 -0.46 -2.68
Spain -1.11 -2.54 -0.29 -1.65 -0.18 -0.74 -0.72 -3.50 -0.29 -2.20
Sweden -1.21 -2.95 -1.08 -1.97 -0.55 -2.67 -0.86 -2.27 0.19 -1.35
Switzerland -0.89 -2.45 -0.50 -2.70 -1.18 -1.50 -1.40 -2.18 -0.78 -1.69
Thailand -1.56 -2.21 -0.68 -4.23 -0.68 -2.22 -1.04 -5.46 -0.95 -1.40
Turkey -1.44 -0.64 -0.25 -1.25 -1.42 -0.75 -2.27 -2.49 -1.13 -2.68
United Kingdom -1.17 -2.25 -0.66 -4.07 -0.86 -1.46 -0.67 -1.41 -0.55 0.13
United States -1.25 -2.35 -1.65 -3.01 -0.41 -3.28 -1.20 -3.14 -0.83 -6.53
Note: Statistics for level variables are based on regressions including linear trend; statistics for ￿rst
di⁄erences include only intercept term. The 95% critical values are -3.4496 and -1.9436, respectively.
134Table C.4: ADF-GLS unit root test results for country-speci￿c foreign variables
eqD AeqD ccD AccD reD AreD irD AirD gdpD AgdpD
Argentina -1.14 -3.36 -0.01 -3.20 -0.63 -2.88 -1.89 -3.33 0.26 -1.19
Australia -0.99 -3.00 -0.76 -5.57 0.05 -3.45 -0.84 -2.21 0.84 -0.16
Austria -1.01 -2.42 -1.04 -5.00 0.03 -1.52 -1.00 -2.83 -0.76 -1.66
Belgium -0.95 -2.70 -0.58 -2.87 -0.60 -2.69 -0.86 -2.30 0.71 0.02
Brazil -0.96 -3.23 -2.25 -5.45 -0.54 -2.75 -1.51 -2.87 -0.31 -1.19
Bulgaria -0.81 -1.93 0.12 -2.85 -0.40 -0.24 -1.53 -2.29 -0.82 -0.07
Canada -1.07 -2.52 -1.16 -3.07 -0.41 -4.42 -0.78 -3.00 -0.02 -1.50
China (Mainland) -0.93 -3.21 -0.63 -5.13 0.33 -3.32 -0.96 -3.33 -1.05 -0.80
Czech Republic -0.90 -2.66 -0.44 -4.26 0.03 -1.50 -0.98 -2.42 0.48 -3.05
Denmark -1.07 -2.95 -0.74 -5.68 0.36 -1.68 -0.78 -2.20 0.89 0.15
Estonia -1.00 -3.20 -1.08 -6.20 -0.52 -1.75 -1.19 -2.20 -1.36 -0.86
Finland -0.99 -3.11 -0.85 -5.57 0.30 -2.10 -1.13 -1.63 -1.27 -0.12
France -0.93 -2.94 -0.71 -3.28 -0.26 -1.64 -0.96 -2.28 0.87 0.43
Germany -0.77 -2.98 -0.07 -2.14 -0.49 -2.62 -1.09 -2.22 0.74 0.44
Greece -0.88 -3.02 -0.46 -4.45 -0.47 -2.04 -1.25 -2.05 -1.00 0.30
Hungary -0.90 -3.00 -0.61 -5.12 0.14 -1.69 -1.10 -2.21 -0.99 -1.10
India -1.03 -3.11 -0.33 -5.03 0.29 -3.56 -1.10 -2.76 0.66 -0.11
Indonesia -1.06 -3.34 -0.01 -3.15 -0.30 -3.21 -0.95 -4.44 0.71 -1.62
Ireland -0.98 -2.98 -0.66 -1.97 -0.56 -2.04 -0.79 -2.08 0.82 0.31
Italy -0.94 -2.92 -0.38 -2.30 -0.62 -1.44 -1.22 -2.20 0.81 0.00
Japan -1.12 -2.52 -0.67 -5.36 0.30 -4.14 -0.82 -6.43 0.45 -0.76
Korea -1.01 -2.95 -0.65 -5.44 0.18 -3.59 -0.95 -2.74 0.21 -0.93
Latvia -0.93 -3.24 -0.37 -4.91 0.27 -1.72 -1.09 -1.33 -1.68 -1.51
Malaysia -1.00 -3.20 -0.38 -5.75 0.20 -3.31 -0.76 -2.26 0.80 -0.12
Netherlands -0.97 -2.83 -0.71 -2.22 -0.35 -1.77 -0.92 -2.49 -0.56 0.32
Norway -1.04 -2.88 -0.88 -5.50 0.32 -1.97 -0.84 -2.13 1.15 0.40
Poland -0.94 -3.10 -0.73 -4.35 0.28 -1.63 -1.19 -2.16 -1.09 -1.24
Portugal -1.05 -3.09 -0.47 -6.35 -0.14 -0.28 -0.89 -3.38 -0.15 0.25
Russia -0.92 -2.91 -0.04 -3.15 0.19 -2.16 -1.37 -2.18 0.53 -0.58
Singapore -0.95 -2.78 -0.74 -5.58 0.23 -3.54 -0.83 -2.20 0.98 -0.02
Slovak Republic -0.84 -2.70 -0.34 -4.70 -0.34 -1.53 -1.02 -2.78 -1.26 -2.78
Slovenia -0.74 -2.99 -0.59 -4.34 -0.28 -1.74 -1.12 -2.74 -0.56 -0.63
South Africa -0.97 -2.74 -0.54 -5.15 0.44 -2.99 -0.88 -2.50 0.81 -0.14
Spain -0.93 -2.85 -0.75 -2.85 0.29 -2.23 -1.13 -2.52 0.79 0.36
Sweden -0.94 -2.72 -1.45 -6.16 0.24 -2.28 -0.94 -2.02 1.08 0.15
Switzerland -1.00 -2.85 -0.79 -4.54 -0.31 -3.68 -0.77 -2.70 -0.66 -0.15
Thailand -0.94 -3.14 -0.80 -3.26 0.01 -3.41 -0.95 -2.53 0.77 -1.07
Turkey -0.88 -3.08 -0.52 -4.83 -0.44 -1.75 -1.12 -2.64 -1.31 -0.05
United Kingdom -0.93 -2.53 -0.71 -2.71 -0.38 -2.46 -0.90 -2.60 0.61 -1.32
United States -0.89 -2.80 -0.57 -6.52 -0.11 -3.05 -0.86 -2.28 0.72 -0.19
Note: Statistics for level variables are based on regressions including linear trend; statistics for ￿rst
di⁄erences include only intercept term. The 95% critical values are -3.4496 and -1.9436, respectively.
135Table C.5: Results of F-tests for weak exogeneity
crit. val. eqD ccD reD irD gdpD dt
Argentina 2.70 0.72 0.25 2.39 0.18 0.83 2.25
Australia 3.09 1.59 0.20 0.63 1.00 1.44 1.49
Austria 3.94 0.96 2.88 0.04 1.50 9.30 0.14
Belgium 3.09 1.39 2.21 1.39 0.91 4.94 3.49
Brazil 3.94 0.06 4.18 0.18 8.45 0.09 0.33
Bulgaria 3.09 0.08 0.65 0.01 0.10 3.42 0.11
Canada 3.09 0.15 0.10 3.70 0.67 3.44 0.56
China (Mainland) 2.31 0.43 0.58 0.76 3.12 1.24 1.77
Czech Republic 2.70 0.63 2.62 1.27 1.90 1.26 0.70
Denmark 3.09 0.56 8.01 0.26 0.64 1.98 0.53
Estonia 2.46 1.51 1.96 2.12 0.66 1.16 1.25
Finland 2.70 0.36 0.28 0.17 0.24 1.81 0.45
France 3.09 0.14 2.35 0.30 1.91 0.25 0.49
Germany 3.94 0.05 0.37 1.11 1.39 0.07 0.07
Greece 2.70 0.08 2.21 0.51 0.70 1.17 1.34
Hungary 2.70 0.32 0.30 0.59 0.86 0.60 1.40
India 3.09 0.61 1.57 0.95 0.41 0.02 0.70
Indonesia 3.09 2.05 3.11 5.06 0.15 3.80 0.09
Ireland 3.94 0.13 0.00 5.88 2.41 0.07 0.17
Italy 2.70 0.09 1.05 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.30
Japan 3.09 0.26 2.54 0.08 1.34 3.34 2.52
Korea 3.94 0.01 2.16 0.04 1.08 0.06 1.14
Latvia 3.94 0.54 0.12 3.34 0.12 2.18 0.15
Malaysia 2.70 0.48 0.08 0.56 1.91 0.13 0.98
Netherlands 2.70 0.52 0.65 0.51 0.59 1.01 1.57
Norway 3.09 0.13 1.86 1.49 2.00 3.56 0.11
Poland 2.70 2.21 1.27 0.04 5.27 1.36 0.65
Portugal 3.09 0.12 1.51 1.64 0.37 1.16 1.94
Russia 3.94 1.18 0.72 0.01 3.35 3.95 0.01
Singapore 3.09 0.31 1.08 1.13 3.91 0.87 0.42
Slovak Republic 3.09 0.73 2.69 1.47 0.53 2.08 0.49
Slovenia 2.46 1.07 1.22 0.16 1.15 1.70 0.36
South Africa 2.70 0.31 1.91 1.32 0.72 0.91 0.06
Spain 3.94 1.07 2.19 0.01 1.82 0.83 0.82
Sweden 3.09 1.28 0.68 0.41 0.26 0.47 0.17
Switzerland 3.09 0.30 0.58 2.05 0.06 0.80 0.93
Thailand 3.09 0.40 1.04 0.77 1.14 0.53 0.32
Turkey 2.70 0.08 1.86 0.19 0.25 0.23 1.30
United Kingdom 3.94 0.25 2.69 1.38 0.94 0.45 1.05
United States 3.09 2.51 1.01 1.32 0.19 - -
Note: Bold numbers denote signi￿cance at 5%.
136Table C.6: Contemporaneous e⁄ects of foreign variables on their domestic counterparts
eq cc re ir gdp
Argentina 0.82 (3.24) -0.21 (-0.51) 0.04 (0.32) 6.04 (1.63) 0.48 (1.5)
Australia 0.57 (8.45) 0.29 (1.38) 0.37 (2.6) 1.17 (3.64) 1.02 (2.01)
Austria 0.19 (1.33) 1.12 (4.61) 0.86 (3.97) 0.77 (6.38) 0.77 (9.62)
Belgium 0.41 (3.26) -0.84 (-0.7) 0.5 (5.04) 0.96 (13.18) 1.42 (4.4)
Brazil 1.2 (11.22) -0.31 (-0.32) 0.42 (1.21) 0.33 (1.35) 0.39 (1.51)
Bulgaria 0.14 (0.59) 0.48 (0.96) 0.58 (2.49) 0.22 (3.68) 0.32 (0.9)
Canada 0.84 (13.98) -0.67 (-1.37) 0.36 (3.03) 0.55 (11.78) 0.37 (2.16)
China (Mainland) 1.12 (4.92) 0.01 (0.03) 0.11 (0.35) 0.16 (0.71) 0.36 (0.65)
Czech Republic 0.88 (3.42) 0.13 (0.42) 0.15 (1.74) 0.18 (1.79) 0.11 (0.25)
Denmark 0.68 (6.32) 0.2 (0.3) 0.84 (1.89) 0.76 (5.77) 0.96 (3.5)
Estonia 0.85 (6.87) 0.43 (1.65) 0.03 (1.67) 0.19 (2.37) 0.26 (1.23)
Finland 1.6 (6) 0.24 (0.63) 0.62 (4.25) 0.68 (6.41) 0.98 (5.57)
France 1.11 (9.81) 0.45 (2.39) 0.76 (4.25) 0.81 (7.77) 0.72 (6.58)
Germany 1.69 (9.5) 0.59 (1.92) 1.05 (3.2) 0.63 (4.33) 0.37 (1.31)
Greece 0.69 (3.31) 0.93 (1.85) 1.04 (1.82) 0.23 (2.08) 1.03 (1.94)
Hungary 1.21 (6.21) 1.72 (3.18) 0.22 (0.59) 0.16 (0.2) 0.41 (1.67)
India 0.97 (4.62) -1.06 (-3.68) 0.4 (0.86) 0.63 (2.05) 0.22 (0.65)
Indonesia 0.89 (3.22) 0.31 (0.6) 0.02 (0.07) 0.51 (1.03) 0.29 (0.5)
Ireland 0.55 (3.79) 0.59 (1.81) 0.58 (2.45) 0.89 (11.35) 1.63 (2.49)
Italy 1.03 (7.59) 0.66 (2.63) 1.36 (4.79) 0.56 (3.79) 0.99 (2.94)
Japan 0.53 (5.61) 0.26 (0.88) 0.61 (2.7) 0.19 (5.26) 0.56 (4.05)
Korea 1.19 (6.35) 0.3 (0.7) 0.4 (1.2) 0.41 (1.61) 0.13 (0.44)
Latvia 1.19 (8.78) -0.13 (-0.35) -0.02 (-0.07) 0.74 (1.71) 1.59 (3.74)
Malaysia 0.36 (2.57) -0.04 (-0.13) 0.25 (0.84) 0.09 (1.46) 1.07 (3.64)
Netherlands 0.77 (10.5) 0.26 (0.81) 0.31 (1.33) 0.89 (11.99) 0.91 (4.13)
Norway 0.71 (6.17) 0.14 (0.88) 0.64 (3.47) 1.04 (3.63) 0.59 (2.17)
Poland 1.02 (4.3) 0.84 (2.86) 0.41 (1.99) 0.29 (1.89) 0.48 (2.29)
Portugal 0.76 (6.03) -0.03 (-0.2) -0.04 (-0.96) 0.95 (18.74) 0.33 (1.75)
Russia 1.25 (3.49) 1.02 (0.52) -0.25 (-0.76) 0.19 (0.48) 0.58 (1.41)
Singapore 1.04 (7.51) -0.54 (-0.9) 0.33 (1.18) 0.74 (4.05) 0.77 (2.62)
Slovak Republic 0.38 (2.49) 0.8 (1.17) 0.13 (1.2) 0.01 (0.06) 1.58 (3.09)
Slovenia 0.09 (0.78) 0.47 (1.4) 0.03 (0.13) 0.22 (1.42) 1.45 (8.42)
South Africa 0.71 (4.32) -0.69 (-1.44) 0.44 (2.3) 0.36 (2.02) 0.94 (2.61)
Spain 1.02 (7.17) 1.11 (3.91) 0.43 (0.92) 0.65 (5.81) 1.21 (6.24)
Sweden 1.66 (9.75) 1.25 (2.64) 0.7 (2.73) 0.72 (4.06) 1.1 (5.68)
Switzerland 0.41 (4.88) 0.43 (1.72) 0.27 (2.49) 0.61 (3.17) 0.86 (3.8)
Thailand 1.12 (4.81) -0.99 (-1.14) 0.34 (0.95) 0.51 (1.27) 0.61 (1.79)
Turkey 2.05 (6.19) -0.49 (-1.08) -0.49 (-1.32) 4.39 (1.38) 0.73 (1.56)
United Kingdom 0.61 (10.99) 0.33 (1.35) 0.77 (2.93) 0.95 (5.14) 0.12 (0.51)
United States 1.2 (13.28) 0.19 (1.26) 0.28 (1.48) 1.41 (3.95) -
Note: White￿ s heteroscedastic-robust t-statistics in parenthesis.
137Table C.7: Number of cointegrating relations for di⁄erent weighting schemes
trade-based weights mixed weights
begin middle end begin middle end
Argentina 3 3 2 3 3 2
Australia 2 1 1 2 2 2
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bulgaria 1 2 2 2 2 2
Canada 2 2 2 2 2 2
China (Mainland) 5 5 5 5 5 5
Czech Republic 3 3 3 3 3 3
Denmark 2 2 2 2 2 2
Estonia 4 4 4 4 4 4
Finland 4 4 4 4 3 4
France 2 2 2 2 2 2
Germany 2 1 1 2 1 1
Greece 3 3 3 4 3 3
Hungary 3 3 3 3 3 3
India 2 2 2 2 2 2
Indonesia 4 2 2 4 2 2
Ireland 2 2 1 2 1 2
Italy 3 3 3 3 3 3
Japan 0 0 0 1 1 0
Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latvia 1 1 1 1 1 1
Malaysia 3 3 4 3 3 3
Netherlands 3 3 2 3 3 3
Norway 2 2 2 2 2 2
Poland 4 3 3 4 3 3
Portugal 3 2 2 2 2 2
Russia 1 1 2 1 1 1
Singapore 2 1 1 2 2 2
Slovak Republic 2 2 2 2 2 2
Slovenia 4 4 4 4 4 4
South Africa 3 3 3 3 3 2
Spain 1 2 2 1 1 2
Sweden 2 2 2 2 2 2
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 2 1
Thailand 1 2 2 2 2 2
Turkey 3 3 3 3 3 3
United Kingdom 1 0 1 2 1 1
United States 2 2 2 1 2 2
Note: Number of cointegrating relations as indicated by Johansen procedure using critical values from
MacKinnon et al. (1999).
138Table C.8: GFEVD: a negative standard error unit shock to US real equity prices
months 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80
Developed Markets Americas eq 11.92 6.82 2.85 1.44 0.87 0.84 1.05 1.18 20.59 14.32 8.64 5.51 4.36 4.95 5.99 6.46
credit 1.31 2.36 3.04 3.50 3.73 3.67 3.57 3.55 1.67 3.18 4.74 5.61 5.75 5.11 4.49 4.24
house 1.51 0.87 0.54 0.46 0.35 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.44 0.18 0.14 0.22 0.34 0.69 1.11 1.25
ibk 0.26 0.51 1.02 1.38 1.69 2.00 2.34 2.49 0.04 0.37 0.71 0.94 1.14 1.32 1.42 1.44
gdp 0.58 0.70 0.80 0.75 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.76 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.33 0.39 0.44 0.50 0.52
DMA Vars 15.57 11.27 8.25 7.54 7.32 7.40 7.84 8.10 22.75 18.12 14.44 12.61 11.98 12.51 13.50 13.91
Developed Markets Europe eq 16.62 17.36 16.70 16.24 15.69 14.81 13.59 12.98 7.22 7.79 9.01 9.25 8.74 7.64 6.71 6.32
credit 5.24 7.73 9.11 9.35 9.37 9.46 9.63 9.72 4.54 4.14 4.46 5.04 5.64 6.13 6.34 6.40
house 6.71 7.79 8.19 8.31 8.25 7.91 7.49 7.31 6.71 6.76 6.97 6.85 6.38 5.70 5.24 5.08
ibk 5.58 4.27 4.36 3.50 2.61 2.13 2.10 2.09 5.51 7.84 6.02 5.23 4.88 4.59 4.14 3.82
gdp 3.00 7.04 9.67 10.79 11.78 12.85 13.82 14.24 3.17 4.44 6.04 7.09 7.95 8.75 9.41 9.70
DME Vars 37.14 44.19 48.03 48.19 47.70 47.15 46.62 46.34 27.15 30.96 32.48 33.47 33.60 32.83 31.84 31.31
Developed Markets Pacific eq 1.81 1.41 1.32 1.34 1.39 1.40 1.35 1.33 0.12 0.37 1.11 1.68 1.96 1.94 1.84 1.80
credit 2.30 1.67 2.06 2.40 2.70 2.89 2.97 3.00 1.00 1.39 2.35 3.04 3.44 3.45 3.31 3.27
house 1.93 1.22 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.64 0.80 0.57 0.41 0.46 0.62 0.68 0.70
ibk 0.98 0.80 0.91 0.93 0.96 1.02 1.07 1.08 1.20 0.91 0.97 0.95 0.89 0.80 0.74 0.72
gdp 1.21 0.65 0.51 0.63 0.81 0.96 1.08 1.13 2.36 2.35 1.55 0.98 0.65 0.54 0.54 0.55
DMP Vars 8.23 5.75 5.69 6.18 6.75 7.15 7.33 7.40 5.32 5.81 6.56 7.08 7.41 7.36 7.11 7.04
Developed Markets Total 60.94 61.21 61.96 61.91 61.78 61.70 61.79 61.84 55.22 54.90 53.48 53.16 52.99 52.69 52.44 52.27
Emerging Markets Americas eq 0.65 1.22 2.06 2.32 2.49 2.53 2.48 2.46 0.47 1.36 3.18 4.13 4.75 5.16 5.37 5.48
credit 2.28 2.24 1.95 1.90 1.95 2.04 2.07 2.09 2.05 2.81 3.50 3.77 3.86 3.94 3.97 3.98
house 3.53 2.94 2.54 2.43 2.41 2.52 2.72 2.82 3.67 3.36 3.05 2.86 2.85 3.10 3.41 3.54
ibk 1.50 2.13 2.76 2.86 2.75 2.57 2.46 2.42 1.91 2.99 2.92 2.58 2.11 1.76 1.60 1.55
gdp 1.17 1.97 2.35 2.54 2.80 3.03 3.12 3.14 1.78 1.60 1.71 1.96 2.33 2.62 2.74 2.79
EMAM Vars 9.14 10.50 11.65 12.05 12.40 12.69 12.84 12.92 9.88 12.12 14.36 15.30 15.91 16.58 17.10 17.35
Emerging Markets EMEA eq 2.69 2.63 3.03 3.60 4.08 4.07 3.69 3.49 1.85 2.50 3.89 5.23 6.19 6.02 5.38 5.12
credit 3.33 2.45 2.09 1.94 1.77 1.70 1.74 1.77 2.14 2.29 2.56 2.36 1.91 1.75 1.81 1.83
house 1.12 1.38 1.77 1.90 1.97 1.98 1.93 1.91 0.57 1.22 1.76 1.90 1.94 2.07 2.18 2.22
ibk 2.55 2.05 1.49 1.28 1.16 1.14 1.18 1.22 2.46 2.31 2.23 2.00 1.85 1.93 2.11 2.18
gdp 1.29 1.06 1.25 1.31 1.30 1.41 1.66 1.77 0.63 0.35 0.32 0.41 0.48 0.55 0.62 0.64
EMEA Vars 10.98 9.57 9.63 10.03 10.28 10.30 10.21 10.15 7.65 8.67 10.76 11.90 12.37 12.32 12.10 11.99
Emerging Markets Asia eq 0.26 0.18 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05
credit 0.01 0.04 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.17
house 0.29 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.57 1.36 1.81 1.90 1.86 1.79 1.73 1.71
ibk 0.77 0.31 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.18 0.09 0.40 0.77 1.10 1.27 1.26 1.23
gdp 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.37 0.19 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
EMAS Vars 1.35 1.22 1.06 1.06 1.14 1.28 1.38 1.42 1.35 1.79 2.36 2.76 3.07 3.23 3.20 3.17
Emerging Markets Total 21.47 21.28 22.35 23.14 23.81 24.27 24.44 24.49 18.87 22.58 27.48 29.96 31.34 32.13 32.39 32.51
Frontier Markets eq 7.63 7.16 5.88 5.40 5.11 4.88 4.67 4.58 7.60 6.89 6.27 5.62 5.06 4.63 4.38 4.32
credit 1.44 2.68 3.17 3.06 2.80 2.55 2.39 2.31 2.14 2.55 2.78 2.75 2.59 2.38 2.21 2.14
house 1.26 2.96 3.66 4.05 4.38 4.66 4.85 4.93 1.07 2.27 3.65 4.52 5.08 5.31 5.37 5.41
ibk 0.51 0.85 1.10 1.13 1.11 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.10 1.64 1.86 1.71 1.50 1.41 1.43 1.46
gdp 2.37 1.76 1.30 1.11 0.95 0.82 0.74 0.70 1.89 1.07 0.54 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.32
FM Vars 13.22 15.42 15.11 14.75 14.34 13.99 13.75 13.65 13.80 14.41 15.09 15.02 14.64 14.10 13.74 13.66
Oil price 4.37 2.10 0.59 0.21 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 12.11 8.11 3.95 1.86 1.02 1.07 1.42 1.57
Note: Percentage of k-step ahead forecast error variance of the historical shock to the US real equity
prices. Percentages may not sum up to 100 due to covariances between shocks; they are therefore rescaled
for a better readability. Mixed weights on the left hand side; trade-based weights on the right hand side.
139Table C.9: GFEVD: a negative standard error unit shock to US real GDP
months 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80
Developed Markets Americas eq 0.36 0.58 1.11 1.49 1.43 0.88 0.61 0.61 1.03 1.83 3.51 4.96 5.50 4.11 3.20 3.18
credit 6.39 6.11 4.75 3.37 2.52 2.73 3.07 3.13 6.58 5.97 4.47 3.30 3.16 4.82 5.51 5.38
house 0.52 0.55 0.65 0.86 1.40 1.92 1.77 1.61 0.08 0.16 0.32 0.50 0.84 1.06 0.72 0.57
ibk 0.03 0.17 0.78 1.57 1.92 1.14 0.52 0.36 0.01 0.09 0.63 1.31 1.62 0.89 0.42 0.32
gdp 25.94 25.62 22.72 18.86 13.17 6.98 4.06 3.59 26.26 25.81 22.65 18.54 13.01 6.18 2.77 2.22
DMA Vars 33.24 33.04 30.02 26.15 20.44 13.65 10.02 9.30 33.96 33.86 31.58 28.62 24.13 17.05 12.61 11.68
Developed Markets Europe eq 6.15 5.43 5.37 6.04 8.44 12.78 14.95 15.08 5.90 5.41 5.11 5.16 6.03 8.09 8.60 8.40
credit 6.02 6.15 6.48 6.41 6.03 6.02 6.59 6.89 5.78 5.81 5.94 5.93 5.82 5.86 6.28 6.52
house 4.00 4.20 4.35 4.67 5.51 6.85 7.42 7.41 3.73 3.71 3.61 3.65 3.96 4.86 5.31 5.35
ibk 7.14 6.48 8.13 10.78 12.34 9.79 6.37 5.26 6.71 5.93 6.72 7.99 6.94 3.78 3.42 3.38
gdp 8.95 9.31 9.12 8.14 7.27 8.24 10.50 11.62 9.76 9.48 8.70 7.75 7.27 7.94 9.21 9.95
DME Vars 32.26 31.56 33.46 36.05 39.58 43.68 45.83 46.27 31.88 30.34 30.07 30.48 30.01 30.52 32.82 33.59
Developed Markets Pacific eq 0.07 0.09 0.21 0.43 0.85 1.35 1.56 1.60 0.17 0.22 0.34 0.55 1.13 2.20 2.65 2.70
credit 2.35 2.04 1.86 1.91 2.12 2.35 2.45 2.47 1.26 1.27 1.25 1.33 1.76 2.67 3.14 3.20
house 0.44 0.46 0.65 0.93 1.25 1.34 1.26 1.21 0.82 0.83 1.10 1.34 1.33 0.95 0.86 0.91
ibk 0.58 0.54 0.74 0.99 1.10 0.91 0.73 0.68 0.39 0.42 0.67 1.01 1.42 1.51 1.27 1.16
gdp 0.81 0.88 0.77 0.58 0.33 0.22 0.30 0.33 0.64 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.79 0.80 0.70 0.65
DMP Vars 4.25 4.01 4.23 4.84 5.65 6.17 6.30 6.28 3.27 3.47 4.07 4.96 6.43 8.13 8.61 8.62
Developed Markets Total 69.76 68.61 67.70 67.04 65.67 63.51 62.15 61.85 69.11 67.67 65.72 64.06 60.58 55.71 54.04 53.89
Emerging Markets Americas eq 1.40 1.48 1.91 2.39 3.07 3.45 3.33 3.22 1.37 1.50 2.04 2.60 3.21 3.63 3.82 3.86
credit 1.38 1.28 1.10 0.93 0.84 1.07 1.38 1.47 0.99 0.92 0.84 0.84 1.18 2.17 2.89 3.03
house 1.07 1.37 1.30 1.21 1.36 1.81 2.19 2.32 1.05 1.08 0.92 0.87 1.06 1.65 2.20 2.40
ibk 1.03 1.56 2.41 3.10 3.76 4.00 3.83 3.76 1.25 1.45 1.76 2.05 2.31 2.33 2.11 2.03
gdp 6.39 6.23 5.61 4.74 3.61 2.97 3.13 3.31 6.96 6.94 6.61 5.99 5.27 4.49 4.28 4.40
EMAM Vars 11.26 11.91 12.32 12.36 12.65 13.30 13.86 14.09 11.62 11.88 12.18 12.35 13.02 14.27 15.31 15.72
Emerging Markets EMEA eq 0.79 0.70 0.65 0.74 1.35 2.89 3.82 3.91 0.83 0.63 0.58 0.87 2.18 5.11 6.48 6.50
credit 1.58 1.53 1.43 1.32 1.12 0.93 0.88 0.87 0.57 0.53 0.43 0.34 0.32 0.47 0.58 0.59
house 1.33 1.29 1.17 1.19 1.35 1.61 1.71 1.67 1.20 1.10 0.83 0.65 0.55 0.82 1.17 1.25
ibk 1.31 1.19 1.09 1.00 0.97 1.02 1.10 1.15 1.50 1.41 1.37 1.36 1.49 1.68 1.80 1.88
gdp 5.00 4.23 3.57 3.29 2.86 1.83 1.03 0.82 4.78 4.64 4.42 4.14 3.60 2.32 1.36 1.16
EMEA Vars 10.02 8.94 7.90 7.53 7.64 8.28 8.54 8.41 8.87 8.32 7.64 7.36 8.13 10.39 11.39 11.38
Emerging Markets Asia eq 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
credit 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08
house 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.43 0.70 0.72
ibk 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.36 0.58 0.75 0.85 0.88 0.05 0.12 0.32 0.56 1.04 1.73 2.06 2.10
gdp 0.46 0.56 0.55 0.48 0.36 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.34 0.44 0.43 0.36 0.23 0.08 0.02 0.01
EMAS Vars 0.51 0.62 0.80 0.93 1.06 1.19 1.33 1.39 0.41 0.57 0.76 0.94 1.36 2.28 2.85 2.92
Emerging Markets Total 21.79 21.47 21.02 20.82 21.35 22.77 23.72 23.89 20.90 20.77 20.58 20.65 22.52 26.94 29.54 30.02
Frontier Markets eq 2.00 2.42 2.86 3.14 3.68 4.55 5.06 5.18 1.96 2.47 3.41 4.27 5.29 5.80 5.39 5.20
credit 0.54 0.66 0.99 1.45 2.28 3.02 3.01 2.89 0.79 0.93 1.22 1.61 2.38 3.29 3.33 3.22
house 1.20 1.63 2.00 2.27 2.62 3.15 3.68 3.88 1.72 2.09 2.58 2.96 3.47 4.21 4.71 4.85
ibk 1.08 1.61 1.95 1.95 1.80 1.59 1.49 1.52 1.41 1.74 1.89 1.88 1.80 1.59 1.37 1.32
gdp 2.78 2.55 2.22 1.83 1.15 0.51 0.30 0.26 2.53 2.49 2.40 2.09 1.58 0.97 0.64 0.56
FM Vars 7.60 8.87 10.02 10.64 11.52 12.81 13.55 13.73 8.41 9.73 11.51 12.81 14.52 15.86 15.43 15.15
Oil price 0.85 1.05 1.26 1.50 1.46 0.91 0.58 0.54 1.58 1.83 2.20 2.48 2.39 1.49 0.98 0.95
Note: Percentage of k-step ahead forecast error variance of the historical shock to the US real equity
prices. Percentages may not sum up to 100 due to covariances between shocks; they are therefore rescaled
for a better readability. Mixed weights on the left hand side; trade-based weights on the right hand side.
140Table C.10: GFEVD: a negative standard error unit shock to US interest rate
months 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80
Developed Markets Americas eq 0.39 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.20 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.37 0.46 0.70 0.80
credit 0.59 0.93 1.26 1.44 1.59 1.96 2.19 2.19 0.84 1.12 1.42 1.92 3.58 5.32 5.38 5.16
house 0.85 0.52 0.57 0.93 1.80 2.36 2.14 2.01 1.09 0.73 0.81 1.34 2.23 1.94 1.23 1.04
ibk 24.67 19.61 17.69 15.26 10.61 5.14 2.59 2.05 25.64 21.55 20.35 17.51 9.90 3.03 1.15 0.82
gdp 0.28 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.17
DMA Vars 26.78 21.38 19.68 17.76 14.23 9.83 7.30 6.60 28.04 23.74 22.93 21.20 16.31 11.03 8.66 7.99
Developed Markets Europe eq 10.29 8.72 8.97 10.18 13.43 17.68 19.56 19.89 8.58 7.64 8.19 9.68 12.27 12.74 11.60 11.16
credit 5.61 4.96 4.58 4.00 3.32 3.61 4.44 4.72 5.54 4.72 4.58 4.67 5.03 5.68 6.30 6.54
house 5.90 5.42 5.46 5.68 6.48 7.79 8.37 8.45 4.64 4.20 4.33 4.71 5.87 6.84 6.83 6.82
ibk 19.58 30.06 31.54 30.77 26.05 16.92 10.61 8.87 28.19 35.30 33.73 27.52 14.58 6.60 5.65 5.43
gdp 2.55 2.02 1.77 1.69 2.11 4.06 6.35 7.23 2.90 2.43 2.24 2.35 3.47 5.64 7.38 8.11
DME Vars 43.93 51.17 52.33 52.32 51.40 50.07 49.33 49.16 49.84 54.29 53.07 48.92 41.23 37.50 37.77 38.06
Developed Markets Pacific eq 0.94 0.89 1.00 1.19 1.54 1.90 2.07 2.13 0.95 0.93 1.14 1.71 2.87 3.45 3.41 3.41
credit 1.37 1.20 1.26 1.43 1.79 2.22 2.51 2.62 1.02 0.99 1.25 1.88 3.12 3.89 4.04 4.09
house 1.56 1.60 1.74 1.85 1.92 1.85 1.73 1.69 0.85 0.96 0.87 0.65 0.36 0.36 0.51 0.58
ibk 2.77 2.03 1.86 1.69 1.27 0.76 0.53 0.46 1.58 1.82 2.11 2.44 2.44 1.81 1.39 1.28
gdp 1.38 0.76 0.61 0.54 0.49 0.55 0.65 0.68 0.87 0.70 0.85 1.00 1.07 0.95 0.81 0.77
DMP Vars 8.02 6.48 6.47 6.69 7.03 7.29 7.48 7.58 5.26 5.40 6.23 7.68 9.86 10.45 10.15 10.12
Developed Markets Total 78.73 79.03 78.48 76.77 72.66 67.19 64.11 63.34 83.14 83.43 82.22 77.81 67.41 58.99 56.58 56.17
Emerging Markets Americas eq 1.44 1.57 1.91 2.32 2.79 3.02 2.97 2.91 1.46 1.45 1.69 1.94 2.32 2.87 3.31 3.43
credit 0.52 0.39 0.34 0.35 0.53 1.00 1.41 1.54 0.37 0.33 0.44 0.87 1.99 3.08 3.53 3.62
house 1.65 1.25 1.22 1.33 1.54 1.74 1.89 1.94 1.28 0.87 0.72 0.77 1.07 1.53 1.93 2.08
ibk 1.21 3.39 3.63 3.68 3.58 3.30 3.06 2.99 1.24 2.68 2.61 2.38 2.00 1.71 1.55 1.51
gdp 1.19 0.71 0.48 0.36 0.53 1.29 2.00 2.23 1.25 0.87 0.62 0.50 0.89 1.85 2.57 2.83
EMAM Vars 6.01 7.31 7.59 8.04 8.96 10.35 11.32 11.60 5.60 6.20 6.08 6.46 8.27 11.04 12.89 13.46
Emerging Markets EMEA eq 0.63 0.70 0.79 1.17 2.48 4.50 5.56 5.76 0.44 0.43 0.69 1.83 5.14 7.90 8.22 8.09
credit 2.62 1.81 1.48 1.26 1.04 0.93 0.94 0.95 2.09 1.38 1.17 1.15 1.14 0.97 0.85 0.81
house 0.64 0.97 1.16 1.41 1.90 2.47 2.73 2.79 0.25 0.43 0.58 0.81 1.34 1.90 2.14 2.21
ibk 0.63 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.60 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.44 0.37 0.52 0.94 1.51 1.69 1.75 1.80
gdp 1.32 1.69 2.10 2.49 2.67 2.21 1.68 1.52 1.33 1.45 1.81 2.25 2.42 1.78 1.26 1.11
EMEA Vars 5.84 5.66 6.00 6.84 8.69 10.78 11.61 11.75 4.55 4.05 4.77 6.97 11.54 14.25 14.22 14.02
Emerging Markets Asia eq 0.41 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.24 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.10 0.04 0.03
credit 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06
house 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.53 0.97 1.11 1.10
ibk 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.17 0.27 0.41 0.52 0.56 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.39 0.98 1.56 1.82 1.87
gdp 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05
EMAS Vars 0.61 0.43 0.42 0.47 0.58 0.74 0.92 0.98 0.40 0.31 0.44 0.85 1.79 2.71 3.08 3.11
Emerging Markets Total 12.45 13.40 14.01 15.35 18.24 21.87 23.85 24.33 10.55 10.57 11.29 14.27 21.61 28.00 30.18 30.60
Frontier Markets eq 0.89 0.44 0.30 0.35 0.92 2.18 3.04 3.24 0.47 0.59 0.82 1.32 2.56 3.58 3.72 3.70
credit 3.69 3.59 3.84 4.33 4.95 4.90 4.44 4.28 2.18 2.36 2.74 3.46 4.39 4.27 3.79 3.63
house 2.20 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.19 2.68 3.24 3.45 2.09 1.87 1.90 2.10 2.82 3.81 4.39 4.57
ibk 0.76 0.46 0.38 0.38 0.48 0.63 0.75 0.80 0.47 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.35 0.56 0.67 0.70
gdp 1.15 0.90 0.74 0.59 0.49 0.52 0.57 0.56 1.11 0.87 0.75 0.74 0.84 0.79 0.63 0.57
FM Vars 8.70 7.44 7.33 7.72 9.02 10.92 12.03 12.33 6.31 5.98 6.41 7.84 10.96 13.01 13.20 13.17
Oil price 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.06
Note: Percentage of k-step ahead forecast error variance of the historical shock to the US real equity
prices. Percentages may not sum up to 100 due to covariances between shocks; they are therefore rescaled
for a better readability. Mixed weights on the left hand side; trade-based weights on the right hand side.
141Table C.11: GFEVD with di⁄erent weighting schemes: a negative standard error unit
shock to US real equity prices
months 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80
mixed weights - beginning of sample trade-based weights - beginning of sample
Developed Markets eq 24.50 19.87 16.14 13.48 11.04 9.23 8.13 7.83 31.69 25.24 19.64 16.63 14.94 16.59 17.95 18.77
credit 6.24 8.85 10.58 10.89 10.46 9.73 9.12 8.94 6.31 9.24 12.68 14.33 14.63 12.95 11.83 10.96
house 7.48 7.23 7.22 7.02 6.61 6.22 5.99 5.96 6.19 6.55 7.10 7.12 6.98 8.76 9.25 9.55
ibk 9.43 13.32 17.53 23.39 30.71 36.96 40.81 41.62 3.18 5.28 6.30 7.37 7.92 7.14 7.20 6.57
gdp 6.41 7.37 7.17 6.43 5.62 5.08 4.97 5.08 4.69 6.65 8.43 9.13 9.52 9.68 9.50 9.52
DM Vars 54.07 56.64 58.65 61.21 64.44 67.22 69.02 69.44 52.07 52.97 54.15 54.58 53.98 55.12 55.73 55.38
Emerging Markets eq 2.77 3.52 4.60 4.93 4.81 4.46 4.13 4.02 1.94 3.90 6.40 7.78 8.86 8.55 8.07 8.00
credit 4.57 4.17 4.13 3.92 3.61 3.36 3.20 3.18 4.78 5.02 5.18 5.13 5.10 5.03 5.06 5.19
house 3.19 4.55 5.47 5.68 5.56 5.33 5.15 5.10 3.53 4.99 6.09 6.62 7.15 7.15 6.84 6.87
ibk 5.55 5.83 6.02 5.98 5.79 5.59 5.42 5.37 3.92 4.85 5.12 4.97 4.52 3.86 3.77 3.62
gdp 2.46 2.41 2.85 3.15 3.26 3.21 3.12 3.10 1.92 1.99 2.30 2.46 2.45 2.63 2.73 2.70
EM Vars 18.54 20.47 23.07 23.67 23.04 21.94 21.02 20.76 16.09 20.76 25.09 26.97 28.08 27.21 26.47 26.38
Frontier Markets eq 8.06 7.12 5.98 5.03 4.15 3.51 3.10 3.00 8.28 7.07 6.03 5.55 5.39 4.93 4.79 4.83
credit 2.32 3.12 3.31 3.04 2.61 2.21 1.94 1.86 3.25 3.47 3.34 3.02 2.56 2.12 2.01 1.87
house 0.60 1.43 2.01 2.21 2.25 2.28 2.35 2.42 0.52 1.88 3.25 4.22 5.19 5.07 4.54 4.45
ibk 0.75 1.36 1.45 1.24 1.01 0.89 0.87 0.90 0.34 0.94 1.38 1.44 1.42 1.32 1.41 1.48
gdp 3.09 2.36 1.57 1.16 0.86 0.66 0.54 0.50 1.50 1.45 1.15 0.97 0.75 0.70 0.68 0.60
FM Vars 14.81 15.40 14.32 12.68 10.88 9.53 8.80 8.67 13.90 14.80 15.16 15.20 15.31 14.14 13.44 13.22
Oil price 12.58 7.49 3.96 2.45 1.65 1.30 1.15 1.14 17.95 11.48 5.59 3.25 2.63 3.53 4.36 5.02
mixed weights - end of sample trade-based weights - end of sample
Developed Markets eq 20.05 18.27 18.07 17.50 16.63 15.62 14.75 14.38 23.29 20.36 18.67 17.67 16.55 15.17 14.11 13.57
credit 6.20 8.09 10.51 11.96 12.92 13.39 13.58 13.61 6.80 8.91 11.20 12.85 13.90 14.22 14.36 14.41
house 11.56 10.28 8.96 7.92 6.97 6.28 5.88 5.77 9.83 9.66 8.92 8.10 7.43 7.23 7.43 7.64
ibk 14.23 14.99 11.99 11.46 12.59 14.52 16.13 16.71 8.19 9.54 9.06 8.82 9.42 11.15 13.06 14.08
gdp 7.74 8.86 9.65 9.88 9.86 9.74 9.68 9.70 6.30 7.50 8.36 8.86 9.25 9.39 9.34 9.30
DM Vars 59.78 60.49 59.18 58.73 58.96 59.54 60.02 60.17 54.41 55.98 56.21 56.30 56.55 57.16 58.30 59.00
Emerging Markets eq 5.44 6.34 8.89 10.28 10.95 11.08 11.02 10.98 3.75 5.44 8.74 11.06 12.30 12.34 12.13 11.98
credit 2.18 2.96 3.67 3.87 3.85 3.78 3.71 3.67 5.29 5.79 5.87 5.48 5.03 4.85 4.67 4.54
house 6.08 5.55 4.81 4.29 3.94 3.77 3.70 3.69 6.30 6.36 5.81 5.22 4.88 4.80 4.62 4.50
ibk 5.55 5.16 4.57 4.20 3.90 3.76 3.71 3.70 5.05 5.10 5.05 4.88 4.72 4.71 4.65 4.58
gdp 2.32 2.26 2.55 2.94 3.34 3.58 3.69 3.72 2.80 2.61 2.70 2.94 3.24 3.45 3.57 3.64
EM Vars 21.57 22.28 24.49 25.58 25.98 25.96 25.83 25.76 23.19 25.30 28.17 29.59 30.16 30.15 29.63 29.24
Frontier Markets eq 6.26 5.83 5.55 5.18 4.72 4.29 4.03 3.96 6.82 5.99 5.23 4.72 4.25 3.80 3.46 3.32
credit 3.06 3.46 3.49 3.33 3.16 2.98 2.83 2.76 2.31 2.59 2.75 2.75 2.72 2.68 2.57 2.48
house 3.71 4.52 5.09 5.28 5.29 5.20 5.17 5.19 3.28 3.91 4.26 4.41 4.48 4.39 4.20 4.09
ibk 0.59 0.90 1.13 1.25 1.37 1.50 1.61 1.66 0.93 1.06 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.26 1.33 1.38
gdp 2.09 1.14 0.62 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.48 2.36 1.24 0.62 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.47
FM Vars 15.70 15.85 15.88 15.54 15.02 14.49 14.15 14.06 15.70 14.79 14.01 13.49 13.08 12.61 12.04 11.75
Oil price 2.95 1.38 0.45 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 6.70 3.94 1.60 0.62 0.21 0.08 0.02 0.01
Note: Percentage of k-step ahead forecast error variance of the historical shock to the US real equity
prices. Percentages may not sum up to 100 due to covariances between shocks; they are therefore
rescaled for a better readability.
142Table C.12: GFEVD with di⁄erent weighting schemes: a negative standard error unit
shock to US real GDP
months 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80
mixed weights - beginning of sample trade-based weights - beginning of sample
Developed Markets eq 5.62 6.17 7.82 9.94 11.24 9.73 8.16 7.65 7.12 7.29 8.57 10.11 12.23 14.26 14.70 14.86
credit 12.39 11.77 10.73 9.82 9.55 9.55 9.01 8.71 12.22 11.90 10.72 9.64 9.93 12.46 12.14 12.03
house 5.34 5.18 5.32 5.82 6.23 5.90 5.61 5.50 4.67 4.65 4.93 5.51 6.24 6.36 6.04 5.93
ibk 9.45 8.67 7.56 7.87 15.48 29.95 38.01 39.56 8.58 7.58 8.73 10.43 8.85 4.82 3.55 3.12
gdp 37.07 35.98 32.11 25.13 13.78 6.90 5.61 5.77 38.67 38.24 34.04 28.29 20.69 13.55 12.60 12.43
DM Vars 69.88 67.77 63.54 58.58 56.27 62.05 66.39 67.18 71.28 69.66 66.99 63.97 57.93 51.44 49.03 48.37
Emerging Markets eq 2.79 3.00 3.62 4.48 5.33 5.00 4.41 4.22 2.57 2.71 3.31 4.09 6.03 9.28 10.23 10.39
credit 2.22 1.97 1.86 2.10 2.83 3.17 3.11 3.08 1.55 1.38 1.23 1.13 1.40 2.45 2.71 2.74
house 2.65 2.76 2.94 3.53 4.92 5.50 5.34 5.27 1.91 1.94 1.67 1.55 2.14 4.10 4.83 4.99
ibk 2.49 2.81 3.80 5.42 7.18 6.83 6.20 6.11 2.33 2.41 2.79 3.41 4.72 5.70 5.60 5.58
gdp 8.55 8.16 7.26 5.88 3.93 3.09 2.97 2.94 8.85 8.57 8.03 7.37 6.03 4.01 3.52 3.37
EM Vars 18.70 18.70 19.49 21.41 24.18 23.60 22.02 21.62 17.22 17.00 17.02 17.55 20.31 25.55 26.88 27.07
Frontier Markets eq 2.41 3.30 4.94 6.65 7.12 5.19 3.93 3.70 2.11 2.77 3.99 5.28 7.19 8.41 8.87 9.07
credit 0.82 1.04 1.52 2.17 2.82 2.55 2.12 2.00 0.96 1.15 1.58 2.15 3.32 4.09 3.88 3.85
house 1.89 2.19 2.67 2.95 2.75 2.41 2.39 2.47 2.20 2.62 3.15 3.43 3.61 4.19 4.74 4.87
ibk 1.21 1.71 2.31 2.67 2.33 1.43 1.10 1.10 1.04 1.50 1.81 1.95 2.08 1.89 1.79 1.81
gdp 3.27 3.02 2.49 1.75 0.83 0.49 0.40 0.36 2.92 2.70 2.34 1.85 1.19 0.74 0.64 0.61
FM Vars 9.61 11.26 13.94 16.18 15.85 12.06 9.95 9.62 9.23 10.74 12.87 14.66 17.40 19.32 19.92 20.23
Oil price 1.81 2.27 3.04 3.84 3.70 2.29 1.64 1.58 2.27 2.59 3.11 3.82 4.36 3.70 4.17 4.34
mixed weights - end of sample trade-based weights - end of sample
Developed Markets eq 5.60 5.31 6.57 8.77 12.77 16.28 16.26 15.79 6.65 7.53 9.93 12.72 15.92 17.78 16.57 15.19
credit 13.75 13.15 11.83 10.67 10.63 12.32 13.44 13.70 14.81 14.27 12.67 11.26 10.96 12.93 14.64 14.91
house 5.01 5.51 6.09 6.78 7.70 7.73 6.86 6.51 4.84 4.73 4.63 4.68 4.88 5.43 6.32 6.95
ibk 10.89 10.00 9.26 10.10 8.96 7.68 10.02 11.21 6.48 6.07 7.38 9.49 9.67 6.80 7.54 9.94
gdp 33.81 33.80 31.25 26.35 18.94 12.61 10.62 10.37 35.82 34.85 30.77 25.37 19.22 13.79 10.76 9.92
DM Vars 69.06 67.76 65.01 62.67 59.00 56.60 57.21 57.58 68.60 67.44 65.37 63.53 60.64 56.73 55.83 56.91
Emerging Markets eq 2.44 2.46 3.38 4.86 8.15 11.61 12.31 12.30 2.24 2.30 3.33 4.98 7.72 11.12 12.61 12.56
credit 2.40 2.55 2.59 2.58 2.75 3.22 3.46 3.49 1.76 1.64 1.47 1.40 1.66 2.67 3.80 4.14
house 2.80 2.76 2.32 2.06 2.26 2.96 3.32 3.39 2.82 2.56 2.04 1.69 1.66 2.48 3.58 3.98
ibk 2.45 2.94 3.97 5.11 6.15 5.73 4.91 4.69 3.74 3.96 4.53 5.13 5.83 6.26 5.88 5.42
gdp 11.29 11.10 10.76 9.50 6.87 4.30 3.65 3.61 12.01 12.08 11.56 10.34 8.43 6.04 4.50 4.10
EM Vars 21.38 21.81 23.03 24.11 26.19 27.82 27.65 27.47 22.56 22.54 22.94 23.54 25.29 28.57 30.37 30.20
Frontier Markets eq 2.37 2.77 3.35 3.90 4.77 5.12 4.73 4.57 1.72 2.19 2.92 3.60 4.33 4.72 4.25 3.82
credit 1.03 1.09 1.38 1.91 2.96 3.62 3.42 3.26 0.81 0.96 1.30 1.71 2.37 3.09 3.11 2.87
house 1.96 2.35 2.84 3.22 3.85 4.61 4.92 5.01 2.05 2.22 2.41 2.51 2.71 3.33 3.90 4.00
ibk 0.86 1.10 1.19 1.15 1.18 1.41 1.63 1.72 1.08 1.29 1.45 1.45 1.38 1.39 1.44 1.46
gdp 2.54 2.27 2.20 1.91 1.17 0.51 0.37 0.35 1.90 1.89 1.90 1.83 1.63 1.22 0.78 0.62
FM Vars 8.75 9.58 10.95 12.09 13.93 15.28 15.07 14.91 7.56 8.55 9.99 11.10 12.43 13.76 13.48 12.77
Oil price 0.81 0.86 1.01 1.14 0.88 0.30 0.07 0.03 1.28 1.47 1.70 1.82 1.63 0.94 0.32 0.12
Note: Percentage of k-step ahead forecast error variance of the historical shock to the US real equity
prices. Percentages may not sum up to 100 due to covariances between shocks; they are therefore
rescaled for a better readability.
143Table C.13: GFEVD with di⁄erent weighting schemes: a negative standard error unit
shock to US interest rate
months 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80 0 1 3 6 12 24 48 80
mixed weights - beginning of sample trade-based weights - beginning of sample
Developed Markets eq 8.58 9.07 10.49 12.81 16.14 13.43 10.08 9.43 10.22 8.75 9.18 11.41 16.48 17.55 17.32 17.44
credit 9.21 9.24 9.66 10.37 11.40 10.86 9.62 9.22 8.32 7.54 7.77 8.25 10.74 13.54 13.23 13.18
house 8.82 8.82 9.15 9.81 9.99 7.51 6.16 5.91 7.12 6.34 6.41 6.99 8.37 8.08 7.58 7.44
ibk 58.01 56.88 52.09 42.34 22.88 22.79 32.76 34.45 53.10 56.20 54.22 46.40 24.66 10.36 8.50 7.61
gdp 2.84 2.74 2.77 3.03 4.02 4.87 4.91 5.06 3.79 2.90 2.54 2.60 4.31 6.44 6.65 6.74
DM Vars 87.47 86.76 84.17 78.36 64.42 59.46 63.54 64.07 82.56 81.73 80.11 75.66 64.55 55.96 53.28 52.42
Emerging Markets eq 1.35 1.42 1.84 2.81 5.18 5.93 5.09 4.90 1.85 1.95 2.31 3.34 6.67 10.05 11.03 11.27
credit 1.31 1.18 1.27 1.73 3.09 3.85 3.63 3.61 2.20 1.64 1.38 1.48 2.49 3.53 3.80 3.85
house 1.48 1.45 1.75 2.51 4.83 6.38 6.08 6.06 1.99 1.72 1.63 1.93 3.54 5.49 6.11 6.32
ibk 1.63 2.10 2.64 3.66 6.00 6.98 6.49 6.47 2.40 4.05 4.47 5.08 5.77 5.56 5.53 5.51
gdp 1.61 1.71 2.13 2.84 4.12 4.22 3.70 3.63 2.17 2.20 2.64 3.32 4.03 3.72 3.45 3.40
EM Vars 7.39 7.87 9.62 13.55 23.21 27.37 24.99 24.67 10.61 11.56 12.42 15.15 22.50 28.36 29.92 30.34
Frontier Markets eq 0.47 0.62 1.00 1.78 3.64 4.33 3.69 3.54 0.39 0.66 0.94 1.50 3.10 4.65 5.16 5.36
credit 1.18 1.56 1.99 2.59 3.56 3.17 2.42 2.26 2.73 2.87 3.32 4.32 5.53 5.02 4.79 4.76
house 1.34 1.42 1.55 1.74 2.23 2.58 2.66 2.80 2.05 1.97 1.94 1.82 2.08 3.44 3.99 4.15
ibk 0.64 0.60 0.70 0.92 1.29 1.19 1.04 1.08 0.60 0.38 0.37 0.48 0.73 0.87 0.90 0.95
gdp 1.28 1.06 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.74 0.54 0.46 1.05 0.77 0.65 0.65 0.97 1.05 0.91 0.88
FM Vars 4.91 5.26 6.15 7.88 11.61 12.01 10.35 10.14 6.81 6.65 7.22 8.77 12.42 15.03 15.76 16.10
Oil price 0.24 0.11 0.07 0.20 0.76 1.17 1.12 1.11 0.02 0.06 0.24 0.42 0.53 0.65 1.04 1.14
mixed weights - end of sample trade-based weights - end of sample
Developed Markets eq 10.82 9.62 10.20 11.80 15.64 18.84 18.16 17.50 7.74 7.53 8.59 10.74 14.60 16.65 15.62 14.59
credit 7.36 6.61 6.50 6.69 7.97 11.01 12.92 13.35 6.69 6.15 6.29 7.20 10.01 13.67 14.94 14.99
house 6.92 6.05 6.18 6.87 8.35 8.71 7.61 7.17 5.99 5.25 5.27 5.74 6.90 7.69 7.76 7.87
ibk 48.60 53.48 52.79 47.43 31.64 13.39 9.71 9.94 55.72 57.90 55.38 47.68 30.12 13.31 9.94 11.22
gdp 4.25 3.13 2.72 2.96 4.83 8.06 9.46 9.73 4.15 3.50 3.28 3.46 4.73 7.03 8.46 8.89
DM Vars 77.95 78.89 78.39 75.75 68.44 60.01 57.85 57.70 80.28 80.32 78.81 74.82 66.37 58.34 56.72 57.56
Emerging Markets eq 2.34 2.40 3.02 4.38 7.78 11.63 12.59 12.65 3.20 3.18 3.96 5.73 9.51 12.74 13.11 12.72
credit 3.52 2.45 2.08 1.99 2.31 3.08 3.48 3.54 2.19 1.53 1.35 1.49 2.21 3.48 4.21 4.34
house 2.13 1.92 2.01 2.30 2.95 3.59 3.72 3.72 1.91 1.73 1.83 2.07 2.76 3.88 4.38 4.41
ibk 2.15 4.37 4.73 5.07 5.30 4.79 4.25 4.10 2.24 3.63 4.08 4.78 5.51 5.67 5.37 5.06
gdp 2.99 2.31 2.13 2.14 2.49 3.21 3.65 3.75 3.36 2.89 2.84 2.96 3.14 3.32 3.57 3.68
EM Vars 13.12 13.44 13.96 15.88 20.82 26.30 27.68 27.76 12.89 12.96 14.07 17.02 23.13 29.08 30.64 30.22
Frontier Markets eq 0.56 0.34 0.39 0.73 1.88 3.46 3.94 3.99 0.35 0.67 0.99 1.51 2.55 3.41 3.47 3.36
credit 3.04 3.15 3.47 3.95 4.55 4.40 3.77 3.53 1.77 2.10 2.56 3.19 3.98 4.02 3.38 2.97
house 2.37 2.04 1.98 2.15 2.91 4.18 4.78 4.93 1.76 1.50 1.46 1.63 2.38 3.58 4.08 4.10
ibk 0.77 0.53 0.44 0.41 0.52 0.98 1.39 1.54 0.83 0.68 0.61 0.54 0.53 0.77 1.10 1.26
gdp 2.17 1.59 1.32 1.10 0.86 0.65 0.57 0.54 2.08 1.75 1.50 1.28 1.06 0.78 0.60 0.53
FM Vars 8.90 7.64 7.60 8.34 10.73 13.68 14.45 14.52 6.80 6.71 7.11 8.16 10.50 12.56 12.63 12.23
Oil price 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Note: Percentage of k-step ahead forecast error variance of the historical shock to the US real equity
prices. Percentages may not sum up to 100 due to covariances between shocks; they are therefore
rescaled for a better readability.
144Table C.14: Countries and regions (MSCI)
Developed Markets Developed Markets Americas Canada
United States
Developed Markets Europe Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Developed Markets Pacific Australia
Japan
Singapore
Emerging Markets Emerging Markets Americas Brazil
Emerging Markets EMEA Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Russia
South Africa
Turkey
Emerging Markets Asia China (Mainland)
India
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Thailand
FrontierMarkets FrontierMarkets Americas Argentina
FrontierMarkets CEE Bulgaria
Estonia
Latvia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Note: Based on MSCI Barra classi￿cation.
145Table C.15: Countries and regions (IMF)
Asia Paci￿c Australia BRIC Brazil
Indonesia China (Mainland)
Japan India
Korea Russia
Malaysia Eastern Europe Bulgaria
Singapore Czech Republic
Thailand Estonia
Euroland Austria Hungary
Belgium Latvia
Finland Poland
France US United States
Germany Other Developed Countries Canada
Greece Denmark
Ireland Norway
Italy Sweden
Netherlands Switzerland
Portugal United Kingdom
Slovak Republic Other Emerging Economies Argentina
Slovenia South Africa
Spain Turkey
Note: Based on classi￿cation from Galesi and Sgherri (2009).
146Table C.16: Monte Carlo results
known (initial) lag order unknown lag order
N = 10 N = 40 N = 10 N = 40
model with ￿xed mixed weights
trace max.eig. trace max.eig. trace max.eig. trace max.eig.
size 0.1050 0.1002 0.1021 0.1745 0.1437 0.1503 0.1129 0.1877
power 0.9572 0.9940 0.9861 0.9825 0.9463 0.9864 0.9656 0.9768
model with time-varying mixed weights
trace max.eig. trace max.eig. trace max.eig. trace max.eig.
size 0.0438 0.0633 0.0804 0.1791 0.1988 0.2191 0.1420 0.2372
power 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9482 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9538
model with ￿xed mixed weights and shorter sample
trace max.eig. trace max.eig. trace max.eig. trace max.eig.
size 0.1112 0.0808 0.1332 0.1638 0.1302 0.1108 0.1303 0.1671
power 0.9658 0.9144 0.9944 0.9824 0.9507 0.9039 0.9830 0.9770
model with ￿xed trade-based weights
trace max.eig. trace max.eig. trace max.eig. trace max.eig.
size 0.0916 0.0870 0.1142 0.1742 0.1168 0.1192 0.1174 0.1847
power 0.9885 0.9986 0.9931 0.9547 0.9607 0.9905 0.9785 0.9495
Note: Based on 10000 replications for subsets of 10 and 40 countries. Last four columns report results for
models in which lag order was determined by AIC in each replication.
Table C.17: Tests of structural change
Test eq cc re ir gdp d Total
Num. %
PK sup 3 6 4 4 4 0 21 10%
PK msq 3 6 4 10 7 0 30 15%
Nyblom 18 11 15 25 14 1 84 42%
robust Nyblom 16 8 9 22 13 1 69 34%
QLR 15 15 13 28 14 0 85 42%
robust QLR 8 6 6 3 7 1 31 15%
MW 13 14 12 22 16 0 77 38%
robust MW 8 4 4 8 10 1 35 17%
APW 15 13 13 29 14 0 84 42%
robust APW 8 5 5 5 9 1 33 16%
Note: Table display the number of rejections per variable and test as well as the share of rejections over
all possible cases. Tests are conducted at 5% level.
147Table C.18: Autoregressive distributed lag models
(i:j) EC LRC ARDL(p.q1.q2)
(1:2) 0:0717
(0:1789)
1:4921
(0:7273)
￿13:1036
(29:9815)
ARDL(3.0.0)
(1:3) ￿0:5900
(0:2460)
0:7267
(0:3213)
4:8394
(1:8908)
ARDL(3.0.2)
(2:1) 0:1861
(0:2585)
￿7:6282
(9:0522)
1:4897
(0:3070)
ARDL(3.0.0)
(2:3) ￿0:3277
(0:1616)
2:6938
(2:9754)
2:7533
(0:6482)
ARDL(1.0.0)
(3:1) ￿0:4600
(0:2494)
8:9167
(3:6034)
￿0:2744
(0:6518)
ARDL(3.2.2)
(3:2) ￿0:7516
(0:1464)
3:3305
(0:2450)
1:4795
(0:8933)
ARDL(3.2.0)
Note: EC denotes error-correcting term, LRC stands for long-run coe¢ cients; last column reports lag
order that is chosen according to AIC information criterion; standard errors in brackets take into account
super-consistency (T-consistency) of long-run coe¢ cients.
148C.2 Figures
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Figure C.1: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US equity with 68% con￿dence bands.
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Figure C.2: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US GDP with 68% con￿dence bands.
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Figure C.3: IRFs to a positive one standard error shock to US interest rate with 68% con￿dence
bands.
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Figure C.4: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US equity using mixed weights from
the beginning of the sample.
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Figure C.5: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US equity using mixed weights from
the middle of the sample.
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Figure C.6: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US equity using mixed weights from
the end of the sample.
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Figure C.7: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US equity using trade-based weights
from the beginning of the sample.
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Figure C.8: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US equity using trade-based weights
from the middle of the sample.
15210 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
Equity
Developed Markets
Emerging Markets
Frontier Markets
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
x 10
-3 Credit
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
Housing Market
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
x 10
-4 Interest Rate
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
x 10
-4 GDP
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
Oil price
Oil price
Figure C.9: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US equity using trade-based weights
from the end of the sample.
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Figure C.10: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US real GDP using mixed weights
from the beginning of the sample.
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Figure C.11: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US real GDP using mixed weights
from the middle of the sample.
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Figure C.12: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US real GDP using mixed weights
from the end of the sample.
15410 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Equity
Developed Markets
Emerging Markets
Frontier Markets
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
x 10
-3 Credit
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
Housing Market
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
x 10
-4 Interest Rate
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.01
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
GDP
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
Oil price
Oil price
Figure C.13: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US real GDP using trade-based
weights from the beginning of the sample.
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Figure C.14: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US real GDP using trade-based
weights from the middle of the sample.
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Figure C.15: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US real GDP using trade-based
weights from the end of the sample.
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Figure C.16: IRFs to a positive one standard error shock to US interest rate using mixed weights
from the beginning of the sample.
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Figure C.17: IRFs to a positive one standard error shock to US interest rate using mixed weights
from the middle of the sample.
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Figure C.18: IRFs to a positive one standard error shock to US interest rate using mixed weights
from the end of the sample.
15710 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.4
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Equity
Developed Markets
Emerging Markets
Frontier Markets
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
Credit
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Housing Market
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
x 10
-3 Interest Rate
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
GDP
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Oil price
Oil price
Figure C.19: IRFs to a positive one standard error shock to US interest rate using trade-based
weights from the beginning of the sample.
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Figure C.20: IRFs to a positive one standard error shock to US interest rate using trade-based
weights from the middle of the sample.
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Figure C.21: IRFs to a positive one standard error shock to US interest rate using trade-based
weights from the end of the sample.
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Figure C.22: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US equity.
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Figure C.23: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US equity.
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Figure C.24: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US real GDP.
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Figure C.25: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US real GDP.
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Figure C.26: IRFs to a positive one standard error shock to US interest rate.
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Figure C.27: IRFs to a positive one standard error shock to US interest rate.
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Figure C.28: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US equity.
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Figure C.29: IRFs to a negative one standard error shock to US real GDP.
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Figure C.30: IRFs to a positive one standard error shock to US interest rate.
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